10-11-2002

Trends. Predecisional Distortion: An Example of Psychology Distorting Justice?

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Predecisional distortion is a construct often associated with the psychology of jury decision making. The construct frequently is interpreted as the biased interpretation by a juror of new evidence in support of whatever verdict is favored by that juror as a trial progresses.

At issue is whether predecisional distortion should be construed as a bias at all, above or beyond the notion that all human sensation, perception, and cognition are biased. Supporters of predecisional distortion as bias seem to necessarily contend that prior information should have no bearing on succeeding information; that new information should be interpreted out of context; in so far as that context comprises or is formed by prior information; and that any and all information must be considered in isolation from its context or from other information.

This atomistic position on the appropriateness and implicit adaptiveness of cognitive functioning certainly belies extensive psychological research on the many merits of informational integration. In fact, the notion that each new snippet of information should be processed in light of an individual’s best momentary assessment concerning the nature of the world has face validity, is compatible with descriptive accounts of human phenomenology, and is consonant with state-of-the-art analyses of cognitive functioning.