5-22-2003

Hope Springs Eternal: The Psychology of Deception

Editor

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp

Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Epistemology Commons, International Relations Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol14/iss16/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu, wolfe.309@erau.edu.
Title: Hope Springs Eternal: The Psychology of Deception
Author: Editor
Volume: 14
Issue: 16
Date: 2003-05-22
Keywords: American Government, Deception, SSCI

Abstract: The author considers the idea of detecting deception, noted difficulties in doing so, and questions whether additional funding applied to detecting deception in the context of terrorism would be effective. The author refers to the efforts of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) specifically.

The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has recently issued a report on the intelligence authorization act for the 2004 fiscal year that recommends, “an expanded research effort directed at methods for detecting deception.” Of special note are “research activities relating to the development of new techniques in the behavioral, psychological, or physiological assessment of individuals” that may serve to create “alternatives to the polygraph as a security evaluation tool for the U.S. Government.” The report also mandates “a written report identifying the research most likely to advance the understanding of the use of such assessment of individuals in security evaluations” by March 2004.

However—as noted and reinforced by two significant studies in 1983 (Office of Technology Assessment) and 2002 (National Academy of Sciences)—the same significant difficulties have been noted in demonstrating the reliability and validity of behavioral and life sciences applications to detecting deception. These difficulties include the application’s purpose—e.g., mass screening for suitability versus individual screening for liability and perpetration; the extremely low base rate of proscribed misbehavior and inferred character traits; the challenge of demonstrating low false negative and false positive rates; the complexity of the phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral aspects of deception; and even philosophy of science Issues concerning the nature of the whole detection-of-deception enterprise.