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The Recovery of the Aviation Industry: The Aviation Security Challenge

Editor

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Abstract. This article is based on a presentation made to the SAE 2002 World Aviation Congress on November 6, 2002 by the IBPP Editor. The article’s focus is on how representatives of the aviation industry need to think about aviation security to facilitate the industry’s economic recovery.

Introduction. There are two kinds of aviation security. The first addresses the terrorist threat. The second addresses all other security threats including, but not limited to, drug- and alcohol- influenced security violations wherein psychological sequelae largely constitute motive and cause, instrumental criminal behavior related to illicit trafficking, and impulsive behavior related to functioning above frustration threshold and often involving anger. It is the first kind of aviation security that is having the most significant impact on the aviation industry’s economic recovery. This impact is occurring directly through fear of flying and increased security-related overhead and indirectly through decreasing the pleasure, comfort, and convenience of flying by effecting many security-related policies, programs, and procedures.

There are two further aspects to the question of aviation security hindering the aviation industry’s recovery. The first is that as direct and indirect impacts continue to increase, terrorism wins even as the aviation security focus is supposed to ensure that they lose. The second is that as an aviation security focus increases in a zero-sum world of finite resources, a necessary focus on aviation safety decreases and the impact of security on safety and safety on security is ignored, discounted, or given short shrift.

The Nature of a War Against Terrorism With Global Reach. Both non-state political actors and governments of nation-states are involved in terrorism with global reach. In fact, today's era of globalization significantly facilitates and activates the potential of global reach for almost all practitioners of terrorism.

Practitioners of terrorism with global reach are not confined to political or geographical boundaries. Government sponsors can easily employ non-state actor cut-outs to further obfuscate the political, geographical, or operational origins of terrorist operations. That terrorism is more and more becoming a transnational phenomenon impedes the effectiveness of national antiterrorist and counterterrorist policies and laws.

A recommendation for recovery is that antiterrorist and counterterrorist policy and law must be global in nature. Unfortunately, there are huge political, cultural, social, economic, historical, and psychological impediments to effecting such a recommendation.

The Terrorist Goal: Destruction of Open Society and an Open Economy. These extremely totalistic, subjective, and difficult to interpret goals preclude negotiation and mediation based. The currency of antiterrorism and counterterrorist success then becomes either victory or defeat, i.e., within the context of an existential zero-sum game.
Unfortunately, assets, representatives, and consumers of the aviation industry appear to be functional
and symbolic terrorist targets. This is the case, functionally, because global trade, investment, and other
activities bearing on economic productivity are at least partially dependent on the aviation industry
directly through the industry’s own success or failure and indirectly through the dependence of other
economic activities on the industry. This is also the case, symbolically, because aviation often enough
represents an elective affinity for mobility and freedom in one’s life. In fact, flying has represented
strivings and ambition to be all that one can be in various myths and cultural heritages. These symbolic
aspects of aviation generate the sense of passion and magic ascribed to it by so many in the industry.

Unfortunately, there is no security-related recommendation for recovery here, because aviation
essentially and intrinsically is an ineluctable terrorism target. To be otherwise might only occur through
irreparable damage to the industry.

The Natures of the Terrorist Foe. Only somewhat valuably can terrorists be thought of as members of
discrete and formal organizations and groups. Instead, it is more valuable to conceive of and perceive
operational terrorists and people who plan, fund, and otherwise support terrorism as individuals who
can mix and match for specific tasks. Motivations may be immutable or wax and wane. Ideological
opponents may cooperatively engage as easily as competitively square off. Within certain constraints, it
seems to be the case that psychological, cultural, and social boundaries are permeable.

A recommendation for recovery is to break the antiterrorism and counterterrorism mind-set of discrete
and formal terrorist organizations, of terrorist team rosters, and of overemphasized order in a more
disordered world. A more flexible cognitive heuristic to process human and technical intelligence may
lead to a more accurate conception of the terrorist threat and how to meet it. This is especially the case
in matters of profiling and threat assessment.

Shortfalls of Antiterrorist and Counterterrorist Technology. Technology certainly has its place as part of
the response to terrorism. Evolving products in areas such as explosive detection, biometrics, profiling,
and others supporting the four core security disciplines, viz., physical, operations, personnel,
communications need to be funded and employed.

However, terrorist entities can possess sophisticated reconnaissance, surveillance, research,
development, and planning capabilities. These entities can become aware of the technology fielded
against them and methods to avoid or exploit them.

A recommendation for recovery is to upgrade and more coherently employ counterintelligence
capabilities against the intelligence and counterintelligence assets of terrorists.

