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The System-Change in Europe: Theoretical and Political Consequences for the Future Role of NATO. A Comprehensive Evaluation of Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Evidence and Possible Political Guidelines

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The System-Change in Europe: Theoretical and Political Consequences for the Future Role of NATO. A Comprehensive Evaluation of Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Evidence and Possible Political Guidelines

(NATO Individual Research Fellowship 1995-1997)

Alexander Siedschlag

Abstract

In its consequences for the future role of the Atlantic Alliance, the system-change in Europe means more than what it is commonly conceived of to be. Much of the political and scholarly debates about NATO's future embrace military conflict management and Alliance enlargement as crucial factors. Yet another set of decisive factors determining NATO's future lies in the *intra-Alliance* political and military relationships. The immediate challenges in the first place stem from conflicts of internal origin, such as reconciling divergent interests and approaches among its members.

NATO's approach of institutional adaptation to the post-Cold War European landscape in the period between 1990 and 1997 followed a way from 'interlocking' to 'interacting'. The so often-invoked concept of *interlocking institutions* under guidance of the Atlantic Alliance threatened to become a functionally unspecified, more inhibiting than reinforcing juxtaposition of *interlocking institutions*. The Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996 marked a decisive turning point, as it gave up NATO's claim to an ever-leading role in the interplay of European security institutions, turning to the new principle of *interacting institutions* - namely a coordinated interplay of the different European security institutions that does not rest upon one lead-institution but rather on the idea of general common regulations for a well-defined functional sharing. The CJTF-concept is an appropriate device to secure the success of this strategy.

The Alliance, in continuing its process of institutional adaptation and enlargement, should refrain from adopting to diffuse political responsibilities and claiming a too broad functional spectrum in *post-strategic security* politics. Rather, it should adhere to functional specificity. This does not, of course, mean that NATO should devote itself to seeking to redefine post-strategic defense and security politics into all-out war military strategy. In the post-strategic security realm, military aspects of security by far not only refer to classical war scenarios or military intervention but also play an important role in peaceful management of internal conflict and democratic consolidation.

The analysis shows that NATO's specific *long-standing functions* enshrined in the Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty have remained remarkably unquestioned and even been reaffirmed by the system-change in Europe 1989-1991. However, NATO's procedures and politics to fulfill these functions and realize these aims are to be redefined and where necessary redesigned due to the changed political setting and scope in and under which it now is operating in. Primarily, NATO had, and still has, *not to redefine its functional role but its operational prerequisites to comply with it*. As for theory, we need an approach conceiving of the Alliance both as a growing political actor beyond short-term interest calculations of its constitutive actors (the states) as well as in their continued dependence on those constitutive actors.

**The System-Change in Europe:
Theoretical and Political Consequences for the Future Role of
NATO.**

**A Comprehensive Evaluation of Theoretical Propositions, Empirical
Evidence and Possible Political Guidelines**

Final Report,
NATO Individual Research Fellowship,
Academic Cycle 1995-1997

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SED DIU MAGNUM INTER MORTALIS CERTAMEN
 FUT, VINE CORPORIS AN VIRTUTE ANIMI RES
 MILITARIS MAGIS PROCEDERET ...
 AC MIHI QUIDEM, TAMETSI HAUDQUAQUAM PAR
 GLORIA SEQUITUR SCRIPTOREM ET ACTOREM
 RERUM, TAMEN IN PRIMIS ARDUUM VIDETUR RES
 GESTAS SCRIBERE, PRIMUM QUOD FACTA DICTIS
 EXAEQUANDA SUNT, DEHINC QUIA PLERIQUE,
 QVAE DELICTA REPREHENDERIS, MALEVOLENTIA
 ET INVIDIA DICTA PUTANT ...
 (C. SALLUSTIUS CRISPUS, *BELLUM CATILINAE*, §§ I,5 & III,2).

1. L'OTAN est morte, vive l'OTAN! - Fictions, Facts and Challenges

1.1 *Old Functions Preserved, New Functions Gained*

With the coming Summit of Madrid in July 1997, the Atlantic Alliance visibly will set a milestone in the process of its institutional adaptation as rung in by the London Declaration of July 1990. This will also mark a watershed between internal adaptation as the Alliance's chief preoccupation during the last seven and a half years and the step towards its external adaptation, primarily defined in terms of enlargement. This break was naturally more than unforeseeable in late 1994, when the project leading to this study was outlined. Yet it is an incident political scientists usually only can dream of that the formulation of a research report almost perfectly coincides with a decisive point in political developments, and that these do not outdate their research but in contrast confirm much of the related conclusions and outlooks. Thus, beyond the understandable focusing on Alliance enlargement and its ramifications, one should not depreciate the various other dimensions, and pivotal issues, relating to the future role of NATO.

In contrast to radical interpretations which (regardless of the dimension of Alliance enlargement) either do not see any viable alternative and amendment to NATO in the area of post-bipolar European securityⁱ or deem NATO's *raison d'être* irretrievably vanished along with the end of the Cold Warⁱⁱ, one in any case has to assume that the Alliance with its politico-military dual structure, as it has existed since its foundation, currently exerts at least three key functions:ⁱⁱⁱ First, providing for the *collective defense* of its members according to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (in the face of continued but diffuse external threats). Second, fulfilling several *cooperative security* functions so to establish stable relations to its former adversaries on the soil of the erstwhile Warsaw-Pact territory (in the sense of the institutional adaptation of its structures, for example by establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC, and the bilaterally-based program of Partnership for Peace, PfP^{iv}); this role also pertains to regional conflict prevention and management. Third, exerting important coordinating and cooperative functions *within* the Alliance itself.

On the other hand, diverse factors have indisputably amounted to cause NATO a general loss of relevance:^v The radically decreased common public perception of clear-cut threats has posed increased compulsion to justify provisions for continued collective-defense ability in the U.S. and Western Europe; the discussions about an own operational role for WEU and a genuine European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) as well as the new activism of OSCE have ended NATO's lead in questions of 'new' European security politics; extended early-warning periods and scarce military budgets have caused symptoms of free fall in some national force and defense structures, increasingly questioning short-term deployability of several national force contingents.

Unexpectedly however, exactly after the loss of its adversary and subsequent growing into different straining and controversial new security roles (such as implementing U.N. sanctions or setting up diplomatic liaisons with the former Warsaw Pact nations), NATO has developed specific new legitimating potentials and moreover a remarkable institutional attractiveness - obviously reaching far beyond its mere self-preservation. This not only has become clear in the case of Middle East European states' wishes for accession but also in the French "rapprochement"^{vi} towards the Alliance's integrated military structure.^{vii} Just after the end of bipolarity and strategic security policy reflecting global inter-bloc confrontation, thus, NATO is on the way of developing a considerable extend of independent,

corporate identity (or, at least, the governments of its member states are prepared - whatever the reasons - to concede it a considerable extend of institutional action potential).^{viii}

The leading assumption of the present study is that the system-change in Europe means, in its consequences for the future role of the Atlantic Alliance, more than what it is commonly conceived of to be. Much of the political and scholarly debates about NATO's future embrace military conflict management and Alliance enlargement as crucial factors for preserving its functions and relevancy. These aspects naturally are decisive for NATO's future but by no means perfectly determine it, nor are they sufficient to explain the actual process of its institutional adaptation since 1990. Focusing exclusively on them tempts one to externalize the whole problématique of NATO's institutional adaptation, only asking for 'new' external threats (conflict management) or stabilizing outreach (enlargement and relationship to other international organizations).

Whereas naturally taking those factors into account, the present study argues that another set of crucial factors determining NATO's future lies in the *intra-Alliance* political and military relationships in the face of the prevalence of national interest-calculations on the side of its members, especially as far as peace operations are concerned. And foremost, the actually *immediate* challenges which the Atlantic Alliance is currently facing not so much result from external factors such as ethno-national conflicts but from conflicts of internal origin, such as reconciling divergent approaches among its members to defense and security in the post-strategic realm.

This suggests not to limit the analysis of NATO's institutional adaptation and future role to its obvious immediate political context, that is, the Euro-regional setting, but also to delve into the national context of Alliance politics. On the other hand, it is necessary to appreciate the broader context of post-Cold War international relations and security as the constitutive context for the distinct European regional setting NATO operates in.

Taking off from these underlying assumptions - which are to be laid out in greater detail beneath -, the study will seek answers to the four following questions:

1. What is the distinct character of post-strategic European and transatlantic security and security policy and what consequences follow for NATO's current and future institutional adaptation and functions?
2. What are the related challenges for international relations theory and scholarly analysis? What is here the practical impact of theory in the sense of "foreign policy engineering"^{ix} and concrete political guideline-output?
3. What are the problematic linkages between the different contexts of post-strategic Alliance politics and security as assumed in this study (global, regional, national) and resulting predicaments or dilemmas in their consequences for NATO and possible future Alliance policy guidelines? Here the national dimension is of prime importance, for the critical junctures of problems most visibly materialize in national security strategies and Alliance politics and must primarily be dealt with on this level. Note that NATO is an international, no supranational, organization, leaving its member states full national sovereignty.
4. What are feasible possibilities of theoretical integration in the light of the results found? In addition, what could be a feasible framework for post-strategic European and transatlantic security beyond the, as will be seen unrealistic, vision of a comprehensive European security order and institutional structure?

1.2 An Unconventional Agenda of Alliance Challenges

The particular nature of the European 'new' security 'threats' and challenges has by now almost become conventional wisdom: They reach from nuclear proliferation over minority problems, the Russian near-abroad doctrine with its ramifications and ethno-national conflicts up to conflicts implied in the plan for an all-European security structure itself.^x Conflict potentials and scenarios of such kind notwithstanding, it is unlikely that we will witness in the short run any escalation comparable to the post-Yugoslav contingency which would thus call for an analogous resort to the Alliance's

military capabilities and operational structures. By now it has become clear that the pivotal challenges for NATO are considerably different from strategic problems and questions of regional stability in the narrow sense

The flexibility of NATO's goal-setting and principles had, and still has, a paradoxical effect: The Alliance was the first European international institution to devise its post-Cold War agenda and political guidelines, but it also was, and still is, the one to be most preoccupied with its internal adaptation, its self-positioning within the framework of European international institutions and with reconciling divergent national interests, which naturally also have changed with bipolarity abating. From such a vantage-point, it is not in the first place the much-invoked 'new security threats' that pose the critical challenges for NATO's future. Rather, it are those issues concerning the 'new' NATO's final shape itself. They include:

- The question of a European pillar of the Alliance and the extent to which it should be complemented or paralleled by an own European Security and Defense Identity with its own operational capabilities.
- The reform of the Alliance's command and control structures.
- The question of enlargement.
- The relative importance of and relations between NATO's military and political structure and bodies.
- The symptoms of a free fall in some member state's national defense structures and short-term force deployability.
- The general course of Alliance post-strategic security engagement.
- NATO's stance in the institutional landscape of European conflict management.

These types of challenges mainly stem from a particular set of all-regional developments in post-Cold War Europe towards a condition of post-strategic security (a concept to be laid out in greater detail below), which in the first place comprise the following:

- A *strategic de-coupling* of Europe (that is, the reduction of its immediate dependency on both U.S. and Russian politics as well as U.S.-Russian relations) and a resulting further loss of the extrapolated stance of Europe in world affairs.
- Less allowance for *de-coupling of security issues from general political trends*, with increasing linkages between security/defense policy and political integration in general being even intentionally established. For example, political integration finds itself supplemented by an own security component (as in the case of an envisaged defense component of the European Union) or military integration also serves genuine political aims. This becomes obvious in the concept of Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters, entailing important political functions such as connecting NATO and WEU or providing a framework for security cooperation with East European states.
- Security (politics) in Europe is becoming *post-spatial*, increasingly influenced by sub-regional and transnational aspects (for example ethno-national tensions, separational conflicts, minority conflicts). This should lead to a broader security concept, within which security politics, conflict management and peaceful settlement of conflict are no longer contrary but complementary to each other. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that geostrategic calculations, or at least rhetorics, still play a role. This becomes clear in the Russian concept of the 'near abroad' as well as in a relative hyperactivity in the former Soviet bloc's rim areas. This became most obvious in the wars of Yugoslav succession but also applies, if obviously to a lesser extent, to the general political sphere of the post-World War I cordon-sanitaire nations' descendants, such as the Visegrad countries.
- The new Europe does not face the need of an *avoiding* strategy any more (avoiding inter-bloc clashes etc.), but in contrast it becomes necessary to establish *enabling* conditions, under which transformation and innovation can be guaranteed.

2. Theoretical Accounts on NATO's Adaptation and Future

2.1 *Beyond the Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate: From Metatheory to Practical Relevance*

It is to a large extent precisely to try to show the way back to the just mentioned practical policy engineering that the present study will seek to gain a theoretical perspective on the question of the system change in Europe and its consequences for the future role of NATO. The underlying assumption is that what matters for any

theoretically sound account on NATO's development and future after 1989/90 is to devise an analytical framework that allows for conceptualizing from a dual perspective the process of change which the Atlantic Alliance has been undergoing: Firstly, treating NATO as a self-reliant *institution*, that is, *as NATO*, beyond a mere conglomeration of its member states' interests and policy orientations; yet at the same time, secondly, heeding that the Alliance is no supranational institution, nor does it exist in a vacuum. Though shaping an increasingly intrinsic-valued context for political action, it is again embedded in various other contexts. The foremost analytical consequence is to tie NATO and the process of its institutional adaptation to the new European politico-security condition back to its constitutive actors, namely the governments of its member states, whereas at the same time seeing it in the light of the regional environment. This environment is shaped by the new forms and conditions of Euro-Atlantic security politics as well as other existing security organizations, forums and initiatives in Europe. Whereas some five years of scholarly inquiry into NATO's future after defusing bipolarity brought forth a variety of post-bipolar security philosophies and treatments of the whole spectrum of Euro-Atlantic security affairs,^{xi} now the issue of Eastern expansion seems to have swept away much of those deep-grounded general interest in NATO's further development. Naturally except of how, how fast, and with whom the Alliance will enlarge and what might be likely Russian reactions to these steps. However, the issue of NATO's future and the outlook on a post-bipolar European security order is and will remain by far more than a question of enlargement. Alike the public and scholarly focus on this one dimension of NATO's post-bipolar outlook risk to too much divert attention from some other, related or different, fundamental aspects of NATO's future and institutional adaptation.

