

4-2-1999

Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia

Editor

Follow this and additional works at: <https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp>

 Part of the [Military, War, and Peace Commons](#), and the [Other Psychology Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Editor (1999) "Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia," *International Bulletin of Political Psychology*: Vol. 6 : Iss. 13 , Article 3.

Available at: <https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol6/iss13/3>

This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu, wolfe309@erau.edu.

International Bulletin of Political Psychology

Title: Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia

Author: Editor

Volume: 6

Issue: 13

Date: 1999-04-02

Keywords: Bombings, Demonization, NATO, Peace, Psychology, War, Yugoslavia

Demonization and war go together in good ways and bad. To whip up war fever, to develop and maintain morale and cohesion of fighting forces and of those for whom they allegedly fight, to dissuade and dissipate oppositional opinions to one's war initiatives, to keep one's own doubts in check--these are all "good" examples of demonization in the eyes of war leaders.

However, demonization has at least three "bad" consequences for these war leaders. First, it can make less severe and less intense applications of military power less likely to be employed--even if these applications would have a greater likelihood of achieving the political objectives that are the goals of most war-fighting. Second, demonization renders the sorts of negotiations that usually follow war more difficult--for demons cannot be negotiated with. Instead, they are beyond negotiation. Third, demonization is too often self-reflexive. In other words, in perceiving "the other" as demonized and in conceiving of ways to destroy the demon, one may become a demon as well.

Of immediate concern for the ongoing NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is this: a NATO leader becomes less likely to change course even if that course is incorrect. Constructive negotiation--the very lack of which partially precipitated the bombing and the attainment of which is a sometimes-stated goal of bombing--becomes less likely to occur. And one is too likely to engage in behavior that seems less and less different in ethics and morality from the demonized adversary. In other words, one becomes--in so far as identity stems from action--the demonized adversary.

The tragedy of the crisis in Serbia and Kosovo is not only what has happened to Kosovar Albanians and democratic opponents of Slobodan Milosevic, but also what may be happening to NATO leaders. (See Cohen, R. (1999). West ponders how to make demonized Milosevic into a savior of peace. *The New York Times*, p. A10; Diamond, S.A. (1996). *Anger, madness, and the daimonic: The psychological genesis of violence, evil, and creativity*. State University of New York Press; Funch, B.S. (1984). *The demonic*. *Psyke and Logos*, 5, 125-141; Grotstein, J.S. (1997). "Internal objects" or "chimerical monsters"? The demonic "third forms" of the internal word. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 42, 47-80.) (Keywords: Bombings, Demonization, NATO, Peace, Psychology, War, Yugoslavia.)