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Ayla H. Schbley

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Author: Dr. Ayla H. Schbley

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Notes.

1. In 1990, Mexico refused to extradite William Morales to the United States for the murder of a DEA special agent. Similarly, in 1988 Germany refused to extradite Mohammed Ali Hamadi, one of TWA 847 hijackers, for the murder of a US Navy diver Robert Stethem.

2. Qaddafi's uncontroverted implication in the 1985 Rome and Vienna airports attacks, his attempt to finance Chicago La Roche gang terror campaigns, and Berlin's La Belle discotheque bombing justified the United States' retaliation (Fitzgerald 1998, Davis 1990).

3. The cruise missile attack on Khartoum, ordered by President Clinton, destroyed what once was one of Usama Bin El-Addan's (Bin Laden) business ventures (Presidential Documents 1998).

4. Weapons purchased via the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, and those delivered by the CIA to the Afghani Mujahidines are being used by Hezbollah against Israel (U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred Fourth Congress, 2nd Session 1995).

5. In this researcher's opinion, political terrorism is "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change" (Hoffman 1998, p.43). Religious terrorism, on the other hand, is defined: as violent acts performed by elements of a religious organization/sect growing out of a commitment to communicate a divine message. Religious terrorism is distinguishable from political terrorism in that:

- Religious terrorism is a method of forcefully communicating perceived divine messages and/or will.
- Religious terrorism is performed by elements of a religious organization/sect.
- Most violent acts of religious terrorism are not restricted to the influence of governmental decision-making.
- Religious terrorism operations are solely executed for the purpose of fulfilling personal salvation by answering a perceived divine message and/or the satisfactions of religious grievances.
- Non-self-defensive acts of violence distinguish religious terrorism from those committed in fighting for religious freedom.
- The potential religious terrorist has an affinity for martyrdom and is not averse to risk, but is a risk taker.
- A religious terrorist's affinity for self-immolation is inversely related to his/her wealth.

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· To religious terrorists, killing an infidel has the worshiped blessing and is not considered by them to be either unethical or immoral, let alone criminal. Thus, a religious terrorist is distinguished from a political terrorist by his/her unconsciousness of the maliciousness in the violence of his/her acts as s/he pursues his/her own salvation (Schbley 2000).

6. Terrorism was one of the primary topics addressed by President Bush during his 1988 election campaign. Vice-President Bush was also the chair of the Presidential Special Task Force for combating terrorism (The Vice President's Task Force 1986).

7. During an interview with PBS regarding the hostages in Lebanon, in October 1994, former Secretary of State Schultz stated, "If we established a dialogue with Hezbollah, we would have acknowledged their presence. We will not negotiate with terrorists" (Kor 1991).

8. Recently, Congress and the Clinton administration reintroduced federal troops to domestic law enforcement, for the first time since 1878, by creating The Joint Forces Command (JFC). This JFC will direct troops and equipment in response to domestic terrorist attacks.

9. Since 1989, of the 400-plus/year American casualties associated with hostage taking, an average of 389 can be labeled as justifiable homicides by police (Karmen 1996).

10. In 1987, the French government seized a ship containing over 150 tons of munitions, SAM-7 missiles, heavy machine guns, mortars, assault rifles, SEMTEX plastic explosives and electronic detonators. This shipment was requisitioned by the IRA.

11. During an interview in October 1994 with PBS regarding the events surrounding the hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon, former National Security Council Staff member Poindexter stated that he and Oliver North carried cyanide pills while in Iran attempting hostage negotiation.

12. On March 31, 1998, Daniel L. Germann, Executive Committee, New Tribes Mission testified before the House Committee on International Relations that on January 31, 1993, armed guerrillas entered the Kuna village of Pucuro in the Darien region of Panama. They captured three North American missionaries who lived in the village, and took these missionaries with them as they disappeared into the night ultimately crossing the nearby border into Colombia. The captors, known as Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (F.A.R.C.), soon made radio contact with the missionary organization in Panama and demanded five million dollars in ransom. Negotiations continued by radio for the next year, with the missionary organization and the hostages' families informing the captors that there was no money available for ransom of kidnapped missionaries. Radio contacts ceased unexpectedly in January, 1994 and there have been no further direct contacts with the captors. Five years later, these missionaries continue to be held hostage

13. In 1985, a wheelchair-bound US citizen, Leon Klinghoffer, was aboard the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro when a Palestinian terrorist murdered him.

