The Transfer of Military Culture to Private Sector Organizations: A Sense of Duty Emerges

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THE TRANSFER OF MILITARY CULTURE TO PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS: A SENSE OF DUTY EMERGES

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ABSTRACT

As a government institution, the United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) wields powerful influence on private sector organizations in the defense industry beyond the implications of public policy. In our conceptual research, we study the DOD as a key customer stakeholder in these organizations and investigate the influence of its military culture on these private sector organizations. By analyzing the culture of the DOD, we uncover a new dimension, sense of duty, not previously studied in mainstream organization literature. We propose that this dimension transfers from the DOD to its private sector suppliers in the defense industry via interorganizational relationships, characterized by type, strength and tenure. Finally, we review the implications of culture transference for both entities and discuss generalizability of findings beyond the setting of this study.

INTRODUCTION

“We Never Forget Who We Are Working For™.”
Lockheed Martin Company motto (2012)

The literature suggests that organizational culture differs between industries (e.g. Gordon, 1985; Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990) as well as professions and occupational communities (e.g., Barley, 1986; Bloor & Dawson, 1994; van Maanen & Barley, 1984). Some research suggests that the cultures of organizations may differ because institutions are open-systems that interact with the external environment beyond their immediate communities, an environment that includes key stakeholders in their organizations (Katz & Kahn, 1966; Schein, 2004). As such, it is likely that some stakeholders can have an effect on the development and transformation of organizations and their cultures; especially those influential stakeholders that have unique, strong, and lasting relationships with organizations outside their immediate institutional boundaries. Interestingly, despite the rich and abundant research in organizational culture, there is a large gap in the research arena on the evolution and transfer of culture, particularly as a result of stakeholder influence.
A stakeholder represents an individual or group that can affect or is affected by the actions, decisions, policies, or goals of an organization (Caroll & Buchholz, 2008). As a key stakeholder to organizations in the private sector, the United States (US) government can influence all practices, actions, policies and decisions of these organizations via the public policy process (e.g., Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004). It develops, implements, and enforces the laws and regulations that frame how private sector organizations conduct business. Yet, it is likely that the government can impact some organizations far beyond the reach of laws and regulations, spreading into the more “personal” characteristics of the firm, such as its organizational culture. Specifically, we argue that the Department of Defense (DOD), as an integral part of the US government, represents a highly influential stakeholder that can affect the culture of private sector organizations in the defense industry. With its unique and deeply embedded military culture, it influences and shapes the culture of these organizations through culture transference. This transference and the resulting implications for both the DOD and organizations in the defense industry are particularly important in today’s business climate where the boundaries between government and the private sector have begun to blur (e.g., Grimshaw et al., 2005). We propose that the main avenue in which culture transference occurs is via the intensely interconnected relationships between the two entities.

Past research on interorganizational relationships suggests that these relationships develop because a key stakeholder may perceive it has similar values to an organization in which it desires to interact (Voss et al., 2000) and that some organizations view themselves as deeply interconnected with others through dyadic bonds, subsequently leading to shared norms and values (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brickson, 2007). While this literature suggests organizations can develop strongly interconnected relationships, it does not inform us about the effect of those relationships on the transfer of organizational culture. More specifically, we are not aware of research that has investigated why and how culture transfers between organizations, or more specifically, between the DOD, as a key customer stakeholder, to organizations in the US defense industry.

In this conceptual study, we analyze the military culture of the DOD using the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) developed by O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell (1991) and create propositions regarding the DOD’s culture. We also research how cultural dimensions can transfer from the DOD to the defense organizations via interorganizational relationships. While we acknowledge that in many settings culture transference can be bidirectional, we propose this direction on which to base our initial conceptual research due to the uniqueness of the government-business relationship, the unusual environment of a “business of war” (Longnecker, 2005, p. 131) on which their relationship is built, and the highly influential nature of the DOD as customer stakeholder. Furthermore, after extensive review of the extant literature of military culture, as well as culture transference, we believe that the subject research arena is severely underrepresented in mainstream literature, but rich with new knowledge possibilities for organizational management. In our research, the organizations in the defense industry are
comprised of non-government suppliers of research, development, production, and service of military equipment and facilities. Henceforth, the terms, DOD and military will be used interchangeably.

With this backdrop, our contribution is twofold. First, we review the literature on organizational culture and US military culture and uncover a distinctive culture dimension, sense of duty, not previously identified in mainstream management research yet, as we argue, is also relevant outside the immediate boundaries of the military. We define sense of duty as the degree to which an organization feels a profound obligation and allegiance to support a mission or cause. We propose that this unique dimension that highly defines the military culture of the DOD also aids in characterizing organizations in the defense industry and is the result of culture transference. Because of its prominence in the military culture, we focus on the sense of duty as the key dimension of the DOD’s culture that transfers to the subject organizations. Second, we discuss interorganizational relationships and their effect on the transfer of culture, drawing on resource dependence theory, institutional theory and organizational behavior to develop our arguments. As shown in Figure 1, we specifically propose that the conduit for and likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty lies in the type, strength, and tenure of the relationship between the DOD and the defense industry organization. Finally, we close our discussion with implications for management and suggestions for future research.

**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Culture Transference of Sense of Duty**

**ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND THE MILITARY**

While differences exist regarding how to define culture and what dimensions make-up organizational culture, most scholars agree that culture is socially constructed, unique to an organization, and that the common elements of organizational culture include fundamental
assumptions, values, and behavioral norms and expectations (e.g., O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 2004). Scholars agree that values represent the most fundamental and defining elements of organizational culture and that those values manifest in organizational norms, rituals and ceremonies, stories, language, myths, and other cultural artifacts (Chatman & Jehn, 1994; Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Denison, 1996; Enz, 1988; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991). Thus, we define organizational culture as the widely shared and strongly held values by members of a social system (see Chatman & Jehn, 1994; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Peters & Waterman, 1982).

