Spying for Friends as an Unfriendly Act: Another Review of the Pollard Case

Editor

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Abstract. This article describes some negative consequences of an intelligence analyst from Country A providing classified information to allied Country B in an unauthorized fashion.

Near the end of the negotiations at the Wye Plantation Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu requested that United States (U.S.) President Clinton release Jonathan Jay Pollard. Pollard has been incarcerated after being convicted of espionage—viz., passing top-secret U.S. documents to Israel.

Many of Pollard's U.S. supporters who advocate his release emphasize that Pollard only provided classified information relevant to Israel's national survival and that Israel has been a stalwart U.S. ally. These two factors are assumed to be extenuating factors that should mitigate the need for further incarceration.

However, Pollard's supporters are grossly misreading the nature of the intelligence world. To the Israeli Government, Israel's survival is paramount. If Israel's survival needs are judged by the Israeli Government to be incompatible in specific or general cases with the security of the US, the Israeli Government will act contrary to U.S. interests—and from the Israeli perspective, rightly so. There are already historical examples of this incompatibility going back at least as far as the 1967 War—when U.S. Navy personnel were killed by an Israeli air attack—and as recently as the Israeli Government's refusal to share what Pollard provided with the U.S. Government so the latter can engage in an adequate damage assessment. It has worked the other way, too. Historical examples include U.S. political positions on Mideast peace that have been contrary to those of Israel and U.S. political pressures on Israel to cease and desist from various military, paramilitary, and intelligence operations—e.g., not entering Beirut with significant military force during Operation Peace for Galilee. In fact, both sides—the US and Israel—most probably have passed sensitive information obtained from each other about each other or others to other governments and still other political entities. Thus, besides the obvious potential point of allies becoming long-term neutrals or adversaries, even allies may find themselves at cross-purposes in an otherwise friendly relationship.

Even if Israel and the US remained the closest of allies, the Israeli Government—like any government—has almost certainly been penetrated in varying degrees by other governments and political entities—including the US. Penetration may involve loose Israeli analytic and operational procedures and mistakes, the subversion of Israeli intelligence personnel, the characteristics of technical intelligence means, and moles. Even an Israeli Government intent to closely guard U.S. information would not necessarily lead to that information's protection—a fact that might facilitate U.S. deception operations against Israel or through Israel to a third party but that also might facilitate security damage to the US.

Releasing Pollard also would have adverse morale and other motivational effects on U.S. personnel security and counterintelligence personnel entrusted to catch spies, all intelligence personnel entrusted not to commit espionage, and the rule of law—tempered by human judgment—entrusted to be a vehicle of trust and cohesion among all U.S. citizens. Given the huge amount of classified information