Foremost, it is indispensable to treat NATO (and its future) on the grounds of more flexible theoretical and analytical instruments than the current grand *neorealist-neoliberal debate*^{xii} with its popular recourse to stylized propositions about national cooperativity and its stability allows for. Paradoxically enough, institutional forms *themselves*, while the original occasion for the controversy, do not play a very prominent role in the current discussions but are only examined in their effects (as intervening variables) upon national interest-formation and rational state action: Do states prefer a strong or a loose institutional framework when choosing to cooperate? Do they prefer institutional arrangements with few or numerous members? Do they prefer issue-specific or generalized arenas for cooperation?^{xiii} Thus what the discussion constantly fails to capture is the fact that strictly speaking, the related theoretical assumptions all focus on *state action* and that consequently questions relating to intermediary international-political forms are, if anyway, analytically amenable to them only with severe restrictions. Yet exactly among those intermediary forms numbers NATO as an *international institution* - with its growing corporate identity and at least relative de-coupling from immediate effects of its member states' short-term calculations in terms of national interest.^{xiv} Nevertheless, much of the neorealist-neoliberal controversy will still boil down to the celebration of a questionable *structuralist* approach to international politics and security - no matter if this seems appropriate to the subject matter in question or not. For instance, neorealism of the Waltzian style, the predominant core orientation of neorealism's proponents in the debate with the neoliberals,^{xv} still asserts the uniform reaction of the "units", or nations, to (always equally perceived) changes in the international-political matrix of power to be the essence of all international politics and security, as the keeping of each unit's international "position" in relation to the others is proclaimed to be the ultimate goal.^{xvi} For Waltzian neorealism, or structural realism, the space between the global international system-structure with its anarchical organizing principle and the single states, or units, is thus logically empty. Therefore, there can be no forms of institutionalized regional cooperation but only temporary "amalgamations", which come and go with the respective current structural shapes of the world-political global constellation.^{xvii} Those do not possess any intrinsic potential but owe their existence - and, when time has come, their abolishment - to the "most powerful states in the system", which use them as arenas for settling their power relations.^{xviii}

Consequently, structural realism, as some of its proponents frankly admit, regularly encounters difficulty when seeking to come to analytical terms with international cooperation that does not take place 'directly' in the international system and between, and exclusively between, single states but within *institutionalized contexts*.^{xix} Neorealist alliance theory has attempted to elucidate that blind spot by switching over to asserting Waltzian structural effects *within* those institutionalized contexts^{xx}. Yet it is far from examining those contexts *themselves*, merely opening up just another inventory of their possible effects upon national (cooperative) behavior.

Paradoxically enough, neorealism's neoliberal challenge in its common Keohane-inspired version^{xxi} typically exacerbates rather than alleviates these biases. Originally departing from seeking to slacken and amend Waltz-type neorealist structuralism, it was fast at taking over insights from new institutional economics into international relations analysis but stopped far short of developing a truly institutional

approach to international relations. Instead, it continued to search for general world-political effects on 'the' states as such. However, in contrast to neorealism, it no longer assumes them to stem from the anarchical organization of the international system but from the degree to which international cooperation is - at least on a regional scale - "institutionalized".^{xxii} For example, guided by common norms, rules, reciprocal expectations and the structuring effects of international organizations.

These institutionalized forms of international cooperation then, as neoliberalism goes on to argue, help states to save on transaction costs and to avoid sub-optimal outcomes of cooperation; that is, they defuse the so-called "political market failure".^{xxiii} All this leads neoliberalism to assume that elements of institutional certainty will lead even strictly self-interest oriented actors to develop an interest in maintaining and furthering international cooperative forms.^{xxiv} In the last analysis, neoliberalism broadly takes over the structuralist methodology of its neorealist counterpart: It examines regular effects of international 'structures' upon 'the' states (how those structures themselves evolve falls beyond its scope). Yet in contrast to structural realism, neoliberalism does not spot these structures in the anarchical organization of the international system but in international "conventions"^{xxv} which states, each following its own rational self-interest, commonly establish and comply with.

A differentiated typology of the corresponding international institutional forms however does not seem to be of much interest, as does a closer examination of *their* qualities, conditions of existence and development as distinctive international-political phenomena - and not just as products of and arenas for rationally calculated inter-state cooperation, be it on the ground of incidentally complementary national self-interests of enlightened, common interests.^{xxvi} Rather, international 'institutions' seem to possess the bewitching gift to materialize into anything, nevertheless strangely always exerting the same kind of effects and obeying the same structural logic as outlined above. As analysis may demand, one time convention-based rule-systems are declared prototypical international institutions,^{xxvii} another time a specific subset of them, namely international regimes,^{xxviii} and if required, also international organizations are convertible to institutions, in that they serve as organizing arenas for multilateral cooperation^{xxix}. This one again underscores that neoliberalism's analytical interest is not in international institutions but in state action. Institutions only count in their effects on national international behavior,^{xxx} not as genuine entities in world politics^{xxxi}.

Puzzling of that kind does not only miss political reality, which even in the security realm does not simply consist in spot decisions with instantly calculable loss or gain-amounts but in confounded payoffs of different, *intersecting* political 'games' and joint acts, that is, "conjunctures"^{xxxii} of at first sight seemingly independent developments. It also fails to incorporate, or possibly even notice, important theoretical insights beyond the cooperation-under-anarchy scope. For example, so-called liberal-intergovernmentalist oriented research has shown that states not only jump forth from one cooperation-bargaining spot to another but in contrast may use 'historical', existent cooperative arrangements to back their current bargaining position or to mobilize domestic support.^{xxxiii}

2.2 Theory and Methodology in the Realm of Post-strategic Security

What only seems to have a chance of advancing theory and analysis in the emerging field of *post-strategic security* is concentrating upon the rapidly growing dynamic and interdependence of different political problématiques and continuous redefinition of political referential structures.^{xxxiv} In contrast to strategic security policy as a procedure of deterrence and avoidance, post-strategic security, especially as regards the East European transitional space, will have to be a procedure of political development. Here at least, security politics have actually become genuine *politics*, beyond narrow calculations of military capabilities, bargaining, or strategies of immediate crisis reaction. The existence, or absence, of a common political framework will be the critical variable deciding about success and failure of post-strategic security engagement. This importance of politics is in the first place due to the fact that there is no immediately existential common Euro-transatlantic security interest any more.

This makes it difficult to translate the historically remarkable pan-European and transatlantic international value-consensus about the predominance of peaceful conflict management into a specific consensus both about the future organization of common European security and common action in single cases. Here, calculations in terms of the national interest, as the article will argue, clearly prevail over common values. In this sense, the condition of post-strategic security newly poses the classical question of alliance cohesion. That is especially important for the future of the Atlantic Alliance: Decisive becomes the allies' ability to agree upon general political guidelines and devise according genuinely *common*, and not just incidentally complementary, interests.

The crucial theoretical and political puzzle then is the steady *self-positioning* of the actors in the face of security trends and risks. This brings functions of theory on the foreground that lie beyond the scope of the neorealist-neoliberal controversy: not ex-post explanation, but policy-escorting and projecting

construction of scenarios. In contemporary international relations theory, especially the so-called Copenhagen school^{xxxv} devotes itself to the related analytical tasks - together with proponents of a modified structural realism^{xxxvi}, which focuses on processes of regional political configuration that may vary from one issue to another, thus foreclosing any chance to be conceived of in structural terms of sustainable cooperation or iterated games.

In this sense, it suggests itself to refrain from reasoning about the mere *condition* of international or regional security, directing attention to the *process* of "securization"^{xxxvii}. That means trying to construct confluents of the various political trends and attempts to build a European security condition - beyond the illusion of a rational-functional security constructivism that both the neorealist and the neoliberal mainstream share to a large extent. Quite different from the point of departure that Hellmann and Wolf chose for their seminal study,^{xxxviii} NATO's future under the post-strategic European security condition seems less amenable to a structural-systemic type of analysis (as they see it exemplified by neorealism and neoliberalism) but to a multi-level approach which seeks to combine different levels of analysis, from the international system over institutionalized forms of cooperation and the national factor down to individual actors, in the light of an overarching synoptic perspective.

Especially the emerging paradigms of *critical social theory*^{xxxix} and *critical security studies*^{xl} have attempted to overcome the structuralist and monocausal bias that much of the neorealist-neoliberal controversy exhibits. They underscore the socially constructed, contextual - as opposed to merely structural - character of international relations, interactions and issue areas, such as security or alliance politics. Consequently, its proponents now and again engage in the debates over 'institutions' in international relations as sparked off by the general neorealist-neoliberal controversy.^{xli} However, critical social theory does not open a viable path to overcoming the mentioned shortcomings in conceptualizing NATO's institutional adaptation. While making a big step toward appreciating factors such a context dependency of political action and institutional forms, the institutions themselves still as always remain epiphenomenal. Though progressively understood as constitutive conditions for national interests, national identities and state action, they even here are not appreciated as political phenomena of an own kind and worth of being studied as such.^{xlii}

Organizational theory, too, although recently applied to the case of NATO's persistence and evolution after the Cold War in a manner that a first sight appears plausible and fruitful,^{xliii} provides no viable alternative. At a glance, it seems all-obvious that NATO should be a predestined object for organizational analysis, for it is not only a 'simple' international alliance but supplanted by important organizational characteristics. As Inis Claude observed,

In organizational terms, NATO is something new under the international sun. It is an alliance which involves the construction of institutional mechanisms, the development of multilateral procedures, and the elaboration of preparatory plans for the conduct of joint military action in future contingencies. It substitutes for the mere promise of improvised collaboration in the event of crisis the ... actuality of planned collaboration in anticipation of a military challenge to its members. It is a coalition consisting not merely in a treaty on file, but also of an organization in being - a Secretary-General and permanent staff, a Council, a network of committees, a military command structure, study groups, and liaison agencies.^{xliv}

Yet much as it is undeniable that NATO possesses and further develops important traits of corporate identity which resemble organizational features, these are not quite amenable to organizational theory. 'Organizations' in its sense are characterized by well-defined membership, fixed membership figures, durably marked boundaries, internal role and status differentiation, hierarchy in authority and by behavior paths shaped by the organizational structure and imposed on the members. With its various institutional out- and sub-buildings such as PfP, NACC and the concept of Combined Joint Task Force headquarters (CJTF HQ), the new NATO has no clear-cut membership structure and outer boundary, but both are subject to change from case to case, according to the activated context. Consequently, there neither are fixed general behavior paths, nor can one speak of an organizationally warranted hierarchy in status and authority.

2.3 A New Institutional Approach

Given all those theoretical complications, the question arises how, or if anyway, international relations scholars can hope to come to terms with the conditions and process of NATO's adaptation. The answer suggested here is: It is indeed an institutionalist approach that seems most promising - as long as it relies on concepts and methods that stem from general *social science institutionalism*^{xlv} and go well beyond the neorealist-neoliberal debate about international cooperation and institutions.

Institutionalism in this sense mainly comes as a *methodology*, not as a set of propositions or another new theory of international relations. It pleads for a "methodological turn"^{xlvi} in service of better analytical adequacy, not so much for a whole theoretical turn. As for the case of NATO, what makes it promising is that it offers a frame of reference allowing for arranging some promising assumptions of neorealism, neoliberalism and critical social theory together and linking them with insights gained by general institutionalist thought in the social sciences. Moreover, an institutionalist frame of reference facilitates multi-level analysis. Far from conceiving of institutions in neoliberal substantialist fashion as mere intermediate structural factors or intervening variables mitigating between the effects of international anarchy on state action and international cooperation, it sees them embedded in - if not constituted by - various intersecting contexts^{xlvii} (in our case such as national, international, regional or concurring institutional), which may shift over time and from one situation to another, exerting variable effects. Admittedly, also in general social science institutionalism, a gripping characterization or even handy definition of 'the' institutional approach or 'the' institutionalism as well as of the very concept of 'institution' is yet to be achieved. Nevertheless, over the years a useful inventory of institutionalist methodology and core assumptions has emerged. Following on from it, for the purposes followed here with respect to an institutional account on the Atlantic Alliance, three typically *institutionalist* assumptions can be highlighted:^{xlviii} path-dependency, discontinuity and multiple causation.

(1) Political developments are *path-dependent* -^{xlix} not only in the sense of the tendency of once taken courses to persevere but in the first place in the sense of the dependence of current decisions on past. Consequently, not only (national) political action (as for example critical social theory assumes^l) but also institutional developments themselves follow the principle of *context-dependency*. Institutions not only form contexts for state action but are again embedded in larger contexts, which in turn influence the conditions of the institutions' existence and development.^{li}

(2) Given this multiple codeterminancy, political change as well as political action under institutional conditions in general consequently proceeds *discontinuously* and *episodically*.^{lii} Taken paths of development are constantly co-influenced by contingencies and the need to react to new trends on a short-term basis. Additionally, *individual* or spot acts (as for example undertaken by single governments or officials) - whether intended or not - may exert effects on *collective* institutional forms. In this sense, interestingly to notice, already in 1979 Waltz had proclaimed the principle of the "tyranny of small decisions", which under certain contextual conditions can cause inconspicuous "'small' decisions" to trigger vigorous "'large' change".^{liii} Hence, it becomes dubious to call for a new, rational-intentional *grand design* of the future of NATO or even the whole spectrum of European and transatlantic security policy.^{liv}

(3) The only rule political developments really seem to regularly obey to, then, is the one of complex *multiple causation*. This results already from the fact that not only present problem areas but also the respective institutional history influence them.^{lv} For example historical ideas, which despite changed conditions cannot be abolished - already for reasons of continued self-legitimization. As for NATO, this becomes most obvious in the continued emphasis of the principle of collective defense (despite the unquestioned missing of any clearly identifiable and 'personalizable' enemy, which this concept usually requires).