Gordon (1991) argues that the foundation of organizational culture is partially grounded in the organization’s assumptions about its customers. He states that an organization’s values, that is, its cultural dimensions, are born from these assumptions. Scholars have studied culture and identified cultural dimensions across and within industries such as utilities and non-defense high technology firms (Gordon 1985), private manufacturers of electronics, chemicals, and consumer products, service companies in banking, transportation, and trade, and some public institutions (e.g. telecommunications, police) (Hofstede et al. 1990), general consulting firms, public accounting firms, freight carrier firms, and the US Postal Service (Chatman & Jehn 1994), industry clusters such as basic and assembly manufacturing, telephone utilities, power utilities, banking, and insurance (Christensen & Gordon 1999), and fine arts museums and wineries (Phillips 1994). While all these studies represent a diverse cross-section of industries, it is not exhaustive, leaving open the door for some dimension(s) not yet uncovered (Hofstede et al., 1990) but highly relevant in today’s environment.

Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) and the Military

In our quest to understand the culture of the military, we use the Organizational Culture Profile (OCP) (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell 1991). It is based on the perspective that the organization’s external environment is a key determinant of its organizational culture. The OCP has been found to be robust in characterizing organizational culture within and across industries (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell 1991). Thus, it is well-suited for our research on the military culture of the DOD, as well as, our extension to the organizations in the defense industry.

The OCP defines seven key values as the foundation of organizational culture: (1) innovative cultures are opportunistic, where individuals are encouraged to take risks and experiment; (2) stable cultures emphasizes organizational growth, security of employment and predictability; (3) cultures characterized by respect for its people emphasize respect for individual rights, fairness, tolerance, and personal concern; (4) cultures characterized by a results orientation emphasize achievement and focus on results of the tasks rather than the processes, and procedures to achieve these results; (5) team oriented cultures emphasize cohesiveness, collaboration, and people-orientation where tasks are structured around teams rather than individuals; (6) attention to detail cultures encourage individuals to be analytical, precise, and
pay attention to detail; and (7) aggressiveness cultures emphasize competitiveness and aggressiveness as a key to organizational success.

its suppliers, visible through the extensive use of military metaphors by top management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study (Year)</th>
<th>Research Focus</th>
<th>Core Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apgar &amp; Keane</td>
<td>Military transformation</td>
<td>Transformation is making military needs more transparent and turning the military into a more flexible and inviting organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ault (2003)</td>
<td>Need to change US army culture</td>
<td>Culture needs to encourage risk taking and willingness to embrace uncertainty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckingham</td>
<td>The warrior ethos and culture is compared to the current society and its values</td>
<td>Army’s role is shifting from war fighting to peace keeping. Military culture and war ethos characterized by discipline, sacrifice, cohesion, strength and authority need to remain intact and resist blindly adapting to societal changes sacrificing military effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter (2006)</td>
<td>How to change army’s institutional culture to innovation culture</td>
<td>To change army culture into an innovation culture, the strategic vision needs to support change at all levels, innovative behavior needs to be embedded and rewarded by leaders and leaders need to be mentors for followers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combs (2007)</td>
<td>US army cultural obstacles to transformational leadership</td>
<td>Leadership composition, “by the book,” “by the numbers” process driven garrison and training culture, linear progression system, and current officer evaluation systems impede transformational leadership development in the military. Military culture needs to embrace innovation, imagination, adaptability, agility, intellectual and individual stimulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deavel (1998)</td>
<td>Military culture and privatization</td>
<td>Military does not operate like a private organization and hence suffers from inefficiencies, lack of commitment and willingness to change, adapt, and innovate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driessnack (2003)</td>
<td>Transforming the military culture</td>
<td>Military culture needs to be open to change; leadership needs to embrace innovation values (externally sensitive, rapid short term strategic planning, flexibility and diversity). Military needs better, faster learners, rich network of relationships. Effective leadership/strategy, processes, structures, and personnel policy, can help to speed the cultural transformation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunivin (1994)</td>
<td>Change and continuity of military culture</td>
<td>Military’s dominant paradigm of masculine-warrior conflicts with the evolving model of the military culture of equality and social change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumbus, Woodilla, &amp; York (2007)</td>
<td>Case study focused how military culture is maintained and gender issues.</td>
<td>While a case study, it is based on actual events regarding a female cadet in a military academy during a one year time period (approximately 2004-2005). It discusses whistle-blowing, organizational bullying, ethical decisions on honoring codes of conduct and the implications of fraternization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray (1999)</td>
<td>Complexities involved in military culture, and suggestions for moving American military culture in positive directions</td>
<td>The US military is threatened by its self-satisfied, intellectually stagnant culture. It needs to change slowly to integrate innovation. Services need to practice profound introspection to understand themselves, and see how different their world views are from those of their opponents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray (2003)</td>
<td>Organizational climate key to army effectiveness</td>
<td>Army culture is decaying. The army needs to develop a strong and supportive climate by making more effective use of the command climate surveys, implement 360-degree feedback for leaders at the senior tactical leadership level, and an effective officer education system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuppenau (1993)</td>
<td>Factors influencing the success of the military’s process improvement teams</td>
<td>Success of process improvement teams is decreased because military culture lacks a focus on empowerment, innovation, and tolerance for risk taking. It suffers from a rigid, short-term action, and quick-fixes numerical goal orientation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainor (2000)</td>
<td>Military values and culture; civil-military relations</td>
<td>Key military values include obedience, loyalty, integrity, duty, selflessness, hierarchy, subordination, discipline. In future, battlefield is likely to be more widely dispersed, interconnected, highly relativistic, and more reliant on individual or very small group action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson (2006)</td>
<td>Trends in U.S. military culture</td>
<td>The increasingly domestic tone of the military mission and the military’s reliance upon defense contractors to achieve its objectives has led to the erosion of the military culture.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1: Conceptual Studies on Military Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study (Year)</th>
<th>Research Focus</th>
<th>Core Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilson (2008)</td>
<td>Defining military culture as specific form of institutional culture</td>
<td>Military culture differs from other institutions because of its unique mission (internal structure and required resources), and relationship to society, state and other institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winslow (2000)</td>
<td>Literature review of army culture applying perspectives of integration (major themes, larger values, and structures) differentiation (insight into subgroups and informal groups) and fragmentation (making sense of contradictory and ambiguous fragments of culture)</td>
<td>The dialectic between the impulse to order and the chaos of warfare constitutes the heart of the army culture. The cross pull between order and chaos becomes visible in forms such as highly ritualized promotion, ceremonies and drunken initiation and hazings, rationality of tactics and the raw emotions of battle skills and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winsor (1996)</td>
<td>Military perspectives of organizations and their effects on organizational culture</td>
<td>Even though businesses recognize the shortcomings of the hierarchical, inflexible, overspecialized, dictatorial and disciplinarian features of the military culture, middle-level workers are manifesting a demand for metaphors and idols that embrace these attributes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military is a social institution with values and beliefs developed and nurtured to support the “management of violence” (Snider, 1999). These values are instilled early in the soldier’s career as part of basic training and socialization into this unique organization (Carpenter, 2006) and bonded with rituals, symbols, and heroic stories (Dunivin, 1994). While

