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Trends. The Deployment of Ground Forces to Kosovo: A Paean for Ambiguity

Editor

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This weekend is to bring talks in Rambouillet, France between Serbian government representatives and representatives of various ethnic Albanian organizations. The talks will be nurtured in a de facto manner by representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Contact Group, the United Nations, single countries, and yet other entities. Some entities will have multiple representatives and some representatives will represent multiple entities.

This implicit ambiguity but foreshadows a significant Issue bearing on ambiguity. The talks will focus on a draft plan to deploy peacekeeping forces as part of any settlement. Forces probably will include at least those of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (US). As to the last, some Congressional members will demand clear-cut parameters concerning the deployment of U.S. forces. How long is the deployment scheduled to last? What has to occur to trigger reduction or removal of forces? Such questions play well in domestic politics but militate against the success of many international interventions. With clear-cut parameters, adversaries abroad can best plan deception and other information management operations to thwart the political objectives behind the deployment of peacekeeping forces. Adversaries at home can best employ coercive political pressures that may sabotage international intent for domestic partisan gain. What is not ambiguous is that clear-cut communication and parsing of each word will impede clear-cut success. (See Becker, E. (February 3, 1999). Draft plan on Kosovo needs U.S. commitment of troops. The New York Times, p. A3; Fobian, C.S., & Christensen-Szalanski, J.J. (1993). Ambiguity and liability negotiations: The effects of the negotiators' role and the sensitivity zone. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 54, 277-298; Provis, C. (1996). Interests vs. positions: A critique of the distinction. Negotiation Journal, 12, 305-323; Rubin, J.Z., Kim, S.H., & Peretz, N.M. (1990). Expectancy effects and negotiation. Journal of Social Issues, 46, 125-139.) (Keywords: Albania, France, Kosovo, Peace Talks, Rambouillet, Serbia.)