The subsequent institutional account on NATO will look into the three main dimensions of NATO's institutional context already alluded to, which also form the chief determinants of its future development, as well as the future shape of European and transatlantic security policy. One obvious context is, of course, the *European regional system* itself, that is to say, NATO's immediate operational context as well as other institutional forms such as WEU or OSCE. Most analyses stop at that point and do not delve any deeper in the two remaining decisive contexts of Alliance politics: the *international-political system* (as the global context of the Euro-regional political space) and the *national dimension* (as the constitutive and supplanting context of the Euro-regional political space and determining factor for what kind of actual transatlantic security engagement, or disengagement, as the case may be, one can expect to develop in a medium-term perspective).

The global reference of European security and Alliance politics refers to the respective constitutive context and helps to localize the regional European dimension

within the global international system with its fundamental organizing principles as they also apply to any regional setting. The regional dimension is, of course, the specific sphere of developments, challenges and problems that NATO has been facing since the end of the Cold War and that the present study seeks to conceptualize and explain with a view to evaluating and 'refining' related theoretical statements and political guidelines. To delve into the national dimension of NATO's future role is especially important when seeking to portray an image of likely forms of future transatlantic security engagement, also as far as conflict intervention and the use of force are concerned.

3. The Global Dimension of NATO's Relevance, Role and Future

3.1 *Theoretical Interpretations of the Causes and Effects of the End of the Cold War*

Examining the global dimension of the system change in Europe is not only necessary in order to systematically locate the case in point here, that is, NATO's situation and future, within its broader institutional context, namely the international-political system but also to answer a decisive analytical question: What, after all, is the distinctive character of that post-bipolarized international-political system as compared to the Cold War-setting? Coming to terms with this question, although seemingly at least not directly pertaining to the question of NATO's current outlook and future roles, is of prime importance to identify the conditions of departure that *any* post-Cold War European security order is to face. It relates to general characteristics of international politics and security that also leave their imprint on the European regional system and its actors, be they nation states or international institutions in a broader sense (see the attached table to illustrate the following).

Given the theoretical diversity of the field, it comes as no surprise that there is a whole spectrum of controversial answers, depending on which paradigm one chooses as a frame of reference.^{lvi} Now as before, the clearest marks are the (neo)realist^{lvii} and the neoliberal view, sometimes also termed Hobbesian and Grotian.^{lviii}

(Neo)realism with its principally Hobbesian view of political relations as defined in terms of and largely determined by alignments and the distribution of power identifies the chief cause of the Cold War in the trivial effect of super power competition, exacerbated by uncertainty about the opponent's next move's and resulting tendency for misperceptions to emerge.^{lix} Against such a background, the structure of the bipolar order appears as built up by the quest for power and security and tensed by the ever-present security dilemma. Causes of the long peace, then, were the stable bipolarized distribution of power and the obviously functioning system of military deterrence. (Neo)realism sees the current era marked by a transition to multipolarity, ending the Cold War, or bipolarity, but not really the East-West conflict. It regards long-standing basic axioms such as international anarchy and the security dilemma, if in a qualitatively changed mode, still as typical of international relations. In sum, on the grounds of (neo)realist thinking, one should expect neo-nationalism and all-European instability to rise if no tectonic countermeasures are taken. Respective proposed policy guidelines center around the setup of new balance-of-power politics, if necessary relying on multilateral interventionism. (Neo)realists would therefore recommend NATO to follow a *modus operandi* of strategic response to the developments in Middle and Eastern Europe.

Drawing from Grotian trains of thought, *neoliberalism* sees the extension and contents of (broadly defined) international institutions as decisive factors for international cooperation, peace and stability.^{lx} It attributes the causes of the Cold War mainly to an insufficient institutionalization of the anti-Hitler coalition after 1945 so that the following Cold-War period emerged, which suffered from a multiplicity of uncanalized conflicts. Still, increasing regulation of conflict by common mechanisms and collective learning from crises made the Cold War stay cold. The current era is characterized by the spread of enlightened national interests: After the fall of the iron curtain, opportunities for interstate interaction have tremendously increased. According to its axiom that the behavior strategies and interest of states

tend to adapt to one another the more often that states interact in comparable situations (law of reciprocity), neorealism expects a trend towards long-term oriented cooperation.

The appropriate denominator, then, is not the 'end of the Cold War' or the 'end of the East-West conflict' but a coming period of sustainable conflict transformation and institutionalization of cooperation.

Appropriate policy strategies, in this view, would be a general transfer of stability to the East, building issue-linkages between different political problems and agendas so to trigger spill-overs of cooperative norms and procedures from one issue area to another. Notably however, such an approach needs to follow NATO's institutional expansion with skepticism, due to lacking political rule-knowledge in the new member states, which may endanger the so far reached level of cooperation and ameliorative transformation of conflict among the 'old' NATO members.

Apart from the (neo)realist (or Hobbesian) and neoliberal (or Grotian) viewpoint, at least three other paradigms are of importance here, which equally challenge the Hobbesian and the Grotian one. These are the global governance (or Kantian) school, the normative theory of internationalism (or Lockeian school) and the paradigm of critical theory (or, if one will, Neo-Marxian school) already referred to earlier.

The *global governance* school^{lxi} departs from Kantian thinking insofar as it takes the internal organization of the interacting nation states as chief factor determining the war- and peace-proneness of the international system. It sees *democratic* states constrained in their conflict behavior and driven to peaceful interaction by two factors: first their pluralist domestic infrastructure which makes it more difficult to mobilize military capabilities and pursue an aggressive foreign policy; second the allegedly increasing orientation of democratic governments towards international democratic norms and peaceful regulation of dispute.^{lxii} Elaborating on the latter, it chiefly are reciprocal, typified positive perceptions that Kantians expect to further decrease the chance of escalating conflict between (Western type) democracies. It sees the prime factor leading up to the split of the post-World War II great power concert as it was established by the Potsdam conference in competing value-laden concepts of political order (Western democracy vs. Soviet-type Volksdemokratie).

Still, in its view, the long peace during the Cold War was secured by de facto ideological moderation on both sides. With the Soviet empire's demise, Kantians see the core conflict over the respective different conceptions of political and global order resolved. Thus for them, the current era is marked by the end of the whole (culturally defined) East-West conflict, not just its politico-military superstructure, namely bipolarization, antagonistic alliance systems and inter-bloc confrontation. Following on from this, proponents of the global governance school now expect a peaceful world of liberal democracies to evolve, rendering the full realization of the world-political project of democracy the first point of reference for post-Cold War policy. It is to be accomplished by enlarging Western institutions, with NATO making one important, but no paramount, contribution to a crescent sphere of positive perceptions and effective international democratic norms.

Normative theory, or internationalism,^{lxiii} starts from what could be called a Locke-inspired point of view: It sees the degree of centralization and effectiveness of norms (of course, in contrast to Locke, not at the national but at the international level) as the decisive factor for peace and stability. The Cold War, then, resulted from an insufficient coercive effect of international norms and missing strong world interests overarching the two emerging blocks. The structure of the bipolar order, consequently, was made up and maintained by a dispersion and depreciation of international norms and common interests. Whereas internationalists make no statement about why the Cold War then stayed cold, they now identify a trend towards a world public and derive from the thus greatly increased observability of national international behavior a tendency to increased norm-compliance and collaborative orientation. This could lead to a principled world policy, a kind of "global constitutionalism" which then would replace the anarchical order of power as underscored by (neo)realists as the dominant organizing principle in international affairs.^{lxiv}

Internationalism in consequence expects effective international norm building under the global aegis of the United Nations. Proposed policy guidelines are intensifying the buildup and adherence to a common body of international norms, collective sanction politics against deviant states and reforming NATO to a part of the envisaged global system of U.N.-sanction politics, that is, in the final analysis, rendering it a sub-contractor of the U.N.

Critical theory, which could be labeled neo-Marxian,^{lxv} sees international peace and stability as always superimposed by the dominant powers as long as no socially just international political community is established. The prime factor responsible for this superimposed peace and stability is hegemonic ability to define the world-political situation. In this view, the Cold War resulted simply from the then perfectly given conditions for great power politics, which were mainly due to a low degree of politicization of the world public. The structure of the bipolar order, then, was little more than an imposed construction by the superpowers so to keep virtually all other nations out of their 'game', but in as allies.

The Cold War then, mainly in contrast to realist interpretations, is not seen as a structural effect triggered by the anarchical organization of the international system and bipolarized world-political competition but as a "fight for loyalties".^{lxvi} Like internationalism, critical theory makes no distinctive statements about the causes of the long Cold-War peace but is very decisive when answering the question of how the current post-bipolar era is best characterized: As an erosion of the repressive traditional 'texts' of power and a lack of new legitimacy tales, amounting to a deconstruction of the overdrawn contrasts stemming from the era of East-West confrontation. What critical theory expects for the future is a wave of global social change that will sweep away the tenacious rests of the old, bipolar world-political text. This results in radical policy guidelines, aiming at the dissolution of both the U.N. and NATO and subscribing itself to the emancipatory endeavor of realizing global social security.

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3.2 For an Existential Realist Viewpoint

Which of these models can now serve as a sensible foundation from which to precede when, as the global context of the European setting and NATO's future role, seeking to grasp the distinctive character of the post-Cold War world with a special view to security politics and conflict management?

On a world-wide scale, the regional conflicts broken out after 1989/90 show that the end of the Cold War, in terms of security politics and conflict management, meant little more than the dissolution of the bipolarized world-political structure. Various conflict data support the realist bon mot that with bipolarity, global threat and the resulting danger of world-scale conflict disappearing and offensive capacities slashed, the world in fact has become rather more insecure than 'civilized' and stable.^{lxvii} For example, from 1989 to 1992 the total number of worldwide registered armed conflicts increased from 46-47 to 54-55, subsequently going back to no less than 46 in 1993 and 42 in 1994. Moreover, in 1990 as much armed conflicts were started as for the last time in 1963.

Dividing the numbers of armed conflicts registered in post-Cold War Europe in a late-Soviet Union period (1989-1991) and an early post-Soviet Union period (1992-94), we find 8 such conflicts in the first and 14, almost twice as much, in the second. So even if on a world-wide scale the total number of armed conflicts seems to have peaked in 1992 and now to be declining, it would be rash to allege a general trend of abating violent conflict. Including low intensity conflicts (defined as armed conflict with less than 1000 battle-related deaths per year), the period 1989-94 saw a total of 94 violent conflicts in 64 different locations. Thus there is little evidence for alleging a progressive civilization of conflict, as global governance and neoliberalism do. Such a tendency, moreover, would have to be a bottom-up phenomenon (cf. the neoliberal law of reciprocity in reiterated interaction in similar settings). Yet it is precisely smaller, low-level conflicts that have not decreased, as one should then expect, but remarkably increased in the aftermath of the Cold War. In the year 1989, we witnessed 13-14, in 1992 22-23, in 1993 15 and in 1994 17 of such conflicts. Intermediate conflicts (in statistical terms more than 1000 battle-related deaths in total and between 25 and 1000 in that particular year) increased from 14 in 1989 to 18 in 1994.

This empirical data thus suggest a continued appropriateness of (neo)realist thought in the realm of international security and conflict. An important other argument in favor of (neo)realism is that, at a closer look, the end of the Cold War has changed or erased far less of the fundamental principles of international politics as they especially apply to the field of security politics than it is frequently argued. It is now clear that with the breakdown of Soviet communism, manifesting itself in the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in April and the Soviet Union itself in December 1991, bipolarity, or the Cold War, came to an end but not really the East-West conflict itself.^{lxviii} This conflict is more ideologically than geographically defined, and the Gulf War of 1991 as well as the war on the post-Yugoslav territory underscored the endurance of the related incompatibilities. Quite different from the 'deconstructivist' commonsense endeavors in contemporary international theorizing as well as growing political hopes of a continued transformation of conflict and a crescent culture of democratic peace in Europe, political realism - in theory and practice alike - is far from being anachronistic and obsolete. As for the realm of international security, for instance, political realism is also far from being a mere rationalized apology of power politics. In contrast, with its classical emphasis on systematic historical comparison and inductive heuristics^{lxix} it not only offers an overarching theoretical perspective on the long-standing organizational characteristics of world politics, the most important of which have remained unchanged beyond the end of the Cold War, but also provides a useful set of rules of thumb for conceptualizing politics on a more lasting basis than the one of short-sighted beliefs and hopes.

For such a purpose, what has come to be called "existential realism"^{lxx} offers itself as an overarching starting point. This existential realism purports a pragmatic consensus about those realities of international politics that are simply given (or existent) and to be commonly recognized if one seeks international politics and security as well as scientific and political reasoning about it to consist in more than longing to ad-hoc decisions and value-laden exhibition bouts over 'good' ultimate goals.^{lxxi} Existential realism underscores that three axioms of the international systems are still valid: firstly its *anarchical* structure and thus the lack of any central authority empowered to act independent of and if necessary against the prevalence of national self-interest, secondly the consequent tendency to resort to the principle of *self-help* and thirdly the *security dilemma*.^{lxxii} Whereas commonsense reasoning nowadays will typically deny the continued political relevance of the security dilemma-condition, newer trains of conceptual research have shown that it not only still has its traditional significance but - after the vanish of the bipolar structural overlay - also extends to whole new dimensions.