### Table 2: Empirical Studies on Military Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study (Year)</th>
<th>Research Focus</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Reference to Culture Concepts</th>
<th>Core Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breslin (2000)</td>
<td>Social and environmental influences on change in the military’s organizational culture</td>
<td>Empirical: n= 211 army war college students and 680 company grade officers (captains and lieutenants) serving in operations units</td>
<td>Traditional values, discipline (authority), organizational honesty/openness, channels, commissioned officer leaders, climate/teamwork/morale, mutual trust, evaluation/promotion, resource/personnel availability, family balance/support, pay/allowances, racial/gender issues, societal comparison</td>
<td>All groups expressed pride in military service, willingness to sacrifice self for the mission, respect for civilian society and race and gender initiatives in the military. War fighting is still core mission of the military. Both groups perceive low balance between career and family, low levels of trust, and poor leadership, morale (poorly defined missions, shortage of personnel and resources etc.), and quality of military life. Senior leaders seemed out of touch with conditions of their units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soeters &amp; Boer (2000)</td>
<td>Organizational culture and flight safety in military aviation (Air Force)</td>
<td>Empirical: secondary data</td>
<td>Focuses on Hofstede’s (1984, 1991) cultural values of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance</td>
<td>The authors found relatively less accidents in individualistic (organizational) cultures. The authors found relatively more accidents in uncertainty avoidant and higher power distance cultures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the military culture is recognized and studied within the armed forces and by military sociologists (e.g., Breslin, 2000; Buckingham, 1999; Carpenter, 2006; Coates & Peligrin, 1965; Rhoads, 2005; Riccio et al., 2004), it has received limited attention outside these areas regardless of its relevance and extension beyond the immediate military setting. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the extant conceptual and empirical research, respectively, that focuses on military culture relevant to this study. One of the few studies in mainstream literature that highlights the application of military culture outside the federal government community is Longnecker’s (2005) study on the use of war metaphors in the top management team of a defense organization. Her research is particularly useful in highlighting the transference of “war culture” elements between the DOD and

Table 3 recaps each OCP dimension and its presence in the military culture and detailed as follows. First, research indicates that relative to organizational cultures in the US private sector, the culture of the military is not known to emphasize and encourage innovation. The military is highly structured and controlling, and embraces strict rank hierarchies (Collins, 1998; Janowitz, 1959) with the goal to “minimize the uncertainty of the battlefield.” (Ault, 2003, p. 6). In fact, there have been recent calls from within the DOD for a more innovative military culture (Rumsfeld, 2002) and an increased tolerance for uncertainty (Ault, 2003). Second, stability within the military is less pronounced because the environment is characterized by fluctuating DOD budgets and tenuous congressional approval for budgets and activities (Augustine, 1983). These uncertainties result in constant adjustments to military assignments and force build-up and reductions, and contribute to an overall sense of instability. Third, studies indicate that the military culture is generally characterized by a limited respect for the individual needs of its personnel relative to private industry. In fact, many individual freedoms are restricted; individual rights are considered secondary to the needs of society and country (Janowitz, 1959). Surveys of military personnel indicate a discontent with respect to basic rights of pay, allowances, and career-family life balance (Breslin, 2000). In recent years, the US military is seen as slowly advancing towards a more tolerant culture with a stronger concern for member needs (e.g. Collins, 1998; Hillen, 1999; Snider, 1999). Fourth, research indicates that strong cultures, such as that of the military, are typically results-oriented (Hofstede et al., 1990; Peters & Waterman, 1982) although one could argue that the military culture is also highly process-oriented as indicated by the need to follow strict procedures (Collins, 1998). Fifth, the cultural value of teamwork is salient in the military as unit cohesion and teamwork in the severest of circumstances, respect for comrades and loyalty to the group (Collins, 1998; Moskos, 1976; Segal & Segal, 1983; Snider, 1999). Reliable and error free performance in a team environment is required; otherwise catastrophes may occur (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Sixth, the military culture can be defined as detail oriented. For example, the highly intensive and complicated technologies of weaponry and military systems require an inordinate amount of detail and precision to work effectively under the severest of circumstances and prevent injury or death in military training, during development, manufacturing, and testing of products. Seventh, the
military culture can be characterized as aggressive and competitive. It is “an organized system of activity directed at the achievement of certain goals...for carrying on aggression against other societies, protecting the society against aggression by others, and providing the means for maintaining domestic order and control” (Coates & Pelligrin, 1965, p. 10).

