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THE IMPACT OF SHA-1 FILE HASH COLLISIONS ON DIGITAL FORENSIC IMAGING: A FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT

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ABSTRACT

A previous paper described an experiment showing that Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash collisions of files have no impact on integrity verification in the forensic imaging process. This paper describes a similar experiment applied when two files have a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) collision.

Keywords: SHA-1 hash collisions, forensic imaging, computer forensics, digital forensics

INTRODUCTION

An earlier paper (Kessler, 2017) discussed the impact on the hash value of two disk images that contain the same set of files except for one -- one file that has the same Message Digest 5 (MD5) hash value as another file of the same size but different content. That paper showed that the resulting disk image hash values were, in fact, different even though all of the component files and spaces on the disk had the same hash.

That paper was specific to MD5 hash collisions. As it was coming to press, Stevens, Bursztein, Karpman, Albertini, and Markov (2017) announced a SHA-1 hash collision between two files of the same size with different content.

This paper will use the same methodology as the earlier paper to address the impact of SHA-1 hash collisions on validating the results of the computer forensics imaging process.

Section 2 will state the research question. Section 3 will describe the experimental framework with which to test the research hypothesis, followed by test results in Section 4. Section 5 will offer conclusions.

2. RESEARCH QUESTION

The earlier paper (Kessler, 2017) described a scenario that can be summarized as follows: Suppose we have two files, A and B, that have different content but are the same size and have the same SHA-1 hash value. What is the effect on the hash value of two disk images that differ only in that one disk contains File A and the other disk contains File B (where Files A and B occupy the same location on the two disk images)? SHA-1 is described in Eastlake and Jones (2001) and NIST (2015).

The research question is to test the following null hypothesis (H_0) as follows:

- The resultant two disk images will have the same hash value.

The alternative hypothesis (H_1) is as follows:

- The resultant two disk images will have different hash values.

3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

To address the research questions, two files were needed that were the same size, had the same SHA-1 hash, and had different content. Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (2017) provides such a pair of 422,435-byte files, called *shattered-1.pdf* and *shattered-2.pdf* (Figure 1).



Figure 1. *shattered-1.pdf* (left) and *shattered-2.pdf* (right).

Examined in a hex editor, these files are found to be different in 92 nibbles (in 62 bytes), all within a single 128-byte block

starting at byte offset 0x00C0; the differences are indicated by the **bolded** nibbles below:

```

hash1.bin (from shattered-1.pdf)
000000C0: 73 46 DC 91 66 B6 7E 11 8F 02 9A B6 21 B2 56 0F
000000D0: F9 CA 67 CC A8 C7 F8 5B A8 4C 79 03 0C 2B 3D E2
000000E0: 18 F8 6D B3 A9 09 01 D5 DF 45 C1 4F 26 FE DF B3
000000F0: DC 38 E9 6A C2 2F E7 BD 72 8F 0E 45 BC E0 46 D2
00000100: 3C 57 0F EB 14 13 98 BB 55 2E F5 A0 A8 2B E3 31
00000110: FE A4 80 37 B8 B5 D7 1F 0E 33 2E DF 93 AC 35 00
00000120: EB 4D DC 0D EC C1 A8 64 79 0C 78 2C 76 21 56 60
00000130: DD 30 97 91 D0 6B D0 AF 3F 98 CD A4 BC 46 29 B1

hash2.bin (from shattered-2.pdf)
000000C0: 7F 46 DC 93 A6 B6 7E 01 3B 02 9A AA 1D B2 56 0B
000000D0: 45 CA 67 D6 88 C7 F8 4B 8C 4C 79 1F E0 2B 3D F6
000000E0: 14 F8 6D B1 69 09 01 C5 6B 45 C1 53 0A FE DF B7
000000F0: 60 38 E9 72 72 2F E7 AD 72 8F 0E 49 04 E0 46 C2
00000100: 30 57 0F E9 D4 13 98 AB E1 2E F5 BC 94 2B E3 35
00000110: 42 A4 80 2D 98 B5 D7 0F 2A 33 2E C3 7F AC 35 14
00000120: E7 4D DC 0F 2C C1 A8 74 CD 0C 78 30 5A 21 56 64
00000130: 61 30 97 89 60 6B D0 BF 3F 98 CD A8 04 46 29 A1
    
```