For example, in the field of ethno-national conflict studies the concept of "emerging anarchy"^{lxxiii} has been put forward to catch the effects of unexpected desegregation of different ethnic groups, which usually triggers primordial revival. To grasp this new quality of the classical security dilemma, consider the following: The 'new' security dilemma will become virulent and directive for political action, regardless of on which level of political aggregation (from ethno-national up to global), whenever a hegemonic or predominant global or all-regional political order collapses rather abruptly. What is important for the security dilemma to take effect, then, is obviously not the condition of international anarchic per se, but the special state of *emerging* anarchy: Neighboring groups (from ethnies to whole nations) become suddenly conscious (or their political leadership successfully attempts to suggest them) that from now on, they have to provide for their security themselves.^{lxxiv} Such a conception of anarchy also matches well with the onset of the Cold War, when the common phalanx against the Axis came to an end, also ending the globally structuring element of the war-time alliance. Quite different from widespread idealistic hopes and transfigurations, thus, the security dilemma did not disappear together with to end of bipolarity.

Accepting the empirical and theoretical outset presented here, it follows the insight that with the end of the Cold War various things may have ended, albeit the global danger of violent conflict. Anything may have broken out but perpetual peace - not even in Europe. To make things worse, one will have to say that especially in the post-bipolar world, violent forms of conflict are on the best way to gain a permanent position in world politics. Above all, these are ethno-nationally based tensions and crises. It literally seems as if the collective ideologization of world politics during the cold war now were to be superseded by a regionally, nationally and subnationally virulent thrust of ideology. The corresponding cleavages often run straight through societies. This makes it difficult to redefine them, or at least to protect them from violent clashing, by military means. In these situations, even mere blue-helmet tasks, such as the mid-term separation of the disputing parties, seem to be increasingly unfeasible.^{lxxv}

For existential realism, despite, the question of value-based yardsticks for foreign and international security policy is all but obsolete. Yet it acknowledges that every, including its own, theoretical orientation, just as every political conviction however honest it may be, necessarily represents more or less narrowly confined, partial perspectives on the vast variety of political affairs. Following on from this, existential realism consciously and strictly refrains from high-handedly recommending normative concepts for immediate political realization. Rather, it asks for the practical preconditions both of the development and sustainable implementation of those prescriptive recommendations.

3.3 *New World Order - The U.N. vs. NATO?*

Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the breakdown of the bipolarized Cold War order, the United Nations were often seen as a resurgent Utopia of global-scale security politics, replacing regionalism and alliances. Yet soon not only the Gulf War but also the War of Yugoslav succession made clear that this Utopia soon went lost - to a security multilateralism whose global formative influence will in the first place be determined by national capabilities and interests.^{lxxvi} It by now has become evident that no system of collective security within the U.N. framework will render regional security alignments and institutional structures obsolete or at least reunite them under the global umbrella of the U.N. Rather, as not only the Gulf war of 1991 but also the cases of Somalia and Bosnia have shown most clearly, any effective U.N. security engagement involving the

use of military force will have to resort to the logistic and operational assets of either the U.S. or a particular regional security organization that has sometimes been so vigorously reprimanded for now standing and acting in obsolescence - and this is the Atlantic Alliance.

The Alliance not only unites the nations whose participation in international peace operations has often enough proved crucial for its success. It also is the only working security system in the contemporary world. In a few aspects, its record may appear to some as ambivalent, for it could not prevent a war and recurrent conflict between two of its members, Greece and Turkey, and has had some difficulty in positioning itself in the new post-Cold War setting of European international institutions, involving a sometimes confusing change in its self-ascribed 'new' functions (reaching, for example, from an out-of-area operation agency over a regional stability-projector to and U.N. sanction-implementation service). Yet it has indisputably reached an outstanding level of representing, in the sense of Karl Deutsch, a "security community": It disposes of a common military doctrine, permanent headquarters with international staff, multinationally integrated forces, a common supreme commander for the Atlantic area (SACLANT) and the European area (SACEUR), has always conducted multinational force training and maneuvers, and has - what makes it even more unique in the world - effective common command and control arrangement, communications capacities and capacities for transport and force-projection. Considering the related national investments that were necessary to set up and maintain this security community, it is only logical that the Alliance, vice its official bodies, did everything to counter the view that the U.N. was to become the prime international security organization under the aegis of which NATO, at best, could play a sometime-complementary role and that decisions about common action within the Alliance must never be taken within the U.N.^{lxxvii}

NATO codified its strategic relationship to the U.N. in two documents, MC 327, entitled "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations" of 5 August 1993 and "NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations" of 28 February 1994. MC 327 is a NATO military decision taken by the military representatives of the fifteen states which form the NATO military committee. French resistance has prevented it from being agreed by the North Atlantic Council of the sixteen Foreign Ministers of the Alliance but it is used within the integrated military structure. In MC 327, NATO declares itself in principle prepared to cooperate with the U.N. but underscores that NATO decisions will remain NATO decisions and no command and control authorities shall be transferred to the U.N. Most importantly, as a study summarizes MC 327, "national participation in peace support operations will remain subject to national decision" and the Alliance intends to use "its existing command structure ... to the greatest extent possible, with the details "to be determined on a "case by case basis".^{lxxviii}

MC 327 does not specify any responsibility to report to the U.N. on the part of NATO force commanders, the North Atlantic Council or the Defense Planning Committee. The commander of a NATO-supported U.N. force will "normally be an Alliance flag or general officer, serving in an appropriate position in the integrated military structure."^{lxxix} This principle has already become practice in the operation Sharp Guard, that is the surveillance of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro on the Adriatic and the IFOR and SFOR mission in Bosnia. In the latter two cases, a prediction made in a 1994 study has proven remarkably matching the political reality of 1996 and 1997:

"NATO military thinking about the command and control relationship with the U.N. is likely to move in the direction of following the new U.S. peace operations policy. For traditional blue helmet peacekeeping operations NATO could accept U.N.-developed mandates and command and control relationships. These could be implemented by the NATO nations in cooperation with the Partnership for Peace countries. At the same time, increasingly restrictive policies could be implemented for mandates and command and control in operations likely to include combat missions or peace enforcement operations. Major military interventions of the Gulf War-type might be conducted by NATO or U.S.-led ad hoc coalitions, based on weak and flexible Security Council resolutions. U.N. guidance would be limited to acceptable levels, guaranteeing NATO political and military freedom of movement."^{lxxx}

The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of 4 May 1994, entitled "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations", well exemplifies

this trend in U.S. national strategy definition as far as multilateral action is concerned. At the same time however, PDD 25 underlines some important regulations and restrictions that apply to U.S. support for U.N. peace operations:

"In improving our capabilities for peace operations, we will not discard or weaken other tools for U.S. objectives. If U.S. participation in a peace operation were to interfere with our basic military strategy, winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom Up Review), we would place our national interests uppermost. ... Multilateral peace operations must, therefore, be placed in proper perspective among the instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. does not support a standing UN army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in UN operations. ...

It is not U.S. policy to seek to expand either the number of UN peace operations or U.S. involvement in such operations. ... Instead, this policy ... aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is selective and more effective.
...

The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces. On a case by case basis, the President will consider placing appropriate U.S. forces under the operational control of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by the Security Council. The greater the U.S. military role, the less likely it will be that the U.S. will agree to have a UN commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces. Any large scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that is likely to involve combat should ordinarily be conducted under U.S. command and control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions.^{lxxxii}

Other nations' 'peacekeeping doctrines' make similar statements. In Great Britain, for example, it is an almost rhetorical question to ask what reasons there could be to take on any global responsibility within the U.N. framework but to secure one's own vital national interests.^{lxxxiii} As will be seen below, Great Britain, like other countries such as France with its grande-nation tradition or Germany with its civilian-power tradition, has only just started to take the step "from defence to security" - that is, defining its defense and traditional 'security' policy, also as far as military engagement in the service for peace is concerned, beyond a mere national towards a genuinely international focus.^{lxxxiii} Most obviously and remarkably in France, public understanding of the fact that defense and security, already due to important shortcomings in national defense capabilities such as short term force deployability becoming obvious during the Gulf War of 1991, no longer can be a national affair, but that in fact it can no longer be conceived of without international integration.^{lxxxiv}

Despite the political rhetorics and moral hopes of an uprising new era of collective security with the U.N. setting, the fact has been a trend towards rather seeking regional organizations as frameworks for multilateral peace operations. Here history seems to repeat itself, for this post-Cold War tendency of uniting against 'new', if diffuse, 'aggressions' and 'threats' and the at first unexpected prominent role of the Atlantic Alliance in those matters that at first were widely deemed to do rather the last bit to make NATO as essentially a collective defense organization obsolete exactly parallels the setting of the upcoming Cold War when the hopes pinned on the just founded U.N. were already rendered unrealistic. As Inis Claude so astutely observed, then

"[t]he first reaction of the Western powers to the realization that they needed an arrangement for collective defense against the threat of Soviet aggression was not to reverse the San Francisco decision against relying upon collective security for this kind of job, but to create an extra-United Nations system - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."^{lxxxv}

3.4 Global Factors Switching the Points for the European Security Problématique

To sum up, it is indispensable to appreciate the global context, or paradoxically speaking the global dimension of regional security and security politics in Europe, before turning to analyzing the Euro-regional system itself. In the course of this, important preconditions for an appropriate examination of the future role of NATO can be clarified. The following points deserve special notice:

- Of the competing interpretations about the end of the Cold War and the related expectations about the future, the (neo)realist point of view has proven to be most adequate, at least as for security politics and the future of its institutional structures, as well as the (re)crescent relevance of national interests and emerging new forms of the security dilemma.
- Assuming an increasing (Euro-)regional relevance of the U.N. and its specific mechanisms for managing conflicts is as unrealistic as expecting a globalization of NATO's regional approach and its related mechanisms. Not only national interests of the respective member states run counter but also missing resources and military capabilities, such as short-term deployability and long-distance projection.
- According to the proposed underlying institutionalist methodology, it can be concluded that already the global constitutive context of the Euro-regional security problématique brings about a high degree in path-dependency, discontinuity and multicausality in institutional developments. Ideally, institutional change should naturally follow the political problems and trends. Nevertheless, a continuous adaptation is improbable, and often enough it appears as if the problems and developments rather follow the institutions. An example is the case of ex-Yugoslavia, where the conflicts now have gone through virtually all institutional steps of security politics and conflict management: from individualist approaches such as mediatory groups and plans (for example the London Contact Group and the Vance-Owen draft) over the U.N. peacekeeping debacle of the UNPROFOR mission, reprisals taken under cooperation of WEU, OSCE and NATO (for example the control of shipping in the Adriatic and on the Danube in order to enforce the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro) to the conference approach of Dayton and the U.N.-NATO co-action in order to implement it (that is, the IFOR and SFOR mission).
- Relating to the foregoing point, seemingly so concrete military cooperation, in the post-strategic security realm, is not only about operativity and crisis responsiveness but about politics, too. Military arrangements also have an important political meaning and in part foremost fulfill political, rather than military-operational, functions. Conversely, politically motivated cooperation programs can adopt, and form the core of, military operativity (such as the PfP program, which largely

contributed to set up the channels of command and control for the IFOR and SFOR missions, conducted by NATO and non-NATO nations).

Finally, this section intended to clarify the overall constitutive effects of the global context of Euro-regional security on NATO's future role and the related general determinants. At the same time, however, the overview of the different interpretations of the meaning of the changed world-political setting after the Cold War and the derived alleged consequences for NATO clearly showed the difficulty in determining the future of the Alliance and recommendable policy strategies just by recurring to models of global trends and 'pressure'. Here, useful as it has proven in the preceding part of the analysis, a clear caveat against (neo)realism and its predominant structural bias is in order.

4. The Regional Dimension - NATO's Institutional Adaptation

Now that some important dimensions of the global-international context of NATO's future have been explicated, analysis can precede to the immediate context of its institutional adaptation and future, that is, the Euro-regional setting.

4.1 *NATO's Institutional Potential and Adaptation: A Multi-Level Process*

The Alliance's unexpected specific potential for continued legitimization and even increased institutional attractiveness precisely *after* the vanish of a conspicuous common threat is obviously exemplified not only by the enlargement project but also by France's new behavior of approach and integration. Its clearest marks are the return into NATO's Military Committee in December 1995 and its considering a full return into the Alliance's integrated military structure as announced during the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996. That was the final piece of evidence needed to flaw the Mearsheimerian, strict-(neo)realist scenario of a dissolution of NATO and a related relapse into an unstable and conflict-laden European concert of renationalized foreign and defense policies^{lxxxvi}.

This shows at least that the Alliance's general political and military-operational goal setting has been flexible enough to secure the maintenance of its integration until far beyond the turning point of 1989/90. What appears to be the critical point for NATO's future is less saving its mere existence as such or amending it by the adoption of new members than the question of its prospective *character* as a Euro-Atlantic security *institution* with the related informal rules, expectations, common interests, routinized political and military-operational procedures and a world-public image.^{lxxxvii} This leads to the general proposition that sharply defined common (military) threat fading, *alliances* tend to show the appearance and problems typical of a security *community*.^{lxxxviii} Then the question of *internal*, mainly genuinely *political* mechanisms for both continued intra-Alliance cooperation and external effectiveness becomes decisive.^{lxxxix}

Yet such a point of view is no analytical patent remedy either. For example, the currently so popular thesis that international institutions condition national adaptive behavior and the shape of common interests^{xc} tempts one - as argued above - to overlook the question how these *institutions* themselves adapt to changed international-political conditions, or if they are capable of such an adaptation anyway^{xcii}. In this context, it can be shown that the ease of the bipolar overlay exposed NATO to classical international-political adaptive pressure in the structural-realist, Waltzian sense, meaning that changes in the international-political "structure" "shove" NATO as such towards certain courses of action so to maintain its 'position' in the international system.^{xciii} Nevertheless, structural realism à la Waltz is not quite applicable to that phenomenon. Its "units" are states, making international organizations and institutional

forms fall out of its analytical scope. Nevertheless, a structural-realist based model for NATO's institutional adaptation since 1990 is quite elucidating.