Table 3: OCP and the US Military Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Descriptor</th>
<th>US DOD Military Culture (Relative to Private Sector)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>Opportunistic, risk taking, experimenting, innovative</td>
<td>Historically, a low tolerance for uncertainty and risk-taking. Recent calls for more risk taking and innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Rule oriented, stability, predictability, security of employment</td>
<td>Fluctuations in government spending and constantly changing military assignments reduce stability and predictability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for it people</td>
<td>Respect for individual rights, fairness, tolerance, and personal concern</td>
<td>Individual rights secondary to needs of society and country; more recently advancing toward higher level of tolerance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result/outcome orientation</td>
<td>Achievement oriented, action oriented, high expectations, results oriented</td>
<td>Strong culture towards achievements and results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team orientation</td>
<td>Cohesiveness, collaboration, and people/team-oriented</td>
<td>Military requires unit cohesion and teamwork in the severest of circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to detail</td>
<td>Analytical, precise, and attention to detail</td>
<td>Weaponry and military systems require detail and precision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressiveness</td>
<td>Aggressive, competitive</td>
<td>Essential for “management of violence”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we examined the military culture using the seven value dimensions of the OCP, we noticed that these dimensions do not address one of the most important value dimensions that characterizes the military and distinguishes it from many other institutions. None of the seven value dimensions address the key military culture dimension that is based on the preservation of life and society and is deeply-rooted in the military ethos (e.g., Breslin, 2000; Buckingham, 1999; Riccio et al., 2004), transcends all branches of the military, serves to distinguish the military from many other organizations, and remains constant and unwavering despite other changes internal and external to the DOD (e.g., Buckingham, 1999; Trainor, 2000). As aforementioned, we term this value dimension, sense of duty, and define it as the degree to which an organization feels a profound obligation and allegiance to support a mission or cause. This definition is based on an integration of the military culture descriptions in literature and dictionary word definitions for duty and allegiance. The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary) defines duty as “obligatory tasks, conduct, service, or functions that arise from one’s position (as in life or in a group)” (merriam-webster.com/dictionary/duty) while allegiance is defined as “devotion or loyalty to a person, group, or cause.” (merriam-webster.com/dictionary/allegiance). Thus, our definition encompasses obligation, allegiance, devotion, and loyalty to a cause or mission.

Sense of duty, which embraces values of integrity, subordination, unbending obedience, fervent loyalty, duty, selflessness and strict discipline (Trainor, 2000), makes up a “set of normative self-understandings for which the members define the profession’s corporate identity, code of conduct, and social worth” (Snider 1999). It is the integral and innermost component of
the military culture which emphasizes honor and commitment to duty, unconditional service and allegiance to the nation, achievement of the greater good to the sacrifice of self, and unqualified authority to those in command (Breslin, 2000; Riccio et al., 2004). It includes attitudes and behavior of what is considered right, good, and important (Breslin, 2000).

It is critical to understand that sense of duty is distinct from organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) which is defined as “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (Organ, 1988, p. 4). OCB dimensions include, for example, altruism, conscientiousness, sportsmanship, and courtesy (Farh, Zhong, & Organ 2004). On the other hand, sense of duty is an organizational value that is based on preservation of life and society, allegiance, and the goal of the greater good as opposed to self. It is linked to Kantian good will "governed by duty" as stated in Awal et al. 2006. It is formally recognized by the DOD in their reward system in terms of rank promotions and military assignments, as well as meritorious rewards for distinguished service, duty, and valor.

The military, characterized by a high sense of duty, is selflessly committed to and will loyally pursue the mission or cause with focus, obedience, diligence and discipline. It is obvious that the uniqueness and breadth of the military culture that fills the DOD are not fully captured by the seven value dimensions included in the OCP or by comparable research in the field (cf, Denison, 1996; Hofstede et al., 1990, Rousseau, 1990). Hence we suggest,

\[ P1 \] The organizational culture of the DOD can be characterized by eight dimensions: Sense of Duty, Innovation, Stability, Respect for People, Results Orientation, Teamwork, Attention to Detail, and Aggressiveness.

THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CULTURE TRANSFERENCE

Recognizing that a sense of duty permeates the military culture, the task at hand is to determine the theoretical foundation in which this unique cultural dimension can transfer from DOD to private-sector defense organization. As key customer of defense services and products, the DOD has an especially important stake in organizations in the defense industry. On the other hand, the strategic importance of stakeholders to an organization is determined by the contributions of the stakeholder to the environmental uncertainty facing the organization, the ability of the stakeholder to reduce environmental uncertainty for the organization, and the organization’s strategic choice (Harrison & St. John, 1996). Organizations in the defense industry make the strategic choice to concentrate their enterprise on one key customer, the DOD. Therefore, the military – being the single largest customer for defense related services and products - contributes to and can reduce the environmental uncertainty of organizations from the defense industry. Likewise, defense organizations reduce the uncertainty for the DOD in their steady supply of military weaponry.
Harrison and St. John (1996) suggest that partnering tactics help organizations to reduce this uncertainty by developing strong, stable and enduring relationships with strategically important stakeholders. Because of the DOD’s unique position as the nation’s key protector of security and peace, it represents a unique customer stakeholder who will seek to develop and control the relationships with defense organizations. As the DOD develops these relationships, it influences the operation and culture of those organizations. Specifically, the deeply-rooted, core cultural values, such as the sense of duty, will affect interactions and transactions between the DOD and its suppliers and find their way into the culture of those organizations.

In explaining the transference of organizational culture, and, more specifically, sense of duty, we begin by discussing generalized theories and relevant literatures and their respective arguments as to why and how this phenomenon can occur. We then turn our focus to the phenomenon studied under the military-defense organization context, its implications for the new proposed cultural dimension, and finally propositions of culture transference based on attributes of the interorganizational relationship between the two entities.

Resource Dependence Theory

Resource dependence theory suggests that all organizations (public and private) are influenced by and depend on resources for survival. Contingent on the degree of resource dependence, organizations strive to control these resources, thereby reducing their dependence on and uncertainty with regard to those critical resources while increasing their power and control (e.g., Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002; Pfeffer, 1982). Control of resource dependencies produces outcomes of increased chance of survival, improved autonomy and increased freedom from external influences (Pfeffer, 1982). Resource dependence theory recognizes the interdependence between stakeholder and organization and the desire for each party in the relationship to reduce dependence and uncertainty.

Resource dependence theory offers several explanations for the transference of organizational culture from customer stakeholder to organization. First, an organization will voluntarily alter its structure and behavior patterns to acquire and maintain needed, external resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ulrich & Barney, 1984). This indicates that organizations may be open to influence and willingly adapt their cultures when it proves advantageous to increasing access to valuable resources controlled by a key stakeholder, such as a major customer. Second, dependence and resource scarcity may induce cooperation between stakeholder and organization rather than “arm’s length” transactions and competitiveness. As customers provide the revenue for the sustainability and the success of profit-seeking organizations, they hold a special position among the organizations’ stakeholders. Because these organizations are dependent on customers, customers have power to affect the organization (Berman et al., 1999). In lieu of power and control attempts over those customer stakeholders, organizations may resort to cooperation and build unique, not-easily imitated, and strong...
relationships with those key stakeholders that can provide scarce resources (funding, purchase of goods, etc.). These unique and strong relationships are more likely to lead to the transfer of organizational culture or cultural dimensions from stakeholder to organization. Third, outside of cooperative interorganizational relationships, strong stakeholders can use powerful tactics from their position in the environment to promote their value system, seeking to control resources through culture transference, particularly among organizations on which they are highly dependent.