The *fc* (file compare) command confirms these differences. Details of this comparison, including the 150 bits that differ, can be found in Appendix 1.

bit MD5 hash values differ. This confirms that the contents of the two files are actually different and that there is a bona fide SHA-1 hash collision:

As shown below, the two files have the same 160-bit SHA-1 hash, although their 128-

```

File: shattered-1.pdf
MD5 EE4AA52B139D925F8D8884402B0A750C
SHA 38762CF7F55934B34D179AB6A4C80CADCCBB7F0A
    
```

```
File: shattered-2.pdf
MD5 5BD9D8CABC46041579A311230539B8D1
SHA 38762CF7F55934B34D179AE6A4C80CADCCBB7F0A
```

A 32 MB thumb drive was used as the test medium. Using Windows 10, the thumb drive was formatted using the **format e:/v:SHATEST /p:1** command. This initialized a FAT16 partition where the data area was overwritten with zeroes. The contents of the thumb drive were verified using the WinHex (v17.5) hex editor. Finally, a set of seven files were copied -- six arbitrary files plus *hash1.pdf* (containing the contents of *shattered-1.pdf*) -- to the thumb drive. The file list and hash values were:

```
File: 100_0230.JPG
MD5 097D23B541E4F58F03C57D410C3E3AD5
SHA EB916AF75CB5B5BB145F7C11DF17FEC2B04B4395
```

```
File: Charts_Navigation.pdf
MD5 4942439FA574809EEAFF72989FE4276
SHA 6DF61583B57FE4832AD5929E14AFA10638836FA9
```

```
File: diveboat.jpg
MD5 91700649FD62204C3675A045142424E8
SHA B043E115E14C9EA3870D208526EEF300D4F4CCEC
```

```
File: hash1.pdf
MD5 EE4AA52B139D925F8D8884402B0A750C
SHA 38762CF7F55934B34D179AE6A4C80CADCCBB7F0A
```

```
File: IMG_1425.JPG
MD5 CB8FE970560AA6184ED1BC2EEC887681
SHA 8A37616C53CD53B1281B32889A07E29EAC99B09B
```

```
File: in_5615551872.flv
MD5 27DE3209E3B68414A7429E4104C22185
SHA 40E6AD48C728C4FF916E354B962FBA4B5C7C77A6
```

```
File: PICT0131_GCK.JPG
MD5 A9ABC3E926F93A03D4844323B21C513D
SHA C7FD4F3B8F743BF6202E6C57CC621A0EE6F5C6B5
```

4. TESTS AND RESULTS

Four tests were conducted on the media described above. The results described in this section are summarized in Table 1.

In Test #S1, the thumb drive was imaged using FTK Imager (v3.1.3.2). The purpose of this test was merely to prepare a baseline disk image and set of hash values. The image verification SHA-1 hash of the thumb drive was

0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 and the complete FTK Imager report

can be found in Appendix 2. The image was examined with FTK (v1.81.6) and the file listing for *hash1.pdf* showed the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the *shattered-1.pdf* file (as shown in Section 3).

For Test #S2, the thumb drive was mounted with WinHex and the contents of *hash1.bin* were copied over the 128-byte "collision block" of *hash1.pdf* on the thumb drive (i.e., the 128 bytes starting at offset 0x8490C0 on the image). The purpose of this test was to confirm that overwriting data in this way was possible and reliable. Note that it was not necessary to change anything else on the thumb drive since the two files were the same size; no changes were necessary to the FAT table entries or to the directory name, address, or file size. The thumb drive was then re-imaged. The image verification SHA-1 hash was

0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 -- the same as in Test #S1. This result confirms that overwriting data in this way is an adequate process and changes nothing else on the drive. A portion of the FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 3. The FTK file listing showed that *hash1.pdf* had the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the *shattered-1.pdf* file.

