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Sexual Seduction, Illicit Sex, and Licit Sex: International and National Leaders as Targets of Intelligence Operations

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Abstract. This article describes the varied consequences that could be achieved by a hostile intelligence service through effecting the sexual seduction of an international or national leader or through exploiting ongoing illicit or licit sex engaged in by that leader.

Some mass media sources have transmitted stories that Ms. Monica Lewinsky is actually an Israeli intelligence agent whose sexual favors provided to or received by the United States (U.S.) President have been part of a plan to support and further Israeli and pro-Israeli United States interests. Although IBPP has not obtained data to support this story and views the story as a combination of propaganda and disinformation, it is worthwhile to examine how various types of sexual relationships could impact on an international or national leader with consequences for various international and national interests. (Despite a long history entwining sex and politics that suggests remarkable diversity of sexual predilections, propensities, desires, and behaviors, IBPP will focus on a sexual dyad involving one leader (L) and one sexual partner (P)--even if at times P may be the sexual leader.)

Scenario 1. P is an agent controlled by hostile intelligence. P can solicit information from L that L would not otherwise transmit to hostile intelligence. (And this information is deemed useful to support the interests of hostile intelligence.) L does this through being unduly influenced by P as if the former is "in under the control" of the latter. Or L does whatever seems to be necessary to keep the sexual relationship with P going.

L also may be coerced into "giving up" information through threat of blackmail. The blackmail becomes a viable threat because the nature of the sexual relationship is illicit. The most common varieties of illicit sexual relationship comprise combinations of (a) adultery, (b) homosexuality, and (c) behaviors that although may be normative, legal, ethical, and moral take on a hue of shame, embarrassment, or disgust in the eyes of L--even if in no one else's eyes.

P may obtain useful information not only through the direct control factors described above but merely through physical proximity to the phenomena and trappings of decision-making. P may overhear information, observe people coming and going, see items of information lying on a desk. P may even directly steal or copy information whose existence becomes known.

P may obtain useful information in still another way. In the course of the relationship with L, P will in all probability make the acquaintance of other individuals in L's decision-making court. If a sexual relationship strikes up between P and some of the latter, all the above can once again and even concurrently come into play. Even if this does not occur, the nonsexual relationships between P and members of L's decision-making court may lead to obtaining useful information. This may occur by serendipity or even more perversely by the latter assuming that there is a special relationship between P and L that justifies discussing information that might be useful to hostile intelligence with P. Members of L's decision-making court might even assume that "letting their hair down" with P may further their own

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careers through pleasing L. Or they may be ambivalent about or even terrified of discussing concerns about P's proximity to L with L or those close to L.

Of course, obtaining information--save for various secret formulas and weapons specifications of which L probably is not aware and rare decisions for strategic military strikes of which L probably is--may not be of overriding concern to hostile intelligence. The hostile goal may be merely to disrupt "business as usual." The sexual relationship may lead to preoccupations on the part of L that are incompatible with competent discharge of political responsibilities. And once the relationship is "outed" and rendered illicit through its linkage with hostile intelligence or through the content of the relationship's sexual behaviors, "business as usual" for an entire nation-state's government, political pundits, and informed citizenry can functionally come to a halt. In its place comes a clucking about morality, hypocrisy, and the like that approaches Chicken Littles' presaging that the sky is falling. And it is, but not in the way that they think.

As opposed to obtaining information and disrupting government, hostile intelligence may have yet a third main goal. P--of significant influence with L--can be used as a conduit of information, an agent of influence. This information can help induce decision-making in the interests of hostile intelligence and against those of L and the political entity represented by L. Even if P is viewed as a mere plaything by L with no discernible influence on decision-making, the conduit gambit can still be a worry. Ancillary, seemingly irrelevant information can still affect decision-making in a manner in which L may be unaware.

Scenarios 2. P is not a hostile intelligence agent but is engaging in illicit sex with L. Hostile intelligence discovers this and tries to effect whatever options seem to be in its interest.

Scenario 3. P is not a hostile intelligence agent and is only engaging in licit sex with L. No matter. P is still a potential stepping stone to L.

Conclusion. It must be reiterated that throughout the above analysis, IBPP is giving no credence to the "Lewinsky as intelligence agent" wafting from the Mideast. However, political theorists and observers who have long discounted sexual behavior as relevant to the selection--e.g., election--management, and performance of personnel in sensitive positions must take pause. Advancing the notion that sexual behavior is private behavior and that private behavior should be beyond the purview of personnel evaluation and policy is more perverse than that which may be associated with any sexual predilections, propensities, desires, or behaviors.

IBPP Note. Thanks to Mr. Dustin Budd, an undergraduate student in Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University's Science, Technology, and Globalization program, for serving as a research consultant for this article. (See Foubert, J.D., & Sholley, B.K. (1996). Effects of gender, gender role, and individualized trust on self-disclosure. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 11, 277-278; Kitzinger, C., & Powell, D. (1995). Engendering infidelity: Essentialist and social constructionist readings of a story completion task. *Feminism and Psychology*, 5, 345-372; Raza, E. (August 21, 1998). How American Zionists are manipulating U.S. foreign policy against Islam, *Nation of Aztlan*, <http://www.instanet.com>; Rust, M., & Hickey, J. (May 19, 1997). Shelling out. *Insight*, 13(18); (1995). Personnel security: Pass and security clearance data for the Executive Office of the President: Report to Congressional Requestors. United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., GA 1.13:NSIAD-96-20; (1994). Personnel security investigations. United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., GA 1.13:NSIAD-94-135 R;

(1993). Personnel security: Efforts by the DOD and DOE to eliminate duplicative background investigations: Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services. United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., GA 1.13:RCED-93-23.) (Keywords: Espionage, Intelligence, Personnel Security, Sex.)