**Institutional Theory**

Institutional theory has generally focused on external groups (Hirsch 1972), and the mimetic, coercive and normative practices that lead to homogeneity in the form and behavior of organizations within the same organizational field. An organizational field includes “organizations that, at the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 148). The principle of isomorphism states that variation in organizations is “isomorphic” to the variation in the environment (Hannan & Freeman 1977; Hawley 1968). Specifically, mimetic isomorphism develops from organizations mimicking others in their field, seeking enhanced legitimacy, which is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p.574). Conversely, organizations may also become isomorphic to the environment and legitimized via coercion, such as that which may occur as a result of environmental (government) regulation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or in response to the dictations and influences of strong stakeholders in their environment. Once legitimized, firms have easier access to resources and increase their chances for survival (Delacroix & Rao, 1994).

Both types of isomorphism can lead to culture transfer and, ultimately, homogeneity in organizational culture between stakeholder and organization. In the process of adhering and conforming to the rules and norms of their institutional environment, organizations become instilled with values and social meaning compatibility with the characteristics of their environments and its stakeholders (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

**Organizational Behavior Theory**

Schein (2004) explains that culture is socially constructed as founders surround themselves with people who share their values. Organizations attract and select individuals for employment who are perceived to have similar values to those of the organization and who fit the culture of the organization (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Schneider, 1987). The fit or congruence between individual and organizational values and culture benefits the organization
and promotes performance and long-term sustainability (see Kristof, 1996; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991).

Adapting this argument to the organizational level, value congruence between two organizations that are highly interrelated and co-dependent should benefit both organizations and promote their performance and long-term sustainability. Therefore, stakeholder organizations may choose to build stronger relationships with organizations that share the same values and culture or have the potential for changing their culture to match that of the stakeholders in order to maximize organization-to-organization fit. Greater fit may increase the ability of the stakeholder organization to influence the organization to meet its requirements and needs. On the other hand, the organization may be more successful if its culture and sense of reality matches the demands and needs of its key stakeholders. Research supports that organizations and the content of their cultures need to fit their environments and stakeholders; cultural patterns need to mirror environmental challenges (e.g. Kotter & Heskett, 1992). Voss et al. (2000) identified that organizations build relationships with other organizations that share similar values and that these relationships, characterized by value congruence, serve to reduce complexity and increase resource flow.

CULTURE TRANSFERENCE OF SENSE OF DUTY

The theories outlined above provide a foundation for why and how culture transference can occur between stakeholders and organizations, but do not address the specific mechanism in the interorganizational relationship that functions as a conduit for our proposed eighth dimension, sense of duty, to move between the organizations, specifically from the DOD, a customer stakeholder, to defense organizations. As depicted in Figure 1, we believe that the path for and likelihood of culture transference lie in the type, strength, and tenure of the relationship between the military stakeholder and defense organizations. More specifically, we propose that one, two, or all three attributes can increase the likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty.

Type of Relationship

Interorganizational relationships can be thought of as lying on a continuum anchored by non-cooperative arm’s length transactions on one end and cooperative networks, partnerships, and alliances on the other (Gulati, 1995). These relationships are often explored by the advantages they bring to both organizations in a dyadic relationship or to the organizations within a network (e.g., Dyer, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Kogut, 1988; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The established relationship between stakeholder and organization can take on multiple characteristics drawn from different points on this continuum ranging from coercive (non-
negotiable contractual requirements, government laws, and the like) to cooperative and social relationships.

Using the core cultural dimension of the DOD, sense of duty, we argue that the customer stakeholder and its requirements for national defense products generate a strong sense of duty in the organizations in the US defense industry. The transfer and emergence of the dimension is a result of (a) coercion through non-negotiable contractual requirements and dictations of law (public policy) and (b) collaborations and social relationships that develop between the military stakeholder and defense organization.

Coercive Relationships

Institutional theory refers to isomorphism as a process that “forces one unit in a population to resemble other units” in its organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p.149). Coercive isomorphism is the result of formal and informal pressures such as environmental regulations and enforcement of important values imposed on one organization by another organization (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). As organizations adapt to these formal and informal isomorphic pressures, they will become more similar to those organizations that exercise pressure. For example, defense organizations are required by law to provide annual security training, security briefings, and individual employee security certifications, as well as determine the level of security clearance needed for all employees in order for them to perform their immediate tasks on the military program.

Resource dependence theory states that depending on the level of resource dependence, an organization will seek to exercise control over resources and use its power to secure those scarce resources (Mizruchi & Yoo, 2002; Pfefzer, 1982). This suggests powerful stakeholders, such as the DOD, have the ability to control and influence defense industry organizations. As the single most important customer, they control important resources, i.e., revenues that are important to the organizations’ sustainability. Berman et al. (1999) identified that customers hold a key position among other stakeholders and affect an organization’s strategy. Stakeholders may use tactics grounded in their position in the environment to secure access to important resources. These tactics may include coercive pressures that lead to the transfer of cultural values from stakeholder to defense organizations.

The relationship between the DOD and the organizations in the defense industry can be partially described as coercive. As necessitated by the government rules, laws and procedures, defense organizations implement tight US security controls in facilities, processes and procedures, to protect US classified (i.e. Confidential, Secret, Top Secret) information, hardware, and software from “landing in the wrong hands.” Furthermore, inappropriate employee conduct or lax discipline with respect to classified information may result in a number of punishments by the organization depending on severity of infraction: time off, job loss, and, possibly, federal penalty (Tinoco, 2005). Thus, organizational use and protection of classified data and the
resulting development of national defense systems elicit a strong sense of duty in the organization.

