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Trends. Dirty Little Secrets on Secrets: The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001

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Section 303 of the United States (US) Senate's version of The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (S. 2507) stipulates fines up to \$10,000 and imprisonment of no more than 3 years for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. One significant intent of S. 2507 is to more fully establish a rule of law covering such disclosure through the definitions of "authorized," "classified information," and "officer or employee of the United States." However, the problem with S. 2507 is that it focuses on definitions as opposed to real-world problems.

Individuals with so-called "authorized access" to classified information continue to exhibit a sense of entitlement by leaking classified information to advance or impede policies and political careers and to exhibit their own specialness. In fact, some of those who claim the greatest degree of being shocked and appalled at leaking continue to finely hone their own leaking skills--even as a cover for their own leaking.

Individuals with so-called "authorized access" to classified information often are aware that much more information is classified than needs to be. This state of affairs occurs courtesy of (1) hypervigilant guardians who border on and go beyond the borders of the clinically paranoid; (2) over-compensators for feelings of inferiority who approach grandiosity with the power to classify and to withhold information and view people without access as the great unwashed; (3) malignant narcissists who merely arrogate to themselves the quest for continual upgrades in being special; and (4) shame and blame avoidant who operationalize avoiding by keeping information from the light of day. The realization that overclassification exists facilitates a comfort level in not following the strictures of protecting classified information.

Leaking and overclassification are significant enough in themselves as security problems--even if their proponents usually do not intentionally seek to damage national security. However, these problems become even more significant in that they can be exploited by allied, neutral, and adversary political and intelligence operatives--directly through securing information and indirectly through "false flag operations," wherein the intentional leaker or overclassification divulger becomes an unintentional committer of treason. As well, both problems weaken the rule of law--the very construct that legislators try and reinforce. And these problems can only noxiously interact with other problems--viz, intentional espionage, sabotage, and treason. These last problems are further fueled by invalid models of human behavior and motivation on the part of legislators. Finally, all problems are somewhat dependent on yet other cognitions, emotions, and motivations of the legislators and their interactions with aspects of the legislative system.

Thus, as opposed to focusing on semantics, the US Senate and the US House of Representatives as well might do better to focus on political psychology. (See Guest, D.E. (1998). Is the psychological contract worth taking seriously? *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 19, 649-664; Kleinmann, M. V., & Krise, E. F. (1957). Mental illness and classified information. *United States Armed Forces Medical Journal*, 8, 1007-1016; Linn, L. (1973). Psychiatric factors in security screening. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 130, 648-652; O'Hair, H. D., Cody, M. J., & McLaughlin, Margaret L. (1981). Prepared lies, spontaneous lies, Machiavellianism, and nonverbal communication. *Human Communication Research*, 7, 325-339; S. 2507,

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Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Reported to the Senate) SEC. 303, Prohibition On Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c106:4./temp/~c106rOuQEX:e1313>; Turnley, W. H., & Feldman, D. C. (1999). The impact of psychological contract violations on exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. *Human Relations*, 52, 895-922.) (Keywords: Classified Information, Intelligence, Leaking, Overclassification.)