For Test #S3, the thumb drive was mounted in WinHex and the contents of *hash2.bin* were copied over the 128-byte "collision block" where *hash1.pdf* resided on the thumb drive, thus creating the *shattered-2.pdf* file. This test was really the crux of the hypothesis experiment since *hash1.pdf* now contained the "hash-equivalent, content-different" file. The thumb drive was re-imaged, yielding an image verification SHA-1 hash of **a00b80e17de1677d34d21c6e53ff9e0603eadbe6** -- different than Tests #S1 and #S2. A portion of the FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 4. The FTK file listing showed

that *hash1.pdf* had the expected MD5 and SHA-1 hash values for the *shattered-2.pdf* file.

For Test #S4, the thumb drive was mounted with WinHex and the contents of *hash1.bin* were copied back over the "collision block" where *hash1.pdf* resided on the thumb drive, now recreating the *shattered-1.pdf* file. The purpose of this test was to restore the drive to its original state and confirm that Test #S3 changed nothing more than the 128 bytes where the test data resided. The image verification SHA-1 hash was **0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18** -- the same as in Tests #S1 and #S2. This result confirms that Test #S4 had restored the disk to its initial state and that Test #S3 changed nothing more than the file data. A portion of the FTK Imager report can be found in Appendix 5. The FTK file listing showed that *hash1.pdf* had the expected MD5

and SHA-1 hash values for the *shattered-1.pdf* file.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The image verification SHA-1 hashes in Tests #S1, #S2, and #S4 -- images that each held the *shattered-1.pdf* (*hash1.bin*) content -- had the same value, whereas the image verification SHA-1 hash value in Test #S3 -- when the image held the *shattered-2.pdf* (*hash2.bin*) content -- was different from the other tests. The fact that Tests #S1, #S2, and #S4 had the same hash proved that the test process worked as desired; the fact that Test #S3 had a different result shows that the hash value of the imaged drive depends upon the actual bit content of the entire drive. Since the hash values of the two images are not the same, the null hypothesis (H_0) is disproven and the alternate hypothesis (H_1) is proven.

Table 1.

Summary of the four tests and the results.

Description of Test	Image SHA-1 Hash Value
#S1 - Drive with <i>shattered-1.pdf</i>	0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18
#S2 - Overwrite bytes 0x8490C0-0x84913F with <i>hash1.bin</i> data (<i>shattered-1.pdf</i>)	0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18
#S3 - Overwrite bytes 0x8490C0-0x84913F with <i>hash2.bin</i> data (<i>shattered-2.pdf</i>)	a00b80e17de1677d34d21c6e53ff9e0603eadbe6
#S4 - Overwrite bytes 0x8490C0-0x84913F with <i>hash1.bin</i> data (<i>shattered-1.pdf</i>)	0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18

As in the prior paper, disproving the null hypothesis is the expected result because the hash value of a disk image is based upon the bit contents of the disk rather than the hashes of the individual files -- including file system structures and unallocated space -- that compose the disk contents. Thus, even if all of the file hashes on two disks are the same, the disk image hashes will be different if the contents of the files are different. Given this result, the scenario described in Section 2 cannot be realized.

It is hoped that this result will lay the concern about file hash collisions to rest as they apply to digital forensic imaging. As long as both individual files and the entire image are hashed, the theoretical occurrence of individual file collisions is not a factor in confirming the evidentiary integrity of a forensic copy.

This said, the fact that SHA-1 collision can be forced is significant. Although the SHA-1 standard was deprecated in 2013, it is still in wide use.

As noted in the prior paper, the MD5 hash values are different for the *shattered-1.pdf* and *shattered-2.pdf* files, although the SHA-1 hash value is the same. Since the MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms are different, the manipulation that can create an MD5 collision cannot create a SHA-1 collision -- indeed, note the complexity of the SHA-1 collision compared to the relative simplicity of the MD5 collision. To date, no one has yet shown a practical method with which to cause both an MD5 and SHA-1 collision in the same file.

