Attempting to Learn from History: NATO, Anti-Drug Policies, and Intelligence Assets

Editor
Abstract. This article describes some political psychological aspects of being allied with security organizations infiltrated by adversaries.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is commonly termed one of the security success stories of the 20th century. And this seems to be the case. A very strong argument can be made that NATO (a) deterred and contained political and military expansion of Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces, (b) deterred significant military and political conflict and increased cohesiveness among NATO members, and (c) even helped induce resonance for democratic and free market principles internationally.

Yet a very strong case also can be made that NATO was successfully infiltrated by Soviet and Warsaw Pact intelligence assets--formal and informal, witting, and unwitting; that classified and other sensitive plans, analyses, and information often found their way East; that agents of influence often were very influential with NATO authorities and populations; that intelligence case officers from the East often were successful in suborning human targets of opportunity and controlling them in activities to NATO's assumed detriment; and that, perhaps, too many European authorities and lesser cogs of NATO possessed a view of its "first-among-equals member," the United States (US), as excessively imperialist, materialist, crass, parvenu, and unfairly successful. This view may have nurtured significantly anti-US ideologies and predilections.

So why the NATO success story? Was NATO equally successful in infiltrating the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact? Certainly there were areas of opportunity: the broadcast warfare contrasting the daily materialist, psychological, and spiritual realities of the common citizens of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and transmitting news satisfying a need to know; the Central and Eastern European nationalist antipathies towards the Soviet Union; and the timeless individuals--some worthy of the highest respect and emulation, others worthy only of contempt--who feel they have been treated unjustly and want revenge against the real and alleged perfidies of their own system. (As to this last, NATO had its share as well.) But the conclusion may be simply that intelligence activities did not have that much to do with NATO success. Instead, a rival system collapsed under the weight of its own materialist, psychological, and spiritual contradictions.

In the post-Cold War era, one significant security enemy of the US and NATO is not an alliance of nation-states so much as a number of international organizations trafficking in the illicit and illegal, viz., psychoactive drugs. These organizations seem quite successful at suborning putative adversaries, e.g., law enforcement, customs, commerce, and foreign policy representatives of various nation-states, usually with threats of violence and with bribes of money. In fact, some nation-states--e.g., Colombia, Mexico--seem on a de facto level to be as much controlled as merely infiltrated by these organizations. And once again, US security representatives are doing battle against an enemy and sharing information, policies, programs, and plans with suspect allies. This time the infiltration is effective at an order of magnitude much higher than in the days of the East-West battles of the Cold War.
So learning from history, what is to be done? Can the anti-drug forces calmly continue with business as usual until deterrence and containment lead to the collapse of an adversary under the weight of its own contradictions once again? Hardly. This time there are profound differences. First, deterrence and containment can hardly be said to be empirically validated policies—regardless of staged media events proclaiming the latest booty from drug interdiction, the latest drug lord arrested or killed. Second, US citizens—the most financially significant consumers of psychoactive drugs worldwide—are the weakest link in the whole anti-drug effort. Much more than ever before, anti-drug representatives need to watch their fronts and backs beyond the usual lookout for the "bad apples" in their midst and the seeming stupidities from the various anti-drug operational, analytic, legislative, and policymaking types at headquarters. Third, the degree of frustration and anger at infiltration on the part of anti-drug personnel may lead to motivation and performance decrements much more than for the Cold War’s Western warriors who were dedicated to fighting the so-called forces of darkness.

As with the Cold War, however, intelligence infiltration by adversaries may not bring victory with it. In fact, there may well occur a collapse or at least a capitulation from internal contradictions. This time, however, the collapse or capitulation will be that of the US and NATO. (See Akindele, S.T. (1995.) Corruption: An analytical focus on the problems of its conceptualization. IFE Psychologia: An International Journal, 3, 55-69; Chessick, R.D. (1994.) On corruption. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 22, 377-398; Golden, T. (July 11, 1997.) Mexico and drugs: Was US napping? The New York Times, pp. 1; 10-11; Hilsman, R. (1995.) Does the CIA still have a role? Foreign Affairs, 74, 104-116; United States Committee on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. (1996.) Preparing for the 21st century: An appraisal of U.S. Intelligence. U.S. Superintendent of Documents (ISBN 0-16-048535-5.)) (Keywords: Allies, Intelligence.)