10-10-1997

Trends. Motivations of Espionage: Spying on the Wisconsin 3

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp

Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation

Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol3/iss11/5

This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.
Two men and a woman have been charged in an affidavit by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with spying against the government of the United States of America since they were students during the 1970s at the University of Wisconsin. According to the New York Times correspondent reporting the story, "...the case is highly unusual in the recent annals of American espionage, in that the defendants appear to have been motivated by ideology than by money".

However, at least since Harold Lasswell's classic Psychopathology and Politics, one can strongly make the case that one's political ideology is but an intrapsychic compromise, a distorted expression of unconscious conflict. Taking off from Shakespeare's Macbeth, one can surmise that the tale told by an idiot and the strutting and fretting upon the stage may be stridently histrionic but merely a ghost of the fires down below.

In fact, there can be many types and kinds of causality, many levels of analysis in a causal chain, regardless of one's ideology concerning principles of Sufficient Reason and of Universal Causation. Following Aristotelian causal analyses that enumerate among others the proximal, distal, efficient, mechanical, and so on, the anti-espionage expert needs to identify causal factors--singly or together; alone, concurrent, or sequential--that are implicated in specific instances of espionage behavior. Selecting out for them in employment decisions and in periodic evaluations of hired personnel may lower the base rate of espionage. Of course, as philosophers of science tell us via the the social transformation of knowledge, one must continually assess for changes in causality--factors, their kind and type, their contribution to espionage behavior. The Wisconsin 3 are not the last of their kind, but it would help to know what kind they are. (See Hulnick, A. (1995). The Ames case: How could it happen? International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 8, 133-154; Moriarty, A.R. (1990). Abating military espionage problems. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 4, 474-485; Richelson, J. (1995). A century of spies: Intelligence in the 20th century. Oxford University Press; Weiner, T. (October 7, 1997.) 3 onetime campus radicals held in spy case. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.)