Title

Mid Morning Concurrent Sessions: Human Factors: Human Error and Cockpit Automation: Presentation: Cognitive Processes and Challenges during Surprise on the Flight Deck

Location

San Marcos Ballroom B

Topic Area

HUMAN FACTORS

Abstract

In today’s modern aircraft, both large transport category, smaller business jets and general aviation aircraft, the majority of flight time is spent at cruise where pilot decision making is light as compared to other phases of flight. While event tempo is low and while in this supervisory mode, extra cognitive resources are available and sufficient to not only recognize changes but also understand any developing situation and re-adjust the systems as required.

However, when an initiating event occurs during higher workload phases of flight or when system failures result in conflicting or erroneous data inputs to automated systems, staying in control is far more challenging. During these times, under reduced time for reflection, the initiating or triggering event produces a type of surprise situation where flight crews must recognize that the state of control of the aircraft has changed, scan information sources, understand the changed situation, prioritize and decide on new courses of action. Incident and accident reports indicate that these events are challenging and contribute to safety risks.

A recent full-motion simulator observational study examined how experienced flight crews handle an unexpected event similar to the Air France Flight 447 event there were several ways pilots can become trapped in these assessment requirements which include; reorientation, assessment, scanning, decisive action and re-assessment. Within this framework we discuss our understanding of the risks for breakdowns within this structure: the initial delay in accommodating to the surprise event, a fragmented scan, narrow assessment, inability to commit to a course of action, and failure to re-check the new course of action is working as intended and as needed.

Start Date

16-1-2016 9:30 AM

End Date

16-1-2016 10:45 AM

Chair/Note/Host

Co-Chairs: Clint Balog, ERAU-WW; Erin Bowen, ERAU-PC

Keywords

Aviation, Human Factors, Human Error, Cockpit Automation, Aviation Technology, Aviation Safety, Airplane, Airplane Crashes, Advanced Aviation Technology, Pilot Decision Making, National Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, Accident-Precipitating Factors

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Jan 16th, 9:30 AM Jan 16th, 10:45 AM

Mid Morning Concurrent Sessions: Human Factors: Human Error and Cockpit Automation: Presentation: Cognitive Processes and Challenges during Surprise on the Flight Deck

San Marcos Ballroom B

In today’s modern aircraft, both large transport category, smaller business jets and general aviation aircraft, the majority of flight time is spent at cruise where pilot decision making is light as compared to other phases of flight. While event tempo is low and while in this supervisory mode, extra cognitive resources are available and sufficient to not only recognize changes but also understand any developing situation and re-adjust the systems as required.

However, when an initiating event occurs during higher workload phases of flight or when system failures result in conflicting or erroneous data inputs to automated systems, staying in control is far more challenging. During these times, under reduced time for reflection, the initiating or triggering event produces a type of surprise situation where flight crews must recognize that the state of control of the aircraft has changed, scan information sources, understand the changed situation, prioritize and decide on new courses of action. Incident and accident reports indicate that these events are challenging and contribute to safety risks.

A recent full-motion simulator observational study examined how experienced flight crews handle an unexpected event similar to the Air France Flight 447 event there were several ways pilots can become trapped in these assessment requirements which include; reorientation, assessment, scanning, decisive action and re-assessment. Within this framework we discuss our understanding of the risks for breakdowns within this structure: the initial delay in accommodating to the surprise event, a fragmented scan, narrow assessment, inability to commit to a course of action, and failure to re-check the new course of action is working as intended and as needed.