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INTRODUCTION

• From 1985 to 1997, among all documented in-flight engine shutdowns, wrong engine included almost 50% for turboprop and 30% for turbojet aircraft (Sallee & Gibbons, 1999)

• 40% of interviewed twin-engine helicopter pilots admitted confusing engine throttle in an emergency at least once (Wildzunas et al., 1999; as cited in Aviation Safety Council, 2016)

• Under stress, people tend to rationalize expected outcome, even if it does not correlate with reality, thus justifying erroneous decisions (Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2008)

• Decision-making is especially critical on takeoff, when time is of the essence

• “Dead foot – dead engine” is currently used for identification of a failed engine

METHOD

A survey was created to acquire more information on wrong identification of a failed engine in twin-engine turboprop aircraft

• The survey was created through SurveyMonkey

• The survey consisted of 10 questions

• Participants were sampled from one U.S. airline that operates twin-engine turboprop aircraft

• Link to the survey was distributed via email

RESULTS

• 49 airline pilots completed the survey

• Average experience flying twin-engine turboprops – 9 years and 6,300 flight hours

• Almost 23% admitted having problems identifying a failed engine at least once in simulator training

• Pros: most respondents found the method redundant and accurate

• Cons: most respondents found the method time-consuming and having a likelihood of error

• 29% of respondents agreed that there could be a better method of identification of a failed engine

CONCLUSION

• The results of this study correlate with previous findings

• This survey was part of a larger study aimed at testing an alternative method of identification of a failed engine

• For further research, it is suggested to collect data from a bigger sample, as well as from pilots operating other aircraft types

REFERENCES:
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