According to such a model of adaptive pressure, NATO's "London Declaration" of July 1990 stated that "this Alliance must and will adapt."^{xciii} The approach was, whereas retaining the primacy of collective self-defense, to sincerely review and revise the formulation of this common defense, so that

"the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness for its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed."^{xciv}

This identified imperative of adaptation found its concrete political and military consequence in "The Alliance's new Strategic Concept" as agreed upon during the Rome Summit of November 1991. Accordingly (amending, not replacing, its traditional political and military functions), three new roles for NATO were envisaged: the "dialogue with other nations", an "active search for a cooperative approach to European security" and complementing as well as reinforcing "political actions within a broad approach to security", thereby contributing with the "Alliance's military forces" to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution" that "might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members".^{xcv} One further component of this plan for institutional adaptation was to establish a concrete "diplomatic liaison"^{xcvi} with the former Warsaw Pact countries, which subsequently found its institutional formation in the set-up of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991 and the Partnership for Peace program in January 1994.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO moreover consciously turned to a 'generalized' enemy. Correspondingly, the new Strategic Concept stated:

"In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways."^{xcvii}

That way, the Strategic Concept precisely did not give up the traditional core functions of the Alliance but reaffirmed them - whereas at the same time acknowledging the need for far-reaching institutional changes exactly because of the continuance of its principle rationale.

Here one particular paradox in NATO's institutional adaptation to the changed, post-Cold War setting becomes obvious, which makes it clear that any meaningfully institutional perspective on contemporary Euro-Atlantic security must at least *combine* neorealist and neoliberal assumptions, instead of either trying to play them off against each other. The paradox could be termed the *structural-functional paradox*, which has shown up in NATO's development since 1990: Neoliberalism predicted NATO's continued existence as such, yet if only in the pure sense of self-resistance against dissolution and with recourse to sweeping axioms like the alleged striving of states for keeping the transaction costs involved in international cooperation low.^{xcviii} What neoliberalism did not predict were *qualitative* institutional changes. Rather, according to its assumption of trivial institutional stickiness over changed settings and

faded initial founding interests,^{xcix} it had to expect a *functional* reorientation of NATO under retention of its structure - which Keohane explicitly predicted^c. What NATO however has shown and still shows at the moment is, contrarily, a *structural reorientation under retention of its essential founding function* (that is providing for common defense and concentrating on military concerns). As the Strategic Concept continued:

"Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security. ... NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged."^{ci}

However, the new Strategic Concept of Rome did not mark but a fairly common agreement on NATO's future and the imminent necessities of organizational and operational change. One manifest statement was *that* it would be all about a fundamental, also organizational, adaptation to new political and military challenges while preserving the primacy of collective defense. Yet even this consensus was in large part a product of the member states' self-interest, some of which were seeking to ease their stretched defense budgets by creating new, collectively financed, multi-national force structures.^{cii}

Therefore, the Atlantic Alliance's unexpected capacity of adapting to changed world-political conditions, at the same time preserving and extending its traditional legitimization, can - paradoxically - not be sufficiently explained by its *autonomous* institutional potential. Well corresponding to the institutionalist axioms suggested above, such as discontinuity of change and multiple causation, a complementing recourse to explanatory factors on the level of NATO's constitutive actors (which are and remain its member states) is indispensable.^{ciii} A perspective on the constitutive actors can also make clear that the rapid common reaction to the emerging new challenges was not the 'evolutionary' result of enlightened, entwined or multilateralized interests of the majority of NATO states (as neoliberalism could argue) but rather an example of the principle of the "self-reliant optimality potential" of international "bargaining solutions"^{civ}.

Accordingly, the growth of international institutional forms is always co-determined by the will of the relevant states to let the related developments pass beyond their direct, unilateral influence. In international institutional settings, then, states typically lose abilities and opportunities to unilaterally influence the related outcomes or organizational behavior to the credit of politically leveled, "comprehensively efficient solutions".^{cv} At the same time however, they gain the chance of bringing in their own goals freely and (at least according to the fiction) without regard to their status or relative position - whereas having to take on no exclusive responsibility for the consequences of the collective solutions found, although each single state can profit from effective solutions, regardless of its own contribution.^{cvi}

Independently, this principle has recently been introduced in structural neorealist theorizing as "voice opportunity"-proposition, borrowing from organizational theory.^{cvi} Of distinguished interest here is "the level of policy influence partners have or might attain in the collaborative arrangement."^{cvi} Following on from this, assumptions out of neorealist and organizational theory - taken each themselves, as argued above, unsuited for adequately appreciating the process and determinants of NATO's adaptation - flow together into an institutionalist argument that underscores the importance of 'soft', contextual factors in rational state action and international cooperation. According to the voice opportunity thesis, and against neoliberalism, states not only seek institutional arrangements to make cooperation cheaper and increase

their individual substantive gains but also and arguably foremost to find conducive contexts and opportunities to effectively articulate and circulate their national policies.^{cix}

The voice opportunity proposition offers a common denominator for a bunch of developments significant for the future of NATO and post-strategic security in Europe. It can, for example, well account for France's rapprochement to NATO, assuming that the French government was seeking to broaden its available contexts for national policy and interest articulation in the light of the Alliance's increasing politicization after the end of bipolarity. Moreover, it can explain the success of NATO's initiatives for cooperation with its former adversaries, PfP and NACC, as well as some former Warsaw Pact countries pressing wishes to become regular members of NATO and Russian demands for a security charter codifying its relation to the Alliance - as all these developments may be viewed as attempts to open up a well-practiced institutional context, that of the Atlantic Alliance, for purposes of making oneself and one's national policies more visible on a European scale.

Nevertheless, a complete institutionalist analysis of NATO's adaptation has to delve still further into its constitutive context and look into the dimension of intergovernmental bargaining. Intergovernmental bargaining can well account for the often not too well understood parallelism of different approaches to institutionalize post-strategic European or Euro-Atlantic security cooperation as well as for the existence of institutional fragments that seem not to fit into the current setting but despite endure and function. This again hints upon the path-dependency and multicausality of institutional development and once more suggests that there can be no one grand strategy of institutional design. Here is an instructive example concerning intergovernmental bargaining about the shape of the envisaged European pillar of the Alliance.^{cx}

During the Bush Presidency, the United States were responding openly reserved to the reviving European attempts to develop an own security and defense identity (and a related operative reactivation of the WEU). The "Bartholomew telegram", a sharp diplomatic note the U.S. government sent to the then-Secretary General of WEU, Willem van Eekelen, harshly shattered the illusion that a harmonic parallel institutional adaptation of NATO on the one hand and the WEU as well as the common-security policy dimensions of the EU on the other could be accomplished. In a letter to all then-EC member states' governments, then-Secretary of State James Baker repeated the objections expressed in the Bartholomew-telegram less sharply and at the same time made the Bush administration's acknowledgment and support of the envisaged ESDI dependent on several criteria to be met by the Europeans: All related developments should, in the final analysis, strengthen the Atlantic Alliance's effectiveness and keep it the main forum for all questions of European security; NATO must be able to maintain and if possible even deepen its integrated military structure; to avoid conflicts between the Europeans over the concrete shape of ESDI which may also weaken the Alliance, all related considerations and steps should not be undertaken but by all European NATO members together.

These U.S. demands rendered for example Germany in a precarious position, actually forcing it choose between the transatlantic security link and its traditional security bilateralism with France. To this decisional pressure added the fact that at NATO's Ministerial Meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991, the U.S. had succeeded to thwart French plans for a rapid reaction force within the WEU in favor of a British lead NATO-troop, which then became the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). In a remarkable diplomatic move, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl managed to escape the imposed decisional pressure through a package solution. In the "October initiative", together with the French President François Mitterand, he announced the plan to incorporate the development of ESDI into the creation of the European Union by making the WEU the then future European Union's defense component. The first step into that direction, the initiative proposed, should be made by a combined Franco-German corps, which in the meantime has become the Eurocorps. The almost parallel creation and existence of the Eurocorps and the ARRC thus is a conspicuous expression of the just described Euro-American and more specifically Franco-German-American interest conflict over the further institutionalization of a European security identity and package strategy adopted by the Kohl-Mitterand chief of government, or "COG", collusion^{cxii} in order to defuse it.

This relevance of bargaining factors seems at first sight a strong argument for neoliberalism, but a closer look makes it clear that neoliberal connotations of bargaining are too narrow-focused here. Typically, as noted in the introduction, for neoliberalism bargaining entails intentionally establishing common 'institutional' constraints so to stabilize cooperation and overcoming the political market failure, that is sub-optimal outcomes of cooperative arrangements where Pareto-optimal, 'perfect' outcomes would have been reachable as well. Once established, those 'institutional' forms of international cooperation then, in turn, are supposed to exert an enlightening effect on the national interest of the states involved. Apart from the fact that considerations of such kind hardly deserve being called 'institutionalist' (for they do not really allow to conceive of institutions themselves, *their* change and sustainability as distinct from the interests of and cooperative phenomena between its constitutive actors), they cannot account for discontinuous institutional developments. That is because the market-failure axiom and others may answer the general 'how?' yet certainly do not answer the concrete 'why and when?' of cooperation. Also

have they little to say about interdependence between 'actors' and institutional 'structures' and about how much and how strong structural opportunities actors need to act effectively or, conversely, to what extent positive structural effects on cooperative behavior are dependent on benign actors, or 'agents'.^{cxii} In addition to the mentioned state strategies of self-interest calculation and bargaining, also single creative acts of individual actors are to be taken into consideration to arrive at complete explanations of the course and content of NATO's institutional adaptation. For example, the Alliance's general strategy revision was temporarily interrupted by derivative attempt to secure NATO's continued relevance and public support by way of ad hoc-activism. An illustrating example is the Venice speech of May 1993, delivered by the then-Secretary General Wörner, in which he proclaimed a tactic of selective shop-window operations. It was much inspired by the assumption that NATO was in acute danger of loosing its obvious "raison d'être", notably in the perception of its member states' electorates, and thus forced to present itself to the world public as an indispensable provider of "security and stability"^{cxiii}. For that sake, Wörner stressed, it should not make available its capabilities to the U.N. but self-responsibly engage in such conflicts that promise to be well-suited for making the Alliance's genuine "usefulness in dealing with immediate crises and problems"^{cxiv}. Consequently, Wörner cautioned, NATO would have to strictly refrain from any intervention in conflicts and crises where not publicly visible success could be expected or where NATO could not lead the related operations independently, especially in terms of military command and control^{cxv}.

Underscoring NATO's further right to exist and its military operability in the face of post-strategic security threats was an important but only the one side of the coin. There was still another challenge: to elaborate a clear concept for the intended future military and political forms of defense cooperation and integration, reflecting the post-strategic security condition on a long-term basis.^{cxvi}

4.2 From Diffusion and 'Interlocking' to Functional Self-Restriction and 'Interacting'

This second side of the coin was soon realized, and thus after the episode of operational activism, the Brussels Summit of January 1994 marked a turn to the questions of concrete structural adaptation. The CJTF concept laid the basis for NATO's military-operative readjustment (the definitive design of which however was not agreed upon before the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996) and the PfP program with its bilateral cooperative arrangements based upon the respective concrete requirement took to solving the question of a well-defined political and strategic outreach to Middle-Eastern and Eastern Europe, beyond the diffuse idea of a general transfer of stability from West to East.^{cxvii}

So the Summit of Brussels made a significant step towards revising the concept of the Alliance's institutional adaptation from an at first seemingly envisaged diffuse catch-all approach to a more promising strategy of functional restraint:

"In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defense of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE. ... Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. ... As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU."^{cxviii}

Important to notice, much of NATO's adaptive endeavors are, despite its grown institutional autonomy, still best accountable to national interest-calculations. Even the

decision taken back in November 1991 to establish the NACC as an instrument to defuse the immediate pressure to decide about the when, how and who of an eastward expansion cannot sufficiently be explained as a deliberate policy of institution-building but has also to be seen in the classical realist sense, that is, in the light of national interests. In retrospect, NACC especially furthered two important German interests: establishing an institutional framework to foster compliance with the disarmament regulations of the treaty about Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and providing for continued international safeguard of the reunification's consequences in the field of European security (for example the subsequent expansion of NATO's military structures and area of defense to the territory of former East Germany).^{cxix}

France however took that as an attempt to set up a kind of German-U.S. bilateralism in European security affairs, and anticipating political isolation, it replied with a counter-balancing strategy in the form of institutional duplication. That way it sought to decrease the relative importance of the perceived increased political importance of NATO and its new institutional ramifications such as NACC. This counter-balancing was realized with the help of WEU, which was supplemented by a consultative forum consisting of selected East European countries.^{cxx} Notably the French behavior was in perfect accordance with the power-principle of classical realism and the structural logic of Waltzian neorealism - both nowadays so often sweepingly reprimanded as obsolete.