NOTE

All FTK Imager reports, FTK reports, and ancillary files are available for examination at http://www.garykessler.net/gck/sha_test.zip.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Comparison of 128-Byte Difference of the Two Files

```

Comparing files shattered-1.pdf and shattered-2.pdf
000000C0: 73 7F      01110011 01111111
000000C3: 91 93      10010001 10010011
000000C4: 66 A6      01100110 10100110
000000C7: 11 01      00010001 00000001
000000C8: 8F 3B      10001111 00111011
000000CB: B6 AA      10110110 10101010
000000CC: 21 1D      00100001 00011101
000000CF: 0F 0B      00001111 00001011
000000D0: F9 45      11111001 01000101
000000D3: CC D6      11001100 11010110
000000D4: A8 88      10101000 10001000
000000D7: 5B 4B      01011011 01001011
000000D8: A8 8C      10101000 10001100
000000DB: 03 1F      00000011 00011111
000000DC: 0C E0      00001100 11100000
000000DF: E2 F6      11100010 11110110
000000E0: 18 14      00011000 00010100
000000E3: B3 B1      10110011 10110001
000000E4: A9 69      10101001 01101001
000000E7: D5 C5      11010101 11000101
000000E8: DF 6B      11011111 01101011
000000EB: 4F 53      01001111 01010011
000000EC: 26 0A      00100110 00001010
000000EF: B3 B7      10110011 10110111
000000F0: DC 60      11011100 01100000
000000F3: 6A 72      01101010 01110010
000000F4: C2 72      11000010 01110010
000000F7: BD AD      10111101 10101101
000000FB: 45 49      01000101 01001001
000000FC: BC 04      10111100 00000100
000000FF: D2 C2      11010010 11000010
00000100: 3C 30      00111100 00110000
00000103: EB E9      11101011 11101001
00000104: 14 D4      00010100 11010100
00000107: BB AB      10111011 10101011
00000108: 55 E1      01010101 11100001
0000010B: A0 BC      10100000 10111100
0000010C: A8 94      10101000 10010100
0000010F: 31 35      01100001 01100101
00000110: FE 42      11111110 01000010
00000113: 37 2D      00110111 00101101
00000114: B8 98      10111000 10011000
00000117: 1F 0F      00011111 00001111
00000118: 0E 2A      00001110 00101010
0000011B: DF C3      11011111 11000011
0000011C: 93 7F      10010011 01111111
0000011F: 00 14      00000000 00010100
00000120: EB E7      11101011 11100111
00000123: 0D 0F      00001101 00001111
00000124: EC 2C      11101100 00101100
00000127: 64 74      01100100 01110100
00000128: 79 CD      01111001 11001101
0000012B: 2C 30      00101100 00110000
0000012C: 76 5A      01110110 01011010
0000012F: 60 64      01100000 01100100
00000130: DD 61      11011101 01100001
00000133: 91 89      10010001 10001001
00000134: D0 60      11010000 01100000
00000137: AF BF      10101111 10111111
0000013B: A4 A8      10100100 10101000
0000013C: BC 04      10111100 00000100

```



```
0000013F: B1 A1      10110001 10100001
```

Although beyond the scope of this paper, a pattern emerges when looking at the bytes bit-by-bit. The following table shows the values of the 128-byte "difference" block when the two files are Exclusively-ORed (XOR) together; a 0 indicates bits that are the same in the two blocks and a 1 indicates bits that are flipped:

```
00C0: 00001100 00000000 00000000 00000010
00D0: 10111100 00000000 00000000 00011010
00E0: 00001100 00000000 00000000 00000010
00F0: 10111100 00000000 00000000 00011000

00C4: 11000000 00000000 00000000 00010000
00D4: 00100000 00000000 00000000 00010000
00E4: 11000000 00000000 00000000 00010000
00F4: 10110000 00000000 00000000 00010000

00C8: 10110100 00000000 00000000 00011100
00D8: 00100100 00000000 00000000 00011100
00E8: 10110100 00000000 00000000 00011100
00F8: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00001100

00CC: 00111100 00000000 00000000 00000100
00DC: 11101100 00000000 00000000 00010100
00EC: 00101100 00000000 00000000 00000100
00FC: 10111000 00000000 00000000 00010000
```

The table above only shows the portion of the block from offset 0x00C0-00FF; the block from offset 0x0100-0x013F exhibits the same pattern.