The DOD manages and controls the suppliers of military products and services in a similar fashion as they control their soldiers, implicitly expecting and requiring discipline, military ethos, cohesion, and loyalty. They often direct their suppliers to implement similar management and control techniques in their organizations as a result of the highly unique requirements of the customer and the product (Tinoco, 2005). Compliance to copious military standards, processes, procedures, and regulations for product design, development, and test, as well as program management, financial reporting, and program planning, among other areas, are contractual requirements (Augustine, 1983) that necessitate military-like discipline and a sense of duty to implement. Note that we do not argue that all coercive elements will result in a culture shift, but we propose that coercive elements that are tightly associated with a sense of duty will. Thus, we posit:

P2  As the influence of a sense of duty increases via coercive relationships between the DOD and the defense industry organization, the likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty increases from the DOD to the defense industry organization.

Cooperative and Social Relationships

Resource dependence theory suggests that as an alternative to seeking power and control, organizations may resort to cooperation and build unique relationships with those organizations that are needed for key and scarce resources. As stakeholders, such as the DOD, recognize their resource dependence on key organizations, they may become more cooperative and interact voluntarily with their suppliers and build cohesive relationships instilling their values into the culture of those organizations.

The unique relationship between the DOD and defense organizations is becoming more intertwined as the DOD turns to outsourcing many key military functions. Military activity and operations in more recent years has resulted in a substantial increase in the DOD’s reliance on non-military entities to achieve military objectives (Lovelace, 1997; Watson, 2006). “During ... Operation Desert Storm, 9,200 contractors were deployed to support military operations in the Middle East...by 1999, some military observers were expressing sentiments like, ‘Never has there been such a reliance on non-military members to accomplish tasks directly affecting the tactical success of an engagement.’ ” (Watson, 2006, p. 10-11).

Longnecker (2005) found that the nature of the work by a defense contractor for the DOD meant “they worked with warriors in warlike situations” (p.131). She identified a need by the top management team to maintain an organizational culture that was directed toward and included values of war and military life. Defense organizations are actively performing tasks formerly
restricted to military personnel, such as maintaining weapons systems, “piloting” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), collecting and analyzing intelligence, and interrogating prisoners (Watson, 2006). Not only are these organizations increasingly embedded within the DOD, but there is also constant military presence in the defense organization’s facilities and an on-going interchange of personnel between facilities during the design, development, test, and production of the military product. For the past 20 years, the US government has encouraged government-industry collaborations and cooperative assistance where typically personnel are traded between facilities to increase interactions (Linton et al., 2001). These increasingly cooperative interactions in an environment highly characterized by warfare trigger a culture transfer from stakeholder to defense organization(s), particularly with regard to sense of duty. Thus, we posit that

\[ P3 \quad \text{As the influence of a sense of duty increases via cooperative relationships between the DOD and defense organization, the likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty increases from the DOD to the defense organization.} \]

Research indicates that interacting organizations become more homogeneous as the interactions between partners leads to the diffusion of cultural norms, behavioral expectations and values (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As organizations develop close, social relationships, patterns of interactions may emerge that lead to the transfer of important values and norms from DOD to defense organization. These interactions include the sharing of valuable and often “secret” information, as well as institutional values and norms.

Organizational behavior research further supports this argument. As stated earlier, the person-organization fit literature suggests that when individuals’ values are congruent with those of the organization, organizational performance improves (e.g. Kristof, 1996). Raising this position to the organization level, organization-organization fit would mean that value congruence between two interrelated and co-dependent organizations, such as the DOD and defense organizations, should improve the performance of those organizations. As the social relationship between these organizations develops and deepens, it is likely that “organization-organization” value congruence emerges. Finally, institutional theory explains that mimetic processes lead organizations to model themselves after other organizations. This is the result of environmental uncertainty. Mimetic processes will be most effective when organizations have correct and in depth information about the organizations that they intend to mimic. This is most likely the case when information is shared on a continuous and consistent basis and where organizational processes and procedures are readily observed as in the case where organizations have developed a strong social relationship.

As stated earlier, interactions between the DOD and organizations in the defense industry are ever-increasing as a result of a growing interdependence and interaction. Social relationships
between the DOD and its suppliers easily develop under the stressful and pressing conditions of war where defense organizations absorb the profound sense of duty as they work side-by-side with the military. Additionally, upon retirement a significant number of military personnel obtain civilian positions with private-sector defense organizations (Lieberson, 1971; Schoenberger, 1997). Clearly, these new members bring deeply entrenched sense of duty with them, along with strong social ties back to the government institution. These social ties act as a bridge between the DOD and the defense organization that allows entrance into and hiring of additional ex-military personnel by a defense organization. This further deepens the social and cultural interconnectedness between the two entities. Since member demographics highly influence culture (Hofstede et al., 1990), the cultural effect of the ex-military employees on a defense organization grows with each new member. Moreover, the influx of ex-military into a defense organization can increase a sense of cooperation between parties with similar values such as the sense of duty.

P4 As the influence of a sense of duty increases via social relationships between the DOD and defense organization, the likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty increases from the DOD and the defense organization.

Strength of Relationship

Relationship strength is defined as the extent or degree of closeness or strength of the relationship between two organizations. It can differ within a single relationship type and may be higher in vertical integration and cooperative relationships than in arm’s length transactions or coercive relationships (Golicic et al., 2003).

The strength of the relationship between the DOD and a defense organization can be evaluated in terms of the positions of the customer and supplier within an enduring and unique market structure. In the case of the DOD and defense organizations, the market structure is characterized by a strong oligopoly on the supply side (two dominant defense organizations) and a powerful, rich monopsony on the demand side, the government (e.g., Adams & Adams, 1972; Tinoco, 2010) For the defense organizations, US military contracts can be quite lucrative. In addition, new entrants are precluded or limited from entering the industry due to high entry barriers with intense capital requirements and a possible inability of those entrants to fit with the values of the organizational field.

Despite the profit potential of US military contracts, defense organizations have one, powerful, demanding customer in the DOD (e.g. Adams & Adams, 1972; Tinoco, 2010). Resource dependence theory suggests that such a market structure creates significant resource interdependencies and, in turn, will likely result in the development of strong, lasting relationships. The fit between the values, such as the sense of duty, between the DOD and
defense organizations reinforces their relationship further and improves the performance of their relationship.

