

9-25-1998

## Trends. Dubious Editorial on "Dubious Decisions on the Sudan": A Counterterrorist and Intelligence Concern

IBPP Editor  
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp>



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#), and the [Other Political Science Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Editor, IBPP (1998) "Trends. Dubious Editorial on "Dubious Decisions on the Sudan": A Counterterrorist and Intelligence Concern," *International Bulletin of Political Psychology*. Vol. 5 : Iss. 13 , Article 3.  
Available at: <https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol5/iss13/3>

This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [commons@erau.edu](mailto:commons@erau.edu).

Title: Trends. Dubious Editorial on "Dubious Decisions on the Sudan": A Counterterrorist and Intelligence Concern

Author: Editor

Volume: 5

Issue: 13

Date: 1998-09-25

Keywords: Intelligence, Shifa, Sudan, Terrorism

An editorial in the September 23, 1998 Issue of The New York Times describes the possible analytic fallacies in the United States Government's (USG) decision to target the Shifa plant in the Sudan. Language and reasoning in the editorial seem suspect.

By terming Shifa a pharmaceutical plant, the editorial uses language that inevitably mitigates against the US analysis and decision. Moreover, that Shifa is officially termed a pharmaceutical plant by the Sudanese government and might actually produce veterinary medicines and agricultural chemicals may have no bearing on activities related to chemical warfare agent production.

Moreover, the editorial advocates that even if Shifa was involved in chemical warfare production along with more innocuous activities, the USG should offer to replace any lost production of agricultural and veterinary products lost in the missile attack. How would one know how much was lost? Why from the very folks who would be authorizing chemical warfare activities. With "appropriate" estimates of loss, the Sudanese Government could completely subsidize its chemical warfare activities or even turn a profit. Nice work if you can get it. (See Beroggi, G.E.G., & Wallace, W.A. (1997). The effect of reasoning logics on real-time decision-making. *IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A: Systems and Humans*, 27, 743-749; Dubious decisions on the Sudan. (September 23, 1998). *The New York Times*, p. A30; Fink, K. (1995). Projection, identification, and bi-logic. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 64, 136-152; Keene, G.B. (1995). The psychology-logic overlap. *Behavior and Philosophy*, 23, 57-62; Morris, A.K., & Sloutsky, V.M. (1998). Understanding of logical necessity: Developmental antecedents and cognitive consequences. *Child Development*, 69, 721-741.) (Keywords: Intelligence, Shifa, Sudan, Terrorism.)