In summary, 62 bytes of the 128-byte block (48.4%) are different, including 92 of the 256 nibbles (35.9%) and 150 of the 1,024 bits (14.6%).

Appendix 2: FTK Imager report for Test #S1

Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2

```
Case Information:
Acquired using: ADI3.1.3.2
Case Number: SHA Test
Evidence Number: S1
Unique Description:
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash1.pdf
```

Information for C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS1:

```
Physical Evidentiary Item (Source) Information:
[Device Info]
Source Type: Physical
[Drive Geometry]
Cylinders: 3
Tracks per Cylinder: 255
Sectors per Track: 63
Bytes per Sector: 512
Sector Count: 62,719
[Physical Drive Information]
Drive Model: SanDisk Cruzer Mini USB Device
Drive Serial Number: 20051941901913139434
Drive Interface Type: USB
Removable drive: True
Source data size: 30 MB
Sector count: 62719
```

```
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:      62960d3b87b42763f817665e11560fb7
SHA1 checksum:    0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18
```

```
Image Information:
Acquisition started:  Fri Feb 24 21:25:00 2017
Acquisition finished: Fri Feb 24 21:25:04 2017
Segment list:
  C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS1.E01
```

```
Image Verification Results:
Verification started:  Fri Feb 24 21:25:04 2017
Verification finished: Fri Feb 24 21:25:05 2017
MD5 checksum:         62960d3b87b42763f817665e11560fb7 : verified
SHA1 checksum:       0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 : verified
```

Appendix 3: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #S2

Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2

Case Number: SHA Test
Evidence Number: S2
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash1.pdf (overwrite)

Information for C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS2:

```
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:      62960d3b87b42763f817665e11560fb7
SHA1 checksum:    0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18
```

```
Image Information:
Acquisition started:  Fri Feb 24 21:41:24 2017
Acquisition finished: Fri Feb 24 21:41:29 2017
Segment list:
  C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS2.E01
```

```
Image Verification Results:
Verification started:  Fri Feb 24 21:41:29 2017
Verification finished: Fri Feb 24 21:41:29 2017
MD5 checksum:         62960d3b87b42763f817665e11560fb7 : verified
SHA1 checksum:       0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 : verified
```

Appendix 4: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #S3

Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2

Case Information:
Case Number: SHA Test
Evidence Number: S3
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash2.pdf overwrite

Information for C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS3:

```
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum:      5704f9b18354cc804c08b3836e87d43f
SHA1 checksum:    a00b80e17de1677d34d21c6e53ff9e0603eadbe6
```

```
Image Information:
Acquisition started:  Fri Feb 24 21:52:56 2017
Acquisition finished: Fri Feb 24 21:53:00 2017
Segment list:
  C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS3.E01
```

Image Verification Results:

Verification started: Fri Feb 24 21:53:00 2017
Verification finished: Fri Feb 24 21:53:01 2017
MD5 checksum: 5704f9b18354cc804c08b3836e87d43f : verified
SHA1 checksum: a00b80e17de1677d34d21c6e53ff9e0603eadbe6 : verified

Appendix 5: FTK Imager report (partial) for Test #S4

Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 3.1.3.2

Case Information:

Case Number: SHA Test
Evidence Number: S4
Examiner: GCK
Notes: hash1.pdf overwrite

Information for C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS4:

[Computed Hashes]

MD5 checksum: 62960d3b87b42763f817665e11560fb7
SHA1 checksum: 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18

Image Information:

Acquisition started: Fri Feb 24 22:01:21 2017
Acquisition finished: Fri Feb 24 22:01:26 2017
Segment list:
C:\Users\gck\Documents\SHA_test\TestS4.E01

Image Verification Results:

Verification started: Fri Feb 24 22:01:26 2017
Verification finished: Fri Feb 24 22:01:26 2017
MD5 checksum: 62960d3b87b42763f817665e11560fb7 : verified
SHA1 checksum: 0a7c8c48793c0742ae37b9d5b4877ef7700b9b18 : verified