Blackmail, Prudent Threat Assessment, and a Crisis of Will. Military and political realities may preclude
going after the most threatening of terrorist targets’ especially when they have government sponsors
because such targets may already have reached a level of threat that only could be reduced through
seemingly unacceptable loss.

For example, a first move for the United States Government (USG) to militarily intervene with Iraq
instead of Iran might be opposed based on the latter’s far more significant terrorist role against the USG.
Opposition against the USG militarily intervening with Iraq instead of North Korea might be founded on
the latter’s more significant nuclear weapons and conventional military capabilities. Yet, Iran’s global
terrorist capabilities and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and conventional military threat seriously
constrain USG foreign policy options. In fact, these realities support the option of military intervention with Iraq before it, too, develops capabilities that constrain foreign policy options.

A feeble recommendation for recovery is to develop and effect aviation security policies and programs while tolerating a world in which primary threats may be untouchable and only defensive and not offensive strategies may be acceptable to political authorities.

Information Management? The Paradox of Secrecy and Disclosure. One might believe that holding information ever more close to the vest might be a prudent policy in a security conscious world. However, compartmentalization of information may mitigate against “connecting the dots” and delineating important patterns. In fact, disclosing at least some sensitive information may actually be more valuable from a security perspective, because it may increase the number of security conscious people who can see and hear when and what security officials cannot. These people can then become extensions of security authority and provide unique value towards meeting security threat.

A recommendation for recovery is to vet policies and programs on the classification and special handling of security-related information so that only what truly is precious for security is protected. The rest might even be intentionally and intensively transmitted to the general public. Unfortunately, this recommendation is much easier to formulate in the abstract than to effect in the concrete. (Some of this has to do with the subversion of secrecy policy to hide examples of corruption, malfeasance, and error.)

Information Management? Integration and Interoperability of Information. There are many political, cultural, and psychological impediments to sharing information even among security authorities and representatives with a need to know.

There are turf battles among representatives of agencies laboring under the beliefs that knowledge is power; intelligence is knowledge; and prestige, controlling authority, authorizations for personnel hiring, and money constitute power. There are cultural and psychological opacities that mitigate against sharing of information between representatives of the public and private spheres as well as the worlds of intelligence and law enforcement. The above battles and opacities can even cause or reinforce technological interoperability so damaging to timely, responsive, and secure communication.

A recommendation for recovery is the construction of human resource management systems that condition against pressures to resist information sharing. Frankly, however, one cannot be bullish about the likelihood of success of such systems.

Aviation Security Personnel Selection. What is the “right stuff” for the various types of security roles? Often presumptions and assumptions may not stand up to rigorous analysis. For example, mandating US citizenship for passenger and baggage screeners discounts the number of US citizens convicted of committing treason, espionage, or intentional mishandling of sensitive information. The mandating of US citizenship also discounts the fervor and passion for citizenship possessed by non-citizens who appreciate its worth more than many people who have it.

The perspective that formal education and security task performance is positively correlated is common but problematic. Specific tasks may be unrelated or negatively correlated with either or both high and low formal education.
Even the presence, absence, or types of criminal records as personnel security criteria may be problematic. The notion that a transgression in one area must be associated with a higher probability of transgression in other areas may or may not be the case in specific instances. The absence of a criminal record may at least at times be associated with criminal behavior not being observed, successfully investigated, or conclusively adjudicated.

A recommendation for recovery is an ongoing research, development, and implementation project bearing on the human factors in the widest biopsychosocial sense that, indeed, have adequate reliability and validity for specific security tasks.

Commercial and General Aviation. There is little question that most of the focus on aviation security has been on large commercial as opposed to general aviation. The rationales for this focus are two-fold. First, there is the attribution that 9/11 involved large commercial aviation and, thus, future aviation terrorism would as well. Second, there is the attribution that terrorism receives a bigger bang for the buck when bigger aircraft and more people die.

As to the former, the history of aviation terrorism is replete with examples of antiterrorist and counterterrorist authorities preparing for a repeat of the most recent attack while terrorist perpetrators are planning the next novel attack. As to the latter, the subjective psychology of aviation terrorism suggests that a very small plane killing very few people or destroying very little might still have a bigger bang for the buck than the converse. Here, subjective reality can trump objective reality.

A recommendation for recovery is that a comprehensive general aviation security plan needs to be developed and implemented because failures in general aviation security are tragic in themselves and because they can have huge economic consequences for large commercial aviation.

The Attractiveness of Non-Aviation Targets. The vulnerabilities of aviation security are somewhat mitigated by the observation that terrorists do not have a fetish for aviation as a target. There are many attractive targets such as ports, ground transportation, oil refineries, toxic waste repositories, schools, houses of worship, entertainment venues, and other symbols of everyday life.

The recommendation for recovery is but a passive one. The good news for aviation security is bad news for others.