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#### **Evaluating Scenarios That Can Startle and Surprise Pilots**

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# Evaluating Scenarios That Can Startle and Surprise Pilots

Rahim D. Agha, Andrew R. Dattel, & Jennifer E. Thropp

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#### Purpose

- Identify scenarios that can startle and surprise pilots
- Determine the effect startle and surprise has on pilots while flying different aircraft
- Evaluate pilot performance during startle and surprise events
- Evaluate pilot workload during startle and surprise events



# **Startle**

An uncontrollable, automatic muscle reflex, <u>raised heart rate</u>, blood pressure, elicited by exposure to a <u>sudden</u>, intense event that violates a pilot's expectations

# Surprise

An <u>unexpected event</u> that violates a pilot's expectations and can affect the <u>mental processes</u> used to respond to the event

# Why Startle and Surprise

- Contributing factor in multiple airline accidents
  - Air France 447
  - Colgan Air 3407
  - Turkish Airlines 1951

## **Research Design**

- Experimental design
  - 2 x 3 within subject design
  - 8 dependent variables
- Performance\* measured separately for each aircraft

<u>Aircraft</u> Multi Engine (Baron 58) Single-engine (Cessna 172SP)

<u>Emergency</u> Uninformed surprise emergency Uninformed startle and surprise emergency Informed emergency

\* Evaluated using data obtained from X-Plane \*\* Self assessed by each participant Dependent Variables Heart Rate Respiration Rate Mental Workload Physical Demand Temporal Demand Performance\*\* Effort Frustration

# Method

#### Sample

- Fifteen commercial pilots (multi-engine and single-engine rated)
- Recruited using convivence sampling
- Paid 20 USD for participation

#### Apparatus

- Six scenarios were created on Elite PI-135 flight simulator using X-Plane 11 software
- Nexus 10 was used to record heart rate and respiration rate
- NASA-TLX\* was used to assess pilot workload



# Cessna 172SP

<u>Scenario</u>	Scenario Parameters	Scenario Description
Uninformed Surprise Emergency	10 nm** ILS <sup>a</sup> approach to 25R DAB <sup>c</sup>	Engine failure at 1500 feet with cloud layer set at 1000 feet
Uninformed Surprise and Startle Emergency*	10 nm ILS approach to 25R DAB	Engine failure at 1500 feet and engine fire at 1000 feet. A loud bang or thunder noise at different altitudes
Informed Emergency	10 nm ILS approach to 25R DAB	Engine failure at 1500 feet with cloud layer set at 1000 feet

- \* Half participants heard loud bang and the other half thunder noise with lightning
- \*\* Nautical miles
- <sup>a</sup> Instrument Landing System
- <sup>b</sup> Daytona Beach International Airport


## Baron 58

<u>Scenario</u>	Scenario Parameters	Scenario Description	
Uninformed Surprise Emergency	3 nm ILS approach to 25R DAB	Left engine failure at 450 feet with cloud layer set at 100 feet	
Uninformed Surprise and Startle Emergency*	3 nm ILS approach to 25R DAB	Left engine failure at 450 feet and cloud layer set at 100 feet. A loud bang or thunder noise at different altitudes	
Informed Emergency	3 nm ILS approach to 25R DAB	Left engine failure at 450 feet with a cloud layer set at 100 feet	


\* Half participants heard loud bang and the other half thunder noise with lightning

#### Heart Rate

- Significant interaction between aircraft and emergency
- No significant differences for informed emergency between the aircrafts
- Difference between uninformed surprise and informed emergency is significantly higher in the multiengine aircraft



- Respiration Rate
  - No significant interaction
  - Significant main effects
  - Respiration rate was highest in the uninformed surprise and startle condition and lowest in the informed condition



NASA-TLX


- All six factors were significantly higher for the uninformed surprise and startle condition
- Physical and temporal demand, effort, and frustration was higher for the multi-engine aircraft

	Variable	Main Effect(Aircraft)	Main Effect (Scenario)	Interaction (Aircraft*Scenario)
	Mental Demand	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>	p < .001**	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>
	Physical Demand	р = .046*	p = .007*	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>
	Temporal Demand	<i>p</i> = .016*	p < .001**	<i>p</i> = .013*
	Performance	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>	<i>p</i> < .001**	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>
	Effort	<i>p</i> = .004*	<i>p</i> = .003*	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>
	Frustration	<i>p</i> = .001**	<i>p</i> < .001**	<i>p</i> > .05 <sup>ns</sup>

\* *p* < .05 \*\* *p* < .01 <sup>ns</sup> Non-significant

#### NASA-TLX (Temporal Demand)

- Temporal demand was higher in the uninformed surprise condition for the multi-engine aircraft
- No difference in the uninformed surprise and startle condition between the aircraft



#### Performance

- Multi-engine (Altitude Deviation)
  - $F(2, 28) = 56.75, p < .001, \eta^2 = .80$  (Large effect)
  - Post hoc indicated that there were significant differences between informed emergency when compared to uninformed surprise (*p* < .001) and uninformed surprise and startle (*p* < .001). Uninformed surprise was significantly less than the uninformed surprise and startle (*p* = .018)
- Single-engine (Number of Engine-Failure checklist steps followed)
  - F(2, 28) = 39.417, p < .001, η2 = .738 (Large effect)</li>
  - Post hoc indicated that there were significant differences between informed emergency when compared to uninformed surprise (p < .001) and uninformed surprise and startle (p < .001)</li>

# **Discussion**

#### Heart Rate and Respiration Rate

- Informed emergency is predictable hence heart and respiration is low
- Startle and surprise condition increases the heart rate and respiration rate more than surprise condition
- Very significant finding for general aviation pilots
- Heart rate and respiration rate is directly related to each other

#### NASA-TLX

- All six workload factors had a significant main effect for scenario
- The researchers except to find significant interactions for the workload factor with the addition of more data

#### Performance

 Expect to find significant difference between uninformed surprise and uninformed surprise and startle condition for each aircraft with a larger sample size

#### Discussion

- All dependent variables except temporal demand increased when participant flew surprise uninformed emergency condition to when they flew surprise and startle uninformed emergency
- The score for all dependent variables for the informed emergency condition was less than the uninformed surprise and the uninformed surprise and startle condition
- The study found that performance, vital signs, and workload are significantly different when the pilots fly an emergency that is informed vs the emergency that is uninformed

## Recommendations

- Propose more scenarios that can startle and surprise pilots
- Pilot training should incorporate scenarios that are startling and surprising
- Future studies should record other vital signs (i.e., blood pressure) and skin conductance



# Thank you

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