14. In 1987, eleven European Community members and the US banned new arms sales to Syria, suspended high-level talks, and increased scrutiny of its diplomatic personnel. This international reaction was in response to the apprehension of a pregnant Irish woman boarding an El Al jetliner in

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London, while carrying a Syrian-made explosive device. Her Jordanian-born boyfriend, who is employed by the Syrian ambassador to Great Britain, gave it to her.

15. In an interview with CBS, translated by this study, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin unwillingly praised the effectiveness of Hezbollah's suicide bombers by stating:

"We have not seen by Palestinians terrorists similar acts (referring to Hezbollah's suicide car bombers). Their execution from the very beginning dependent on the knowledge of the terrorist, he has to commit suicide to carry his mission. The car bombs, the truck bombs, these kinds of terrorist acts have not been carried at all by any one of the Palestinian terrorists. Shiites are ready to do things that normally other Muslims don't carry out."

Versions of Prime Minister Rabin's 1992 statement were published (in over 17 Issues) by Hezbollah's two newspapers, al-Ahad and al-Muntalaq, and broadcast by most of their politburo members on their radios, Sawt-al-Nidal and Sawt-al-Iman, and television station al-Manar, as indicators of Hezbollah and the Shi'a's unique commitment and effectiveness. In this researcher's opinion, Prime Minister Rabin's statement provided the blue print for Hamas to stand up and be noticed. Less than one year later:

A young suicide bomber in 1993...On the first morning after Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yassir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the historic peace accords in Washington, nineteen-year-old Bahaa al-Din al-Najr rose for dawn prayers, bathed, shaved his head, said good-bye to his friends, and went to pray again at the Majd Abbas, a large mosque in Israeli-occupied Gaza City. With explosives wrapped around his waist, he emerged from the mosque and walked the few steps down the street to an Israeli police compound. According to eyewitnesses, he slipped inside a sliding steel gate and hurled a hand grenade before falling in a burst of gunfire that set off some of the explosives. A graphic photograph of al-Najr's body lying on the ground, its lower torso blown to bits by the force of the blast, appeared in the next day's edition of the New York Times and was picked up by other major media (Appleby 2000).

16. Case in point, one of Brian Keenan's Lebanese captors, Said, solicited Brian for a sponsorship to the land of milk and honey (Keenan 1993). Had we obliged we would have identified many of their dormant cells worldwide.

17. National Security Council staffers John Poindexter and Oliver North pulled a "dramatic seat-of-the-pants operation" when U.S. warplanes intercepted an EgyptAir jetliner carrying convicted Palestinian terrorists. The New York Daily News headline captured the national sentiment: "We Bagged the Bums."

18. Yehya Ayash (AKA-The Engineer) was killed by Shin Bet agents in 1996 when his cell-phone battery exploded. The killing occurred in reaction to his bombing campaign that led to the death of over 70 Israelis.

19. Hezbollah Secretary General, Abbas al-Musawi, and his immediate family were killed when, on February 5, 1992, an Israeli Helicopter Gun Ship intercepted his motorcade.

20. The FBI was able to lure Yunnis, a Lebanese Terrorist convicted of the TWA Flight 864 hijacking, on a heroin deal from Lebanon into Cyprus and then into Attica Federal Penitentiary. It was also able to secure Pakistan's cooperation in the capture, trial, and conviction of the World Trade Center's bomber. Those two terrorists are our nation's only foreign counterterrorism trophies.

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21. CIA Director William Casey was accused by the media of "proactive war making, and taking the war to the terrorists." Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah accused the CIA in 1986, 1991 and 1994 of botched assassination attempts.

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