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Trends. Ehud Barak and Peace: Mistakes on the 15-Month Mistake

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Many analysts, journalists, and diplomats--the last often speaking on an unattributed basis--have been citing a huge error in the current quest for peace between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority and between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. (Some rather view the peace quest as among the four entities given their de facto independence, even if Lebanon largely functions as a dependent surrogate or vassal of Syria.) The huge error supposedly is Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's declaration that important agreements on the peace quest must be finalized, or be close to finalization, within 15 months.

There are at least two significant rationales for viewing the declaration as error. First, a deadline allows negotiating powers to not even attempt serious negotiation until the deadline is drawing nigh. Second, the deadline becomes a tripwire of failure for its declarer--leading to pressures to accept positions not in the interest of security but of not failing to reach an agreement.

In opposition to opponents of deadline, one might well posit that a deadline impedes a negotiating power from merely stringing others along and marking time. A deadline--through the setting down of a marker--also can demonstrate the resolve and good faith of the deadline's creator and facilitate negotiation.

In fact, a history of peace negotiations among various nation-states and political entities surely suggests that deadlines may or may not contribute to successful resolution of issues. As with decisions on clarity and ambiguity on how specific issues are even conceptualized and phrased, a general stance on always favoring or opposing deadlines becomes yet another set of ideological blinders with which negotiating participants are already burdened and from which they must try to break free.