Whereas NATO's initial post-Cold War strategic impetus, that is functionally confining itself to military tasks, especially collective self-defense, has become visibly blurred in the course of the out-of-area debate and subsequently in the enlargement discussion, a strategy of self-limitation would now as before be appropriate and also advisable - for the Atlantic Alliance remains an indispensable and effective, but is not any longer a *comprehensive* 'security provider'. When in November 1991 the North Atlantic Council came up with the formula of "interlocking institutions"^{cxixi}, it obviously believed the Alliance to be able to play a general leading role in devising future European security structures and accordingly declared: "The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty."^{cxixii} This vision however soon found itself disappointed, when other European security institutions promulgated their own, competing concepts for future European defense and security. The first step made the newly founded European Union as soon as in February 1992 with the project for a common European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), followed by the WEU with its Petersberg Declaration and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which - symbol enough - assembled in Helsinki, its founding location, and presented a comprehensive program for future European security. To a large part, the history of European security politics after 1989/90 can indeed be written as a history of "institutional rivalry".^{cxixiii}

Given this institutional competition in general post-strategic European security issues, it is problematic that after the end of bipolarity NATO - while *militarily* sticking to collective defense - *politically* has repeatedly striven for a general involvement in the European broad political agenda, which it early institutionalized in the form of NACC. So it has come that the concept of *interlocking institutions* under political and strategic guidance of the Atlantic Alliance threatened to become in practice rather a functionally unspecified, more reciprocally inhibiting than reinforcing juxtaposition of *interblocking institutions*. That was of course also due to NATO's attempt to present itself as the leading 'stability-projector', which early enough adopted paradoxical forms.^{cxixiv} For example, the Alliance not only collectively admitted the Soviet successor states into NACC - despite of the involvement of three of them either in war-type conflicts with one another (Armenia and Azerbaijan) or with secessionist groups (Georgia). The member states of NATO also, while facing growing problems with their attempts to settle the war in their immediate strategic neighborhood (ex-Yugoslavia), successively broadened the Alliance's self-declared security guarantee: In June 1992 CSCE was officially offered operational support, reaching up to NATO conducting peace-keeping operations under a CSCE mandate, and in December the U.N. security council was offered an according kind of support.

Here once again the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of June 1996 marked a decisive turning point: Whereas the communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of 29 November 1995 still maintained that "[t]he Alliance continues to be the linchpin of European security"^{cxixv}, half a year later in Berlin NATO gave up its claim to a leading role in the interplay of European security institutions, thus relinquishing the organizing principle of *interlocking institutions* and turning to a new principle that could be termed the one of *interacting institutions* - namely a coordinated interplay of the different post-strategic security strategies and institutions in Europe that does not rest upon one lead-institution but rather on the idea of general common regulations for a well-defined

functional sharing. Nonetheless, the different action units will not be isolated from one another but interconnected especially by using common organizational modules.

That became most obvious in the NATO Council practically charging the West Europeans, respectively the WEU, to develop an own military operability,^{cxxvi} which effectively meant to establish the since the times of De Gaulle so much debated European pillar *within* NATO itself. This pillar however is not to set up a European parallel structure to the traditional transatlantic pillar, but in contrast to be "separable but not separate" from it.^{cxxvii} This is to be ensured by two structural interconnections: on the one hand the concept of allied Combined Joint Task Force headquarters (CJTF HQs), that is, integrated operational command and control nuclei attached to selected NATO commands but at the same time, as the case may be, removable from NATO's command and control structure and available for 'Europeans-only' operations, for example within the WEU framework; on the other hand the principle of *double hatting*, that is, making forces answerable both to NATO and WEU.

CJTF perfectly exemplifies the path-dependency of institutional innovation, its co-determination by past decisions and also the multiple causation of institutional change. Altogether, additionally to its strict military-operational functions, CJTF can fulfill a fivefold coordinating task.^{cxxviii} First, it can guarantee, by developing clear-cut criteria, that multinational force units really become effectively integrated and operative. So CJTF should help to counteract the tendency prevalent in some NATO countries to contribute to multinational units, yet mainly in order to ease one's *own* defense budget and consequently not ensuring that the respective forces are trained and equipped in a way that actually allows for multinational interoperability. Second, CJTF can provide a common framework for joint exercises of NATO and PfP nations' military forces, helping to smooth the way to enduring cooperation in military and security affairs. Third, CJTF allows for linking NATO countries not (yet) integrated into the Alliance's military structure (as it is currently the case for France and Spain) indirectly to that structure. Fourth, CJTF HQs may serve as coordinating agencies between NATO and WEU or a future European defense organization in the framework of the envisaged European security and defense identity. Moreover, the CJTF HQs have the strategic function of providing WEU on a case-by-case basis with the necessary military and command-and-control infrastructure for own operations. Fifth, as an additional political function, CJTF HQs could act as connection authorities to the U.N. That way, a strong coordinative cord, also defining clear political and operational responsibilities, could be established for NATO-missions conducted in implementation of Security Council resolutions.

Confirming these observed trends towards an approach of *interacting* institutions, the Ministerial Meeting at Sintra in May 1997 marked a further step to the Alliance explicitly acknowledging the multilateralized character of post-strategic European security. As for the relationship between NATO and WEU, for example, the final communiqué stated:

"We welcome agreement reached recently in the WEU on the participation of all European Allies, if they were so to choose, in WEU operations using NATO assets and capabilities, as well as in planning and preparing of such operations; and on involvement, to the fullest extent possible and in accordance with their status, of Observers in the follow-up, within the WEU, of our meetings of Berlin and Brussels. We note that the basis has therefore been established for the implementation of Ministerial decisions, for the strengthening of NATO-WEU working relations and, in this framework, for the development of the ESDI with the full participation of all European Allies. This will ... contribute to setting the groundwork for possible WEU-led operations with the support of Alliance assets and capabilities."^{cxxix}

4.3 The Mixed Menu of European Security Problems - NATO Expansion as an Example

Whereas the example of NATO's strategic adaptation has shown the elucidating contributions of institutionalist *methodology* (such as path-dependency, discontinuity and multiple causation), the issue-area of NATO expansion poses ponderous *theoretical* questions. Briefly, from a theoretical point of view, NATO enlargement is still quite a paradox. Judging by common theoretical perspectives, it should never have come up - a fact that even Hellmann's and Wolf's seminal analysis^{cxxx} of alternative theoretical predictions about NATO's future overlooked. None of our common grand theories is able to explain *why* at the Brussels Summit of January 1994, the Alliance members set the - albeit rather vague - sign of a coming expansion^{cxxxi} and subsequently followed a remarkably strictly according political course.

Structural realism for example would absolutely acknowledge that international-political adaptive pressure as arising from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and some Russian neo-imperialist tendencies can "shove"^{cxxxii} Middle and Eastern European states towards NATO. Waltz deems national self-renunciation of such kind abnormal in a sense, but concedes it possible if pursued for precisely the sake of a unit's own survival.^{cxxxiii} Alternatively, this trend could always be explained in terms of bandwagoning^{cxxxiv}: In order to secure their newly reached positions as sovereign powers, the loosing Alliance's members may choose to figuratively jump on the train of the winning coalition. Alas, the whole enlargement discussion per se, from a neorealist point of view, is perfectly at odds with the standard assumption of an immanent decline of alliances after the loss of their immediate adversary. Waltz and Mearsheimer had prominently predicted such an inevitable decline of NATO.^{cxxxv}

Neoliberalism, on the other side, could always put NATO's continued existence as well as its envisaged enlargement down to the fact that institutional forms are (for some important part at least) independent forces in world politics, which - if only somehow functional - tend to preserve themselves or even to widespread. Yet it cannot explain why any state should develop an interest in increasing the number of Alliance members. That is because neoliberalism has to assume that states will always prefer small cooperative arrangements - among other things because otherwise transaction costs would exceed the respective calculations of individual gain.^{cxxxvi} This surely also applies to the anticipated costs of national adaptation to a broad revision of current common Alliance positions and bargaining about new political and defense tasks and commitments - all likely necessities in case of enlargement. Accordingly, Keohane himself declared *institutional closure* to be one of the cornerstones of neoliberal assumptions^{cxxxvii}.

As for the question of NATO's and its member states' adaptation to a new membership structure, it again becomes obvious that taking the historicity (or path-dependency) and multicausality of institutional development seriously, it forecloses any hopes for rational *grand design*-type solutions. Increased Alliance membership will strongly demand both strategic and institutional reforms - already so not to risk to minimize its ability of collective decision-making. Moreover, as has often been overlooked, the question of enlargement is not exclusively one of high NATO politics but also considerably concerns the smaller member states (as for example Spain or Portugal), which will be facing severe cuts in their military support programs.^{cxxxviii}

An enlarged NATO of course will have to direct all its related capabilities eastward in order to establish there as soon as possible feasible military structures and also lead up the new members' defense policies to Western standards. Otherwise, the Atlantic Alliance would render itself hampered and consequentially obsolete exactly *by* embarking on a strategy of institutional adaptation and innovation. Additionally, as a consequence of expansion, currently comparatively well contained regional problems and conflict potentials on the post-Soviet territory could newly pose themselves as common Alliance problems in one go. NATO will therefore unavoidably have to take up the question of how to handle conflicts between new members (whereas its historical record shows that it has not always performed well in defusing conflicts between its old members, just to mention 'Suez' and 'Cyprus'). Institutionalization and institutional adaptation should therefore not at all be equated with ameliorative conflict transformation - as do many proponents of neoliberalism -^{cxxxix} but can, conversely, trigger the escalation or amplification of conflict as well as create new ones.

In well accordance with the classical realist national interest-doctrine, it has to be acknowledged anyway that the question of NATO expansion is anything but an end in itself or the logical consequence of any self-generating tendency of institutional evolution. Rather, single national decision-makers typically handle it in a form that promises best compliance with their own interests. Great Britain for example has, precisely due to its strongly NATO-oriented defense and security policy, never been especially interested in fast enlargement. A then unavoidable temporary weakening of the Alliance would at the same time considerably reduce Britain's say in international security affairs. It is different with the case of Germany, which is characterized by a relatively small say in Alliance security matters - due to its nuclear poverty and traditional multilateralism in security affairs. Accordingly, Germany has now and again tried to present itself as an advocate of some of the newly independent states' desire for economy and security integration. France's position was over long periods characterized by the fear of, having left NATO's military integration in 1966, becoming politically isolated in the course of enlargement. The U.S. were suspected to pull the wires, trying to secure themselves a strong political stance in the new Europe at the expense of France.

Contrarily to the prevalent policy metaphors as for the future of European security, not the vacuum-absorbing projection of stability towards Middle and Eastern Europe is the decisive stake but the foundation of general "behavioral regimes" in the "post-Soviet security space", reaching from minority protection to arms control and crisis management.^{cxl} Many features of the prospect for institutional flexibility and fluidity of post-strategic European security have recently become obvious in the institutional reform of NATO. Here it is conspicuous that *security* has fully become *politics*. This trend was well exemplified by NATO's Berlin decision to set up a Policy Coordination Group (PCG). As for Alliance politics in general, increasingly important is not the common reaction to a clearly defined threat

and challenge by means of a new grand strategy or - speaking in terms of structural realism - the keeping of a state's (or a whole alliance's) 'position' in the international 'power game' but the act of *positioning* oneself in new regional frameworks and new general political settings.

Selective multi-state cooperation in changing coalitions will become both typical of and crucial for NATO's relevance and effectiveness. This assumption is reinforced by the plans taken at Berlin to implement the CJTF-concept directly into NATO's strategy and to adjust its command and headquarters structure to CJTF-like needs. This requires on the side of the member states the willingness and ability to (re)define their relations to NATO and with one another from issue to issue. Such a multilateralism will entail different coalitions within the Alliance, as the case may be, for example for conflict-intervention in implementation of U.N. resolutions, for humanitarian assistance or for purposes such as helping to stabilize the transitions in Eastern Europe.

As regards the Alliance's concrete operational East European outreach, the clearest indicator for the appropriateness of expecting a multilateralist approach is the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997. According to its Basic Document,

"[t]he Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as the successor to NACC, will provide the overarching framework for consultations among its members on a broad range of political and security-related issues, as part of a process that will develop through practice. PfP in its enhanced form will be a clearly identifiable element within this flexible framework. Its basic elements will remain valid. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will build upon the existing framework of NATO's outreach activities preserving their advantages to promote cooperation in a transparent way. The expanded political dimension of consultation and cooperation which the Council will offer will allow Partners, if they wish, to develop a direct political relationship individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance. In addition, the Council will provide the framework to afford Partner countries, to the maximum extent possible, increased decision-making opportunities relating to activities in which they participate.

... The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council will retain two important principles which have underpinned the success of cooperation between Allies and Partners so far. It will be inclusive, in that opportunities for political consultation and practical cooperation will be open to all Allies and Partners equally. It will also maintain self-differentiation, in that Partners will be able to decide for themselves the level and areas of cooperation with NATO. Arrangements under the Council will not affect commitments already undertaken bilaterally between Partners and NATO, or commitments in the PfP Framework Document".^{cxli}

5. The National Dimension: Individual vs. Common Goods

5.1 *Internal Linkages of Post-strategic Security Cooperation*

However much the Atlantic Alliance deserves it, as explained above, to be conceived of an increasingly self-reliant, remarkable stable institution with important corporate traits beyond a mere narrow reflection of its member states' national interest calculations, it is precisely that *national context* that any sound scholarly analysis and political conception alike must not miss to decently appraise. When, in the context of the newly emerging security challenges and the question of appropriate international institutions, disseminating the idea of a "multipolar peace", "constitutional foundations of world peace" and even a "post-modern" or post-strategic politics of peace,^{cxlii} one should

consequently focus upon those 'sub-strategic' determinants of its realization that lie beyond grand strategy and a common existential threat.

The operative translation of multinational or 'common' transatlantic security beyond collective defense will depend in the first case, as it has become clear over the past few years, on national calculations - be they considerations of how to legitimate international military action in the face of their electorate, questions of the transfer of operational control to a multinational force commander or 'classical' attempts to maximize individual gains out of international cooperation at a minimized own contribution.

