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The Political Psychology of Negotiations: The Terrorism of Terrorists

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Abstract. This article illustrates some of the psychological advantages possessed by terrorists who engage in negotiations with nonterrorists.

Terrorism has been a viable technique of achieving political power throughout history. For some individuals, groups, and organizations terrorism has been the only viable technique. Not only has terrorism directly effected political salience, political credibility, and ultimate political goals, but it can provide a significant advantage when its purveyors engage in formal negotiations with adversaries and other competitors who eschew terrorism.

Terrorists usually promise not to engage in terrorism to initiate the negotiations and for the duration of the negotiations—as long as these negotiations seem to be occurring in good faith on all sides. Terrorists rarely promise to eschew terrorism forever. (That's why terrorists are terrorists.) Because "good faith" is operationally defined by the visceral reactions, ideological necessities, and manipulative styles of terrorists, the other sides to the negotiation are at the terrorists' mercy. Terrorism is actually occurring throughout the negotiation, because the threat of terrorism—itself an exemplar of terrorism—has been explicitly made by the terrorists as they enter the negotiation: no good faith, no promise not to engage in further terrorist acts. Thus, terrorists have a built-in negotiation advantage.

Another way of looking at this is that the welcoming of terrorists into negotiations based on a promise of a temporary cessation of hostilities implicitly legitimizes additional terrorist acts if a breakdown in negotiation occurs. To avoid this, nonterrorists face significant pressure to make concessions. In fact, through the use of effective information warfare (IW) programs that comprise (1) a periodic breaking off of talks allegedly because of a lack of bad faith in some negotiation partner and (2) a succeeding terrorist act, terrorists may succeed in badly injuring the foundations of political power of that negotiation partner. The dynamics for IW success comprise the manipulation of causal attributions, fundamental attribution errors, consensus effects, ingroup and outgroup phenomena, and innuendo inductions.

Negotiation with terrorists is truly playing by their rules on their turf. All the more reason for the principle that one does not negotiate with terrorists—a principle that has largely been founded on the fear of positively reinforcing terrorist acts and that has been broken virtually everywhere and every time.

Terrorists have additional advantages when negotiation ends in a formal agreement by all sides. Again by visceral, ideological, and manipulative criteria, terrorists will dictate when the agreement has been violated—again abrogating any promise not to engage in terrorism. This is to be expected because terrorism is what brought the terrorists into the negotiations and successfully brought them to a close. In essence, terrorists continue to be positively reinforced for terrorism.

Before, during, and after negotiations, terrorists can continue to effect terrorism through "cut-outs"—so-called renegade and "uncontrollable" groups that have de facto psychological and/or organizational
linkages. Thus, terrorists have the best of all worlds concerning negotiations. They can promise to absolve themselves from terrorism, but terrorism can still continue through parties that are not part of the negotiations. The very promise not to engage in terrorism carries the implied threat that the promise may be taken back depending on circumstances--itself an exemplar of terrorism. And because terrorism has largely been responsible for the need on the part of nonterrorists for negotiations, a so-called catch-22 is operative. For consider that terrorists within the negotiations do engage in additional terrorist acts. If they are removed from the negotiations, the negotiations become moot, for the whole point was to coopt the terrorists into not committing terrorism. If they are not removed, the same consequence occurs.