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# Trends. Campaign Funds, Satellite and Missile Technology, and the People's Republic of China: The Real National Security Problem

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What is the real national security problem concerning a myriad of stories about (1) Chinese military intelligence funneling funds to the Democratic National Committee during the 1996 United States (US) Presidential campaign; (2) antecedent, concurrent, and/or subsequent decisions to facilitate Chinese launching of US commercial satellites; and (3) the consequences of (1) and (2)?

As to (1), covert action and overt influence operations entailing funneling funds to one or more competitors during a campaign is nearly as old as the second oldest profession. These acts continue to be very common among many political entities in the international security arena. While troubling to the target of such acts, the reactions of many in the US Congress express an incredulity bespeaking ignorance or hypocrisy.

As to (2), the traditional tension amongst the Pentagon, State, and Commerce as to priorities, compatibilities, and incompatibilities regarding military and commerce issues again mirrors a very old phenomenon in government. The US Congress opponents to the Clinton decision should not be objecting that it was made, but why.

As to (3), an investigation is merited to provide an assessment. This assessment needs to be based on more than establishing temporal associations between transfers of money and political decisions. It needs to approximate the phenomenology of intent. The assessment should not be masquerading as a quest for some objective truth, while hiding partisan or personal political concerns.

The real national security problem is the neutering of a representative democracy and its citizens by US elected leaders and their supporters who misrepresent the issues as unique to US history as opposed to characteristic activities that--in this case--may have strengthened or weakened US security. (See Information warfare, China, and South Korea: More than a military concept. (January 16, 1997). IBPP, 4(2); Leventhal, T. (December 6, 13, 1996; January 10, 1997). The need for a United States Government capacity to analyze and counter foreign perception management operations: Parts I, II, III. IBPP, 1(5,6,7); Schmitt, E. (May 21, 1998). House votes to prohibit satellite exports to China. The New York Times, p. A1, A26; The new information and communication order: Déjà vu all over again. (May 9, 1997). IBPP, 2(6).) (Keywords: Campaign Funds, China, Clinton, Democracy, National Security, Representative Government, United States.)