5.2 *United States: Multilateralism and National Prerogative*

Like the aftermath of World War II, the end of the Cold War brought the U.S. into a paradoxical situation between the search for a peace dividend and the necessity to react to new challenges and threats.^{cxliii} Soon after 1945, they had realized that they were not to face a new world order but for the first time in their history a genuine world-political adversary, the Soviet Union with its Eurasic bloc, which had led to a twofold political response. In terms of *moralpolitik*, the U.S. responded by propagating the idea of the 'free western world' (as in the Truman doctrine of 1947), accompanied by a populist anti-communism as it found its expression for example in the era of McCarthyism. In terms of *realpolitik*, the response was the set-up of a world-wide system of alliances or treaties and military bases to literally fence the Eurasic Communist bloc (policy of containment), accompanied by a special not only militarily but also socio-economically defined umbrella for Western Europe (OEEC, the later OECD).^{cxliv}

Now, after the end of the Cold War, hopes for a new world order have once again been disappointed and the vision shattered that the U.S. would now at last no longer have to be resort to power politics but be able to replace the policy of containment by one of enlargement,^{cxlv} that is the spread of democratic values and practices. Once again, after the demise of the old a new, if diffuse, opponent has emerged. This new opponent comprises, among others, the risks of nuclear proliferation, drug dealing, ethno-national conflict constellations, militant so-called 'crazy states' and the hard to predict developments in the rim areas of the former Communist bloc (for example Middle and Eastern Europe, Korea, China/Taiwan).

In terms of *realpolitik*, the response to these new security challenges could easily be derived from the logic of containment, transformed into a strategy of trying to fence a 'generalized' enemy and enhanced by the needs of international burden-sharing. In this regard, when discussing the strategic changes in U.S. security policy after the Cold War, its one actually outstanding epochal shift is away from unilateral self-commitment to European affairs and the strategic bondage to the 'old' continent after World War II, through the Atlantic Alliance.

Still, the slackening of the bipolar overlay over Europe has led to a paradoxical fundamental change in the U.S. approach to that region. According to its Wilsonian 'Make the world safe for democracy'-tradition, the United States have early embarked on an enlargement strategy towards Eastern Europe. This was, at least in its beginning, not so much a strategy of 'tough' organizational expansion (such NATO enlargement) but rather an approach based on Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, calling for the spread of democratic values and procedures.^{cxlvi} This more cooperative and less 'expansionist' approach however was closely accompanied by a legitimacy enterprise, directed not only to the U.S.' domestic electorate but also to some Alliance member states that were seeking to slash their defense expenditures and to minimize substantial contribution to NATO budget and force requirements.

The clue was found in the creation of the "security metaphor"^{cxlvii} of the 'new threats' to Alliance security, mainly posed by the aforementioned 'generalized enemy'. That approach however has increasingly equated 'democratic' enlargement with Alliance enlargement and thus activated the traditional U.S. military entanglement trauma. Namely, "expansion would convert an alliance designed to achieve clear and limited security objectives in a relatively stable Cold War setting into a nebulous crisis-management organization in a highly unstable post-Cold War setting. NATO would change from a defensive alliance to protect the territory of member states from attack into an alliance to project force - a different mission with a vastly different set of risks and obligations."^{cxlviii}

Already the Clinton administration's definition of national security strategy makes it clear enough that in the post-strategic U.S. defense and security perimeters, Europe has become but one region among others, and possibly more important ones. The Clinton administration right started off looking for a whole system

of "integrated regional approaches" as the primary frame of reference for security policy, so that the U.S. as a "genuinely global power" would be able to realize its national interests within loose, multilateral forms of international cooperative action.^{cxlix} This however must not foreclose the option for unilateralism when circumstances require it. As the already mentioned Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of 4 May 1994, a kind of elementary doctrine for post-strategic security policy, states: "When our interests dictate, the U.S. must be willing and able to fight and win wars, unilaterally whenever necessary. To do so, we must create the required capabilities and maintain them ready to use."^{cl} Even given those principles, the Clinton administration clarified that "circumstances will arise, however, when multilateral action best serves U.S. interests in preserving or restoring peace. ... Thus, establishment of a capability to conduct multilateral peace operations is part of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy."^{cli}

As for engagement in multilateral peace operations, this approach calls for a system of post-strategic security multilateralism in the sense of ad-hoc coalitions, utilizing common assets and operative frames, subject to ad-hoc activation according to the situation and one's own interests. The approach is thus exactly comparable to the one that has become a mainstay of Alliance-wide post-strategic multinationality and interoperability in the form of the CJTF concept. As for U.S. national strategy, "multilateral peace operations" are regarded as "an important component",^{clii} yet the President made clear that "first, and foremost, our national interests will dictate the pace and extend of our engagement"^{cliii}. Accordingly, deciding about the "When and How" of U.S. armed force deployments in multinational contexts will always remain a Presidential prerogative.^{cliv}

Consequently, two principles emerge. Firstly, multilateral peace operations will only find U.S. support if they serve its immediate national interests and secondly, there will be no transfer of operational command over U.S. forces to a multinational force commander. Only necessary parts of operational control may be transferred.^{clv} Given those principles, two scenarios for U.S.-supported multinational security engagement remain realistic. These are either a coalition of NATO countries authorized by a U.N. Security Council resolution, such as the UNITAF mission to Somalia, or the IFOR/SFOR model, as realized in Bosnia, with NATO and non-NATO countries conducting a joint operation, using common NATO assets and NATO command and control structures, with a U.S.-lead NATO Major Subordinate Command (MSC) taking the strategic lead - as AFSOUTH in the case of IFOR.

5.3 *Great Britain: From Defense to Security*

British military doctrine shows distinct features of the Anglo-Saxon legal and also political culture with its emphasis on custom and precedence, that is, it typically arises from agglomerated decisions and events.^{clvi} Concerning multilateral peace operations, political principles basing on example cases are yet to form. Even until 1992, security policy found itself almost equated with wider national self-defense and defined in terms of four conventional aims: maintaining a nuclear deterrent capacity, defending Great Britain, contributing to West European defense and the defense of the East Atlantic and the Channel.^{clvii}

Great Britain, like France, has only lately begun to undertake the step "from defense to security", which - in the face of new alliance-wide challenges - also comprises an orientation away from unilateral and towards multilateral action in situations of crisis.^{clviii} Quite different from Germany's position and comparable to that of the U.S., Britain thus articulates no self-reliant interest in securing international peace and stability. In contrast, it for a long time still emphasized the strictly national character of security interests and consequently derives three core functions of future British security policy: defending British territory, warding off threats to national and Alliance-wide security and contributing to wider national security interests in the sense of maintaining a benign international environment of peace and stability.^{clix} Not earlier than in the Defense Estimates of 1995^{clx} can one witness a change in that policy, making it better corresponding to the changed global setting. Now the following security functions are considered: Maintaining an independent nuclear capacity,^{clxi} adapting to NATO's new force structure^{clxii} and taking part in humanitarian missions as well as the "Provision of a Military Contribution to Operations Under International Auspices"^{clxiii}. It looks as if this is a revival of the dual stance doctrine as it was developed after World War II and envisaged a double standing leg in defense policy. The dual stance doctrine acknowledged Britain's demise as a world power at its strategic dependency on NATO, vice the U.S., but at the same time attempted to maintain a genuinely British standing leg in defense affairs and defined it - following the idea of global post-imperial British responsibility - in terms of the ability of unilateral

military intervention virtually all around the world.^{clxiv} Reviving this tradition, already the 1994 Statement on the Defense Estimates started declaring that the United Kingdom disposes of one of the most splendid capacities of worldwide military force projection, only being reached by the U.S., Russia and France.^{clxv} In contrast, because of Britain's undeniable strategic dependence on NATO assets and therefore on the U.S. (or, turned positive, because of the British-U.S. "special relationship"), the Atlantic Alliance has since its existence officially been regarded as an important framework for co-operative multinational action. Additionally, its importance is increased by the fact that the majority of the British 'security' elite sees essential advantages in Britain exclusively engaging within the NATO framework as far as multilateral peace operations are concerned - and needless to say that Britain is to take over some of the decisive military command positions in these contexts.^{clxvi} British politicians well realize that they could not win nearly half as much political influence in the EU or WEU as they could in NATO. Through the transfer of the ARRC command to Britain for example, it gained the opportunity to have a part of its national command and control structure financed by NATO, with the opportunity left to use then, as well as the ARRC-assigned troops, for unilateral national operations whenever it wants. That way, the revived dual-stance principle can not only be sustained in times of shrinking military budgets but also in the face of the necessity to lastingly take some army troops in the planning for intern peace operations (for example Northern Ireland).^{clxvii}

Now as ever, Great Britain thus shows no interest in a sharing of sovereignty in the field of defense and security affairs. Recent British objections against the plan to make the WEU into an integral part of the envisaged ESDI therefore have come as no surprise. Comparable to the position of the U.S., Britain underscores the necessity to calculate in terms of the national interest. Consequently, military contributions to multinational peace operations will always be made on a selective base, which leaves no realistic alternatives to ad-hoc formed multi-state coalitions, typically within NATO.

In contrast to the U.S. however, Britain is not anxious to design international peace operations in a large-scale fashion that promises to secure its success in advance. Rather, it tends to prefer medium- and small scale actions because its colonial experience shows how difficult it can be to come to political terms with the long-term consequences of massive military engagement in crisis regions.^{clxviii} Accordingly, military planning for out-of-area operations concentrates on the tasks related to "wider peace-keeping" and the contingency planning centers, among others, around measures of conflict prevention, demobilizing, military protection of civilians and humanitarian relief.^{clxix}

Finally, in the face of continued cuts in the defense budget and in the military forces volume, a broad operational engagement in a possible transatlantic security-multilateralism would, for the time being, not a political option anyway. Especially if Britain seeks to maintain its share in the defense planning for Europe, thus preserving the benefits stemming from its ARRC command, and at the same time remains resolved to continue its military presence in Northern Ireland, which requires a broad basis for personnel rotation, its out-of-area and short-of-war capabilities in general will be strongly limited over the next few years.^{clxx}

5.4 France: New Interests in International Integration in Defense and Security Affairs

France has been resistant to resigning of sovereign rights in the field of defense and security all along.^{clxxi} As it has not taken part in NATO's integrated military structure since 1966 and only recently started to consider a return, one should assume that, for the time being, the Atlantic Alliance has not been a significant frame of reference when French military engagement short of war was at issue. Yet, the opposite is true. Precisely because France seeks to avoid losses of national authority in defense and security affairs, it has tended since the beginning of the post-strategic security era to strongly relate to, and rely on, NATO (and not the U.N., WEU or CSCE, respectively OSCE).

This is illustrated by the observation that while providing one of the largest personnel contingent for U.N. operations, France is always concerned to achieve the best possible congruence between the nations involved in conferring a U.N. mandate and those executing it. Ideally, this can be realized by the U.N. 'charging' NATO to implement a certain Security-Council sanction so that in consequence NATO states take themselves into duty,^{clxxii} as for example in the case of the IFOR mission. Due to this interest in the Atlantic Alliance taking the lead of multinational peace operations, France had decided to take part again in Military Council sessions even before officially announcing its decision to return in NATO's military

bodies in December 1995 - though only on an ad-hoc basis and as far as peace-keeping questions were concerned.^{clxxiii}

The Atlantic Alliance is of prime importance to France for yet another reason. This is the *French security trilemma*. Three different security interests that are hardly consistent with one another form it. If they can be brought within some common context anyway, it is the one of NATO.

To begin with, and as the first component of the dilemma, also the French political elite is convinced that European defense cannot be effectively provided for unless through an enduring transatlantic alliance. Related to this insight however is the apprehension that the U.S. may prefer a selective strategy as a political approach to Europe to an integrative multilateralism. That would mean to look for different European cooperation partners, according to the situation in question, and that way not only undermine the emergent first harbingers of a European security and defense identity but also isolate France. The key event here was the Gulf war of 1991, during which French troops were placed under foreign (that is U.S.) command and control for the first time since 1966. France's role in the operation Desert Storm let the ambiguity of its traditional defense policy become obvious enough to trigger a national security debate.^{clxxiv} National positioning in relation to NATO then definitively proved ambivalent, if not contradicting:^{clxxv}

Without a doubt, France is thrown dependent upon cooperation with, and assets of, the U.S. in the defense and security realm. The Gallo-Atlantic bilateralism founded therein meets a broad national consensus. The Gulf war of 1991 however not only underscored Europe's, vice France's, strategic dependence on the U.S. but also made clear that the U.S. were the only remaining genuine world power in terms of autonomy in defense affairs as well as material and general strategic capabilities. This, in the classical Waltzian sense, "shoved" France into a politics of counter-balancing that found its expression in the efforts to face the Euro-Atlantic security partnership once again with the conception of a relatively autonomous European pillar of NATO. The Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting of NATO in June 1991 provided an illustrative example. France forwarded a blueprint for a WEU-led rapid reaction force. Although it failed, an important transatlantic compromise was reached: In turn to the continued personal union between SACEUR - i.e. the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe - and CINCEUR - i.e. the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe -, the U.S. agreed on the plan to elaborate the WEU into an integral part of a future European defense and security identity. A plan however that after the Ministerial Meeting of Berlin in June 1996 and the final acceptance of the CJTF concept seems to have become obsolete and is now not only being objected by Britain but also by France itself.

