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Evaluating LAANC Compliance and Air Traffic Collision Hazards Posed by Small Unmanned Aircraft Operations in Controlled Airspace

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Presenter Information

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Evaluating LAANC Utilization & Compliance for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Controlled Airspace



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Purpose


- Codify operational behavior patterns of sUAS operations within controlled airspace/LAANC areas
- Determine sUAS operator compliance with LAANC authorization process & accompanying restrictions
- Evaluate potential aviation interference & safety hazards posed by sUAS
- Research Questions
 - What proportion of sUAS activity carried out in controlled airspace can be correlated with a LAANC authorization?
 - What proportion of detected sUAS activity exceeds maximum altitude limits of the UAS Facility Map?



Events at Gatwick & Heathrow (UK) highlight NAS vulnerabilities to UAS interference

What is LAANC?

- Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability
 - FAA-industry collaboration to share airspace data
 - Provides access to controlled airspace via near real-time processing of airspace authorizations below approved altitudes
- Advantages
 - Employs a risk-based approach to UAS airspace integration
 - Significant improvement in access & timeliness of airspace authorizations; “built for the pace of business”
 - Leverages industry expertise, technology, and ingenuity
- Disadvantages
 - Currently unmonitored – relies on UAS operator self-conformance



UAS Facility Map, Daytona Beach (KDAB)




Methodology

- Applied, exploratory research methodology;
- Convenience sampling at Daytona Beach International Airport (KDAB)
- 30-day sUAS detection sampling using DJI AeroScope
 - sUAS detection device for DJI-manufactured platforms
 - DJI commands an estimated 76.8% of market share (Drone Industry Insights, 2019)
 - ~10 SM detection range
- Requested 30-days LAANC authorization data from FAA
- Correlated sUAS origination detections with LAANC authorization locations





Preliminary Work

- Assessed area sUAS population (FAA sUAS registration database)
 - Part 107: 649
 - Recreational: 1,147
- Coded KDAB LAANC UAS Facility Map (UASFM)
 - Replaced 16-character coding with sequential numerals to simplify reporting
 - Colorized grids by UASFM maximum altitudes




Findings



Findings


- sUAS Detections
 - Total sUAS detections: 377
 - Within UASFM Grid: 272
- LAANC Approvals
 - Total LAANC approvals: 94
 - Part 107 (auto) LAANC: 41
 - Recreational (auto) LAANC: 24
 - Manually Processed: 29




Findings & Discussion

- Overall UASFM utilization proportional to makeup of UASFM grids
- LAANC *approvals* slightly elevated in UASFM areas closer to airfield(s)
 - sUAS operators more likely to know flight nearest to airports requires permission
- Higher unapproved *utilization* in UASFM periphery
 - May indicate sUAS operators are still following rescinded Special Rule for Model Aircraft


Automated LAANC Approvals Corlorized by UASFM Grid Maximum Altitude



Utilization by UASM Max Altitude




Detected UAS Activity in LAANC Grids Corlorized by UASFM Maximum Altitude




Findings


Average LAANC Approvals & sUAS Detections by Day of Week




Automatic LAANC Request Duration



Detected sUAS Activity & LAANC Approvals by Time of Day





Duration of Detected sUAS Operations (m)



Findings & Discussion


- Compliance with UASFM altitudes
 - 178 sUAS platforms (65.4%) detected within UASFM altitude limits
 - 26 (9.6%) within 50 ft of UASFM limit
 - 13 (4.8%) within 100 ft of UASFM limit
 - 55 (20.2%) exceeded 100 ft of UASFM limit
- National Airspace Systems Risks
 - 23 (8.5%) between 500-1,000 ft AGL
 - 3 (1.1%) between 1,000-1,500 ft AGL
 - 3 (1.1%) greater than 1,500 ft AGL



Findings & Discussion


- Only 19 (7%) sUAS flights could be correlated to a LAANC approval
- Possible explanations:
 - While LAANC authorizations were sought, some sUAS operations were not flown
 - Some LAANC authorizations included models of sUAS that were not detectable using the AeroScope
 - While LAANC authorizations were received for specific areas, some sUAS flights may have deviated from their original LAANC request

“The quantity of UAS flights taking place outside the scope of established FAA approval and safety management processes may indicate that current regulatory mechanisms designed to control sUAS operator access to controlled airspace may not be working...”




Findings & Discussion

Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization
 Daytona Beach International Airport, FL (KDAB), 21 Aug 19
 0900L - 28 Aug 19 0859 L




Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization
 Daytona Beach International Airport, FL (KDAB), 28 Aug 19
 0900L - 4 Sep 19 0859 L




Findings & Discussion

Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization
 Daytona Beach International Airport, FL (KDAB), 4 Sep 19 0900L
 - 11 Sep 19 0859 L




Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization
 Daytona Beach International Airport, FL (KDAB), 11 Sep 19
 0900L - 18 Sep 19 0859 L



Findings & Discussion

Low Altitude Authorization & Notification Capability Utilization
 Daytona Beach International Airport, FL (KDAB), 18 Sep 19
 0900L - 22 Sep 19 0859 L



Is Remote ID the solution?

3 Ways of Remotely Identifying

STANDARD REMOTE IDENTIFICATION DRONE



LIMITED REMOTE IDENTIFICATION DRONE



FAA-RECOGNIZED IDENTIFICATION AREA (FRIA)



Conclusions

- Relatively equivalent sUAS activity across UASFM network
- Extremely low LAANC approval rate compared to detected sUAS activity in UASFM network
- Difficult to correlate detected sUAS flights and LAANC approvals
- Duration of LAANC approvals vastly exceeds average sUAS flight time; inaccurately portrays activity within UASFM
- 44.6% of sUAS exceeded UASFM maximum altitude limits; 10.7% exceeded 500 ft AGL
- Propensity for some sUAS operations to fly lengthy distances from origination point (possibly outside VLOS)
- Demonstrates need to sample additional UASFM locations to enhance generalizability of findings
- Demonstrates need for additional tracking methods, such as Remote ID





Questions?



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