Interests and Gains: Conditions for the Abraham Accords

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Abstract

The accords were signed by Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. This marks the first Persian Gulf state and the third/fourth Arab state to normalize Israeli relations. These agreements proclaim that each state recognizes the sovereignty of the other, promotes peace, coexistence, and encourages these accords open a door to further Israeli recognition by other Arab states. What conditions allowed for these accords? Mutual concerns/interests concerning Iran’s increasing influence in the region was the key reason for the mediation’s success. Ripe moment theory needs to be implemented in analyzing the conditions that led to the successful mediation. The independent need to be analyzed and argues that the underlying conditions (economic and security related) of the parties created the ripe moment for the accords.

Ripe Moment Theory

2. When dealing with conflict between parties, specifically long-term conflicts, there is a specific time that negotiations are possible
   1. Hurting Stalemate
   2. Looming catastrophe

Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have met these conditions

This ripeness is not enough for full scale negotiations

Conditions must be taken advantage either by these states themselves or through a mediator, a role the United States acted as.

Figure 1. Title: Signing of the Accords
Representatives of the United States, Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates sign the Abraham Accords

Relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel/ Security Incentive:

1. Ties that have formed over the years between Saudi Arabia and Israel because of the increasing threat Iran is becoming in the region
2. Iranian revolution encouraged Shi’i protests and revolts in Saudi Arabi, Bahrain, and Kuwait
3. Iran has sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah
4. Arab Spring created Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
5. They have a common regional adversary, both states began to see one another in a less antagonistic light and form a light partnership
6. Bahrain depends on Saudi Arabia for security

Initiators of Peace Positively Impacted Negatively Impacted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiators of Peace</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Palestinian Groups</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
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<td>Israel</td>
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</table>

Figure 2. Security Impacts of the Accords
Shows the differing regional shifts and Arab priority. The Palestinians see this as a betrayal to their interests and the Iranians see this as a further security threat.

Economic Incentive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Exports (Billions)</th>
<th>Military Spending (Billions)</th>
<th>GDP (Nominal) (Billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
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<td>2.50</td>
<td>257.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>8.50</td>
<td>257.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>12.00</td>
<td>257.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>257.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Displays the total number of money made from exports within the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Shows the economic benefits of an alliance, especially Bahrain.

1. Will allow for previously private economic dealings to be carried out publicly, and therefore expanded in all areas
2. Eager to gain access to Israel espionage technology and military advancements
3. Desire for economic growth within the countries was brought to the forefront due to the Covid caused economic crisis
4. There is no distinction between business and politics

Conclusion

1. This hurting stalemate was the states of Bahrain and the UAE coming to the realization that their economic and military need to cooperate openly with Israel supersedes their desire to stay in the boycott.
2. Iran has become too much of a threat for them to overlook, their looming catastrophe
3. Objective elements that contributed to this stalemate was the tentative partnership that Israel and Saudi Arabia has established that allowed the GCC to start cooperation
4. The informal mediation had been taking place for years; these accords to were more of an evolution than a revolution.

Mediation

1. Bahrain and the UAE had already established that they desired an end to the conflict or a “way out” policy
2. Could not talk to Israel publicly without being suspected of leaving boycott
3. The United States was asked to be the official mediator

1. Israel was making no progress regarding Palestinian relations
2. Track II diplomacy was the only option

1. Both states had mutual trust for the U.S.
2. The Palestinians see this as a betrayal to their interests and the Iranians see this as a further security threat.

Additional Factors to Consider

1. Oslo Accords in 1992
2. The Failure of the Iranian Nuclear Deal
3. The peace treaties between Israel and the individual states of Egypt and Jordan

References

2. Yoel Guzansky, Y. (2020). The United Arab Emirates: Proactive in War and Peace

Figure 4. Table displays the increased approval for Israeli cooperation that has risen significantly from 2015. It is this increased public approval rating that has allowed for the Accords.