Although resource dependence theory suggests that organizations strive to increase power and control over limited resources (Pfeffer, 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), an alternative for gaining control and power is the development of strong relationships with those organizations critical for survival. This is especially applicable to an organizational field where the number of major organizational participants is small. More directly, the DOD can exercise its power by seeking to develop strong relationships with defense organizations by way of immersing its cultural values such as the sense of duty into those defense organizations.

Furthermore, it is likely that powerful customer stakeholders will engage in transactions with organizations that fit their needs, requirements, and view of reality. It is likely that value congruence between organizations such as stakeholder and defense organization(s) will increase the commitment of those organizations to the relationship. This will lead to the development of stronger, lasting relationships between those organizations. For example, since value congruence is a key factor in the development of interorganizational relationships (Voss et al., 2000), its presence increases organization-organization fit, leading to decreased uncertainty and reduced complexity while increasing resource flow for both organizations. When key stakeholders have significant control over other organizations in an organizational field, greater value fit may increase the ability of stakeholders to influence the values and cultures of defense organization(s).

Interdependence and the strength of the relationship are further augmented as a result of the needs and demands of war. As aforementioned, the DOD is increasing its reliance on defense contractors, far beyond the levels seen in the past. Exchanges between the military and defense organizations have emerged to such high levels of strength and efficiency that they are no longer substitutable by any other structural form. For example, military observers state that deployment is no longer possible without defense contractors (Watson, 2006). This growing need for non-military involvement in military actions stirs a strong sense of duty in defense organizations and the industry itself, as organizations “stand ready to help keep or restore the peace anywhere it is needed” (Sizemore, 2006). As such, we posit:

**P5** As the relationship between the DOD and the defense organization strengthens, the likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty from DOD to defense organization increases.

**Tenure of the Relationship**

Over time organizations learn from their environments and stakeholders. The longer an organization has a relationship with a key influential stakeholder, the more likely the organization adopts important cultural values of that stakeholder. Jones and colleagues (1997)
explain that frequently recurring transactions between organizations over extended periods of time will lead to relational and structural embeddedness of norms and values across those organizations. For example, transacting organizations will develop shared perceptions of destiny, purpose, and mutual interests. Therefore, as the recurrence and frequency of interactions between the DOD and defense organizations extend over longer periods of time, it is likely that the defense organizations will learn and adapt important values such as the sense of duty, from the DOD. The adoption of those values and norms from will further cement the interorganizational relationship and increase culture homogeneity between those organizations.

Institutional theory suggests that organizations become more homogeneous across an organizational field and learn to depend more on organizations in the same field over time as they interact with organizations across the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This suggests that cultural homogeneity is a long-term process. Over time, organizations, such as those from the defense industry, are likely to adhere and conform to the rules and norms of their key stakeholder, such as the DOD. As part of this process, the values and social meanings that characterize the DOD are likely to be embedded in the defense organizations.

These arguments support that highly interconnected organizations develop relational channels of continuous interaction, communication and cooperation which leads to the emergence of shared beliefs and values. The US military and the organizations in the defense industry have had a long, enduring, and unique relationship since the middle of the last century; so much so that President Dwight D. Eisenhower coined the term, military-industrial complex, to capture the essence of this relationship (Eisenhower, 1961). The multiple and continuous interactions that have occurred over the years between the DOD and defense organizations have built a strong pathway from which sense of duty can be transferred. Whether the interactions have occurred based on arm’s length transactions, collaborations, alliances, or strong social ties, we propose the tenure of this relationship contributes to culture transference of sense of duty:

\[ P6 \quad \text{As the relationship between the DOD and defense organization ages, the likelihood of culture transference of sense of duty increases from the DOD to the defense organization.} \]

**DISCUSSION**

Our conceptual study on the transference of organizational culture was taken from the perspective of the DOD as a key stakeholder in the “business of war.” In doing so, we first analyzed the military culture of the DOD using the widely used and methodologically sound OCP and then uncovered a distinctive culture dimension, sense of duty, not previously identified in mainstream organizational culture research. We are not aware of any studies to-date that adequately address this cultural dimension that is so deeply associated with a sense of obligation.
and allegiance to a cause and so profoundly ingrained and irrefutably a significant part of organizational culture.

This dimension of organizational culture, the sense of duty, has significant implications for the government and private sector organizations. In recent years, the government has turned more and more to government-private sector partnerships for co-development and implementation of products and services, as well as, to outsourcing of formerly key government tasks and activities. The increase in government outsourcing of core and peripheral government competencies to private contractors has prompted critics to refer to these private organizations as the “shadow government” (e.g. Goldstein, 1992; Light, 2008). With this more recent change in the manner in which the government functions, public-private boundaries are blurring and certain elements of culture can transfer more easily between entities to the benefit of both parties. By instilling a sense of duty in its contractors, the DOD may reap the fruits of a uniquely shared cultural value that leads to better understanding between parties as to the goals and objectives of the relationship. Sharing the sense of duty between DOD and defense organizations is likely to increase the effectiveness of both organizations during times of war and reduces interorganizational conflicts as a result of a shared allegiance to the mission.

Through the conduit of the interorganizational relationship and its attributes of type, strength and tenure, we proposed that sense of duty transfers from DOD to defense organization. More specifically, we suggest that three different types of relationships, that is, coercive, cooperative or social, increase the likelihood of culture transference. Furthermore, the strength and tenure of the relationship are additional characteristics that can explain the transference of culture. As culture transfers from DOD to defense organizations, the industry as a whole takes on important homogeneous cultural value dimensions, aiding to create a united “military industrial complex.”

Our research, while conceptual in nature, is based on informal discussions, observations, and interviews with military personnel and employees in defense organizations, as well as extensive literature reviews in military organizational management, military sociology, and mainstream management research. For the organizations in the defense industry, the sense of duty characterizes a core element of their identity and transcends the other cultural dimensions. This identity permeates throughout the organization, instills a strong sense of duty and patriotic pride, and focuses work toward the greater mission at hand. It is often apparent in the vision statement of defense organizations, such as that of Northrop Grumman, which operates under the vision: “...is to be the most trusted provider of systems and technologies that ensure the security and freedom of our nation and its allies. As the technology leader, we will define the future of defense—from undersea to outer space, and in cyberspace."

