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Trends. The Ins and Outs of Nuclear Nonproliferation: The Case of Georgia

Editor

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A strong case can be made that the essence of all foreign policy matters involves the most basic of psychological boundaries: between the "me" and "not me." Research in developmental psychology suggests that ontogenetic development of these boundaries is first characterized by primary narcissism—everything is me—then a secondary narcissism—everything good is me, everything bad is not me—after this some asymptotic approach towards realism—similar and/or dissimilar aspects of good and bad characterizing the me and not me. Some theorists even posit a fourth process: some asymptotic approach towards idealism wherein the me and not me are recognized to share the essentials of humanity amidst the hosannas of We Are the World. (Later in development, generalization occurs to the we and not we—dyads, groups, organizations, and even more macromolecular entities like nation-states and the supranational.)

Foreign policy begins with the development, implementation, and evaluation of coping strategies to manage interactions across the boundaries between me and not me as these interactions impact on survival, the satisfaction of needs, and, in general, adaptation. This psychological foundation of foreign policy can often help explicate dilemmas such as those involving the potential for proliferation of nuclear material from the Caucasus nation-state of Georgia.

As reported in The New York Times, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) have initiated removing nuclear material—highly enriched uranium and spent nuclear fuel—from Georgia to the UK. (This occurred after the Russian government first seemed to engage and then disengage from cooperating on the Issue, while the French seem to have never seriously engaged.) As long as the material remained in Georgia, the proliferation concerns largely included (1) authorized or unauthorized sale by elements of the Georgian government on the black market or directly to nation-states or other political entities seeking to develop, maintain, or increase a nuclear weapons capability; (2) theft by criminal entities or even Georgian insurgent paramilitary forces for sale to the same sources as in (1) above; (3) theft by political entities, criminal or otherwise—e.g., representatives of nation-states, terrorist groups—for their own nuclear weapons needs or for sale to the same sources as in (1) above.

The psychological boundary Issues have been many. (1) The US Government (USG)—with the very broad conception of "me" characteristic of a superpower—viewed the nuclear material as "me" because of the potential security consequences that could be "bad." Thus, it made sense for USG policy to embrace engagement with other political entities possessing nuclear material. To a lesser degree the UK Government did this as well in identification with the interests of the more powerful USG. (2) The USG apparently rejected the option of moving the nuclear material within its territory because of potential legal challenges from US environmentalist individuals and groups. The latter apparently viewed the material as "bad" and "not me"—not perceiving that poorly regulated nuclear material anywhere in the world can become "me" with unfortunate consequences while well-regulated nuclear material can become "good" through minimization of its weaponization potential. (The environmentalist challenge—as well as that of nationalists from Scotland where the material is to be stored and reprocessed and of political opposition members—appears to be less of a serious issue to the UK government as of this writing.) (3) The Georgian government viewed the nuclear material as "me" and "bad" and desired the...
"bad" to become "good" through transfer to a safe repository. Or, perhaps, it viewed the material as "not me" even if residing within its territory—an ego dystonic status inducing a form of psychological splitting—and desired to remove the foreign body from its own. These and similar boundary interpretations facilitated engagement with the USG on nuclear nonproliferation. (4) The Russian government originally viewed the material as "me" and "good" during the era of the Soviet Union (SU) and for some interval after the SU’s disestablishment, then "not me" and "bad" reflecting a host of complex political and economic calculations. Negotiations among the USG, the Georgian government, and Russia were eventually at an impasse. To the French, the whole matter appeared to be "not me" and "bad."