3-23-2001

Falling Dominoes in 2001: Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Editor

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Political Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol10/iss10/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.
Abstract. This article describes psychologies of inevitability and their foundations pertaining to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

During the Cold War, United States (US) national security officials labeled as "hawks" cited the gospel of a domino theory. In its most radical incarnation, the theory impelled the dire necessity to not only contain but roll back any Communist initiative anywhere at any time. The consequence of not doing this would be a succession of successful Communist initiatives (one domino falling after another) eventually leading to "world victory"--today it would be global victory--for Communism. Often implied in this theoretical take on the world were other inevitabilities: e.g., (1) uncontesting an initiative or success always led to a detriment in one's other-perceived prestige and formidability and (2) following any cooperative venture with a Communist entity always led to others perceiving one to be weak. One upshot of this theory was the seemingly necessary, inevitable, and disastrous policy decision for the US Government (USG) to significantly engage Communist forces in Vietnam.

Nowadays, it is a segment of opponents of USG national security officials being accused of setting dominoes in motion. These opponents of USG initiatives for ballistic missile defense--both theatre and national--claim that decisions to develop and field such defenses will inevitability lead other nuclear powers to increase the number and quality of their own nuclear weapons. These opponents also claim that the USG initiatives also will inevitability lead to non-nuclear political entities with and without chemical and biological warfare assets developing and/or upgrading missile-borne threats before ballistic missile defense is fully fielded. As well, they claim that the initiatives will fatally harm USG relations with allies--this last assertion already becoming disconfirmed by the ongoing discourse of public diplomacy.