On a more general note and from the perspective of management, analyzing and understanding the nature of the relationships between two or more organizations and the effect this relationship has on organizational culture can help managers to look beyond their immediate organizational boundaries. Schein (2004) suggests that organizations need to develop learning
cultures characterized by a commitment to systemic thinking. As the world becomes more complex and interdependent, managers need to be able to think systematically and analyze the forces that affect organizational culture (Schein, 2004). Considering the effect of external environmental forces such as stakeholder influences on the emergence and change of organizational culture may present new opportunities and/or challenges to managers. For example, it may reveal that certain dimensions of the organization’s culture cannot be easily controlled or changed and may represent “a fact of the organization’s life,” based on the influence of external stakeholders. While this may pose a threat to managers who now recognize the need to manage this relationship and associated influence carefully, it could serve as an advantage. Analyzing and understanding the relationship process and the stakeholder influences on one’s culture may lead to the development of more productive relationships with key stakeholders based on a high degree of organization-to-organization fit. Also, managers who understand the scope and depth of their organization’s culture and how it is influenced by external stakeholders are more likely to engage in recruitment and selection that will result in better employee-organization fit which in turn leads to stronger commitment, less turnover and ultimately higher organizational performance (O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991).

Understanding the dynamics of stakeholder-organization relationships and the key cultural dimensions that define the various stakeholders should result in improved understanding, communication and coordination with those stakeholders. It may present a benefit for managers who identify key stakeholders and know that the development and maintenance of key stakeholder relationship resides in the ability to develop a cultural fit between their organizations’ cultures. This seems to be especially important before organizations engage in mergers, acquisitions, alliances or joint ventures or organizational fields with limited numbers of participants. Overall, managers who understand their own organizational cultures and those of their stakeholders are able to manage interactions and relationships with those stakeholders more effectively. They can address the needs of those stakeholders and reduce conflict by developing cohesive working relationships.

Future Research Opportunities

Rousseau (1990) explains that cultural dimensions are unique to organizations and that research needs to focus on the identification of dimensions and categories that have not been uncovered before. Many empirical studies of organizational culture apply a priori assessments of culture, yet research on organizational culture should begin with theory and analysis to identify relevant dimensions of organizational culture that apply to specific institutions and organizations. Without this kind of initial investigation, empirical research may lead to the omission of important culture dimensions and possible misspecification of organizational culture. In return, this could lead to erroneous conclusions or the neglect of important attributes of culture that affect organization performance as well as employee behavior and attitudes. Thus, we hope to...
encourage other researchers to study organizations and organizational field first through observation and conceptual analysis before engaging in empirical research studying the effect of culture on other organization-specific variables and relationships.

Our research will be enriched by development of a measurement scale for sense of duty and by empirically testing the propositions developed in this study on culture transference. The sense of duty dimension, as born out of the military culture of the DOD, is directly related to the preservation of the US way of life, lives of US soldiers, and the safety of US citizens. A similar sense of duty may be found in organizations that share a profound obligation and allegiance to support a mission or cause, such as hospitals, public service organizations, and many non-profit organizations, such as the Red Cross and Habitat for Humanity. These organizations are characterized by a strong sense of duty, the duty to improve and save lives. They are likely to employ individuals who are selflessly committed to the cause and will pursue the cause with focus, obedience, diligence and discipline. As sense of duty permeates the organization, employees in these organizations feel honor in their duty and go above and beyond out of commitment to the cause. We encourage researchers to study conceptually and empirically the sense of duty as a key dimension of organizational culture generalizable beyond our context.

We acknowledge that the direction in which elements of culture flow between organizations should be addressed and why. We believe that the characteristics of the stakeholder in terms of power and influence are key drivers in the direction of the culture transfer. However, the characteristics of the changing organization should be considered as well. For example, if the organization is characterized by a weak culture, transfer of organizational culture dimensions should logically flow from the stronger culture to the weaker culture.

Because we believe that sense of duty is such an important element of organizational culture in many industries, it is likely that it will impact organizational outcomes such as the effective and efficient flow of information and resources across organizational functions, improved coordination and cooperation across the organization while reducing conflict as well as general performance and productivity of the organization. Employees who fit these cultures and share this sense of duty are likely to demonstrate higher commitment to the organization and its goals, increased citizenship behaviors and reduced turnover and absenteeism. While this extends beyond the scope of this paper, it represents an interesting avenue for future research.

While we focus on the relationship between the customer stakeholder and organizations across a specific industry, it is reasonable to assume that this may transcend to other interorganizational relationships. For example, research on interorganizational relationships recognizes that organizational sustainability and performance depends on the relationships organizations develop with other organizations (e.g. Neville & Menguc 2006; Oliver 1990). Shared values are a key factor in the development and maintenance of relationships between stakeholders (Ranson et al., 1980; Wilson, 1995). For example, Voss et al. (2000) studied nonprofit professional theaters and found that organizations seek to build relationships with other stakeholders that share their values and that value congruence is likely to improve the relational
performance of stakeholders including resource sharing and financial performance. However, this research does not extend to the emergence of shared organizational cultures, which is likely to develop as a result of those close interorganizational relationships grounded in interorganizational value congruence. Future research should investigate, in more depth, how interorganizational relationships affect the emergence and change of organizational cultures and how organization-to-organization fit may lead to sustainable competitive advantages. This may be particularly interesting for large conglomerates, such as General Electric Company and United Technologies Corporation, who operate globally and across multiple industries. Further conceptual and empirical research is needed to study how multiple stakeholders and organizations interact to lead to the emergence of cultures across organization fields in general.

CONCLUSION

As a key stakeholder, the government can influence private sector business practices, actions, policies, and decisions, as well as their organizational cultures. As the federal government increasingly outsources core competencies and services and develops more public-private partnerships in order to function, both entities needs to understand the subsequent blurring of organizational boundaries and its implications. The cultural dimension of sense of duty, so visible in the DOD and equally present in defense organizations, creates a unique and lasting bond between government and industry, dating back to World War II, that appears even today, unwavering and withstanding the tests of time. Recalling the Lockheed Martin Company’s driving motto, defense organizations with their sense of duty and patriotic zeal, never forget who they work for.

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