The second component of the security trilemma arises from the two basic aims - Franco-American bilateralism and at the same time a European defense and security identity or at least an autonomous European military pillar - being hard to combine and to politically realize simultaneously, which however is decisive for abating the security trilemma. Both components cannot be reconciled but under the aegis of a national rapprochement to the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, France must have a strong interest in establishing an own European defense and security identity which however must just not lead to uncoupling the U.S. France's declaration of June 1996 not only to return into NATO's military committees but also to consider its military reintegration was surely pushed forth by the NATO Council's Berlin decision to explicitly task the WEU with setting up an own European defense capability on the basis of the CJTF concept. Accordingly, every engagement decision will be taken in the North Atlantic Council, which means unanimity and inclusion of the U.S., and the (multinational) CJTF headquarters to set up will be available both to NATO and WEU, just as the assigned troops will be double-hatted, that is, answerable both to NATO and WEU.^{clxxvi}

Additionally, as the trilemma's third component, French security policy seeks to obviate two threat scenarios at the same time, requiring different partners, respectively: Germany for guarding against a potential Eastern threat (of which, at least for some, Germany appears as a part) and Italy together with Spain and Portugal for handling the more manifest Southern threat as it results, among other things, from the legacies of colonialism. These twofold French post-strategic security interests become symbolically obvious the parallel interest in two different institutional forms: Eurocorps (with Germany as continental 'center power') and EUROFOR/EUROMAR (with Italy, Spain and Portugal as Mediterranean countries vis-à-vis the North African crisis potential).

All these aspects, to sum up, have currently resulted in a changed French policy towards NATO that combines elements of the since 1966 practiced transatlantic selectivity with elements of a new rapprochement.^{clxxvii} First circumstantial evidence of these emerging trend could be observed since some time before the 'spectacular' French decisions of December 1995 and June 1996. Taking part, for example, in the operation Deny Flight over Bosnia and the enforcement of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro, French troops had indirectly returned into NATO's military integration months before.

5.5 Germany: The Dilemma of Double Normality and Historical Defense Policy Traumas

During the Cold War, a common coin phrase said that the predominating national interests of the Federal Republic of Germany consisted in not having any, and there is still some truth in it. Common assessments of the current state and recommendations for the future of German foreign and defense policy pose it in the dilemma of double normality, being caused by commonly confounded two discrete and conflicting perspectives from which united Germany may be examined and its foreign and defense policies judged. Viewed as a 'new' Germany, it is attributed increased political and military capabilities and obligations, whereas regarded as an enlarged 'old', it is expected to impose itself restraints and adhere to international expectations regardless of any own interests so to forestall any new raising fears of Germany^{clxxxviii}.

In consequence, united Germany is sometimes seen as a "bigger and better" civilian power, abdicating any military engagement,^{clxxxix} or in contrast as suffering from "Machtvergessenheit" (power oblivion) and falling prey to a universal multilateralism instead of following own national interests^{clxxx}. By some, moreover, it is viewed as a "great power with many options"^{clxxxi}, "ripening" geo-politically,^{clxxxii} and being able, and capable, to chose autonomously the international way it desires. Others speak of a "new assertiveness"^{clxxxiii} and accuse Germany of desiring predominance in Europe, arguing in contrast to those seeing it as a "pressured power"^{clxxxiv} between a variety of incompatible international urges and expectations, between increased "opportunities" and "obligations",^{clxxxv} leaving it no space to devise genuine national-interest and long-term conceptions.

Given these diverse assessments and predictions, the ending of Germany's constitutional special condition by the Federal Court's Bundeswehr sentence must not let forget that a consensus, or at least a political discourse, about the envisaged multilateral action frames of German post-strategic security politics as well as about procedural questions (for example rules of engagement and questions of command and control transfer to a multinational force commander) are not in sight. According to the Whitebook 1994, German vital national security interests consist, among others, in "a policy of networking and of fair balance in, for and with the community of nations."^{clxxxvi} Yet also, or rather especially, after the Bundeswehr sentence, a political guideline is indispensable that would contain general regulations for short of war military operations, which are transposable to the needs of actual missions in question. There is a whole spectrum of conceivable post-strategic peace operations. They may involve military action of different forms and grades and thus German decision-makers will have to decide which of those forms they favor so to sensibly derive the necessary and adequate financial, material and military contribution. Quite different from these political shortcomings, the Federal Government and the Ministry of Defense have developed a political interest in participating, on an ad-hoc basis, in international peace operations. Accordingly, much effort was made to adapt national units to NATO's new force structure, with a special view to crisis reaction forces. Despite of its world-community rhetoric and like the other countries examined here, Germany interestingly shows no decisive interest to actively contribute to U.N. peace operations on a large scale but concentrates on NATO-led operations.^{clxxxvii} An active contribution to NATO operations is seen to be an effective instrument to increase general German influence in the Atlantic Alliance: "It is the aim to make an effective contribution to NATO's *crisis reaction forces* in particular, which is in keeping with Germany's role in the Alliance and establishes a qualified say".^{clxxxviii} This nevertheless is not the effect of a sometimes-maintained trend toward a creeping renationalization of German defense politics or a worldwide German interventionism. Rather, it is the effect of a specific cognitive scheme, or operational code, of the German defense and security elite, largely informed by historical experience. It developed during the first years of West German rearmament (1955) on the grounds of the Federal Republic's nuclear dilemma, which consisted and still consists in the fact that Germany disposes of no nuclear weapons and thus has traditionally had repeated difficulty in claiming a say in NATO strategy matters and was sometimes about to be de-coupled from the general strategic development of the Alliance.^{clxxxix} Consequently, it has always been of prime importance to make an important non-nuclear contribution so to be indirectly able to claim a sensible say in pivotal strategic issues and moreover to try to anticipate the evolution of NATO's military strategy in order to adjust one's conventional contributions as well as possible to it. That is, in Hanrieder's classical formulation, to strife

for optimal international "compatibility".^{cxv} To a large extent, thus, "West German security policy became synonymous with Alliance policy. ... In international affairs, Germany assumed what might be called a 'instinctive multilateralism' ... Instead of pursuing specific national interests, West German security followed general aims."^{cxvi}

In the course of this, however, over the years the trauma emerged that almost ever when those compatibility decisions were taken with all the necessary domestic political debates and compromises and were about to be implemented, the international situation and NATO's strategic response would change, rendering Germany's adaptation efforts obsolete in large parts. Compare the following historical sketch:^{cxvii} After joining in 1955, every effort was made to set up a conventional defense capability that promised to make an adequate contribution to West European defense according to NATO's Lisbon Program of 1952. Yet shortly after beginning to levy the first Bundeswehr units, NATO's change from the conventionally based Lisbon strategy was beginning to be replaced by what in 1957 became NATO's new strategy of massive retaliation, widely known as MC 14/2. This caused Germany the need to make a hard turn in its just begun defense policy and force structure planning, and a flaming domestic debate about a nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr started. The plans for a nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr at first were well compatible with U.S. plans for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). In 1964 however, the U.S. gave it up and Germany no saw itself urged to join the now envisaged nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). Into the bargain, NATO's Harmel Report of 1967 and the new strategy of flexible response, or MC 14/3, laid much emphasis again on conventional forces, the buildup of which Germany had postponed due to the expected nuclear armament.

In the beginning post-strategic era, the complex of anticipated traumas caused new adaptation effects. This becomes widely obvious in a statement by General Naumann, then-Generalinspekteur of the Bundeswehr, who argued that "the Western Alliance not only offers security to our country but also creates ... far-reaching possibilities to influence the security policy of the partners. This is of vital interest for a non-nuclear nation like Germany".^{cxviii} Therefore, the reform of Bundeswehr structures, anyway necessary because of the integration of the GDR's Nationale Volksarmee, was also used to adapt national force structures to NATO's new triad of basic organization, main defense forces and crisis reaction forces, as agreed in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept of Rome, November 1991. The result were the attempts often reprimanded as remilitarization to increase, or rather establish, basic national command and control capabilities for out of area and task force operations beyond individual and collective self-defense.^{cxix} Nevertheless, this strategy did not show the desired positive effects.

One reason was that official German plans for an increased peace-keeping engagement obviously over-stretched the available resources and consequently risked, in the general tradition of "Genscherism" (named after former foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher) in German foreign and defense policy, to get stuck in the rhetorics of "Verantwortungspolitik" (politics of responsibility) and a moral overcommitment.^{cxv} Consequently, as Timothy Ash pointed out, "with increased demands on limited resources, the danger is that by trying to do everything Germany will end up achieving nothing."^{cxvi} Additionally, repetitive spontaneous cuts in the force figures and defense budget, for several years accompanied by confusing domestic debates about the future scope, extent and mode of German 'peace politics' have partly led to the international perception that Germany after all is not really interested in broadening its role in the Atlantic Alliance and actually resuming more responsibility.^{cxvii} In fact, for the time being, Germany remains unable to command any peace support operations exceeding 20.000 troops.^{cxviii}

5.6 Consequences for the Policies of NATO Engagement and Enlargement

The ascertained predominance of national-interest calculations in post-Cold War Alliance politics and security engagement at first is, of course, another instance of the continued appropriateness of (neo)realist reasoning. But at the same time, it shows that neorealism should open itself to insights provided by the less structuralist and more historico-political or textual approach as promoted by critical social theory and critical security studies. Well exemplifying the importance of the institutionalist principle of path-dependency, the tendency of a renationalization on Western national security policies can well be accounted for on the ground of what could be termed the *identity hypothesis*. This hypothesis suggests that the loss of a common existential threat has posed all high-stake players of the Cold War period into the predicament of redefining

their roles and interests in the face of no common, 'objective' reference points. Consequently, by far not only Germany, but also the U.S. and others are compelled to find an appropriate way of self-positioning in the new security setting, which allows for much less structural, balance-of-power type, strategic and military capability-guided reasoning.^{cxci}

Even if this should not lead one to subscribing to the over-sketched axiom of a totally de-objectivated "no-essentialist character" of security and security politics,^{cc} it at least underlines the fact that no nation can continue to define its security and security strategy on the grounds of a mere program of delimitation against well-defined, objective 'threats' and 'adversaries' but at the latest by now is forced to "write" its security policy and security condition by itself^{cci}. Post-strategic security politics then are, to a large extend, interpretatory politics of identity.

Yet apart from those theoretical considerations, the relevance of the national dimension of Alliance politics has an important practical consequence in that it suggests an important practical implication as for the question of adequate policy guidelines for the future role of NATO. The suggestion is that NATO, in continuing its process of institutional adaptation and enlargement, should refrain from adopting to diffuse political responsibilities and claiming a too broad functional spectrum in post-strategic security politics. Such a policy guideline could cross with national peace operations doctrines of its members as well as cause them balancing behavior against some other members, naturally at the expense of NATO's continued effective political as well as military integration and operativeness.

Moreover, as neorealist alliance theory could argue, NATO should in any case restrict itself to military tasks and common military politics in a comparatively narrow sense so not to risk its *positive functional specificity* to wither away. It is to a large extend exactly that functional specificity that has kept NATO attractive to its members, and arguably made it so attractive to its prospective members. As Henry Kissinger cautioned,

"The task before us is nothing less than to distill a sense of direction from a world in which almost all key elements are changing simultaneously. Stability in Europe requires reaffirming the centrality of NATO rather than diluting it in an abstract multilateralism."^{ccii}

Any strategy seeking to render NATO in a prominent functional role in *any* question of European security - from humanitarian concerns to collective defense and the vision of an all-regional system of collective security - has to be regarded with sincere reservations. Otherwise, the Alliance would risk drifting into a mere expression of common value orientations, but de facto be drifting in hovering "désuetude".^{cciii} That way, it may risk to become just another security codex formulation agency with little effective value when it comes to a clash between the values proclaimed and the national interest:

"Consider the Budapest Document adopted at the December 1994 CSCE Summit. Its 'Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security' requires that when armed forces are used for internal security purposes that force be commensurate to the needs for enforcement and that due care be taken to avoid injury to civilians or their property. Only a few days after this CSCE Document was agreed, however, Russian forces began their alarming campaign in Chechnya, resulting in heavy civilian losses and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons."^{cciv}

Hence, looking at the principles put forward in the Study on NATO Enlargement^{ccv}, a clear caveat is in order, for the political strategy finally recommended to bring NATO on the course of enlargement indeed involves much functional diffusion. Although the study is anxious to point out strategies (such as intensified military and peacekeeping cooperation and joint operations with the new members) to ensure that enlargement will strengthen the Alliance, it still in large parts seems to conceive of NATO enlargement as a general political evolutionary process almost parallel to enlarging the European Union with a common all-European zone of political and economic stability as leading motive. Alliance enlargement, according to the study, shall lead to a new role of NATO as a complementary part of an "inclusive European security architecture" together with the OSCE.

These rhetorics aside, one must not forget that, as neorealist alliance theory suggests, the classical security dilemma can still today become interest- and policy-determining, though in the changed form of a not international-political but alliance-internal dilemma (being insecure about the allies' politics and

how sustainable for example issue-specific cooperation with them will be).^{ccvi} If this is true, it is one more strong argument for NATO sticking to functional specificity. This necessity is underscored by some tendencies of a free fall in national defense readiness and overall NATO military capability: "The NATO infrastructure budget has shrunk by 60 per cent in four years, and the NATO Defense Ministers warned on 15 December 1995 of 'shortfalls ... especially related to support for reaction forces, ground-based air defense and strategic mobility'.^{ccvii}

Adhering to functional specificity does not, of course, mean that the Alliance should devote itself to seeking to redefine post-strategic defense and security politics into all-out war military strategy. In the post-strategic security realm, military aspects of security in a broader sense by far not only refer to classical war scenarios or military intervention but also play an important role in peaceful management of internal conflict and democratic consolidation. Functional specificity in the area of the military dimensions of security thus

"includes the facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and the enduring democratic control of the armed forces. The expression 'democratic control of the military' is generally understood as the subordination of the armed forces to democratically elected political authorities; it means that all decisions concerning the defense of the country must be taken by those elected to take charge of the country's affairs. ... There are a variety of reasons why it is important to professionalize the armies of Eastern and Central Europe. In conditions of internal instability, domestic strife or civil turmoil, the military can represent a relatively stable element and source of order. ... While there is no single model, there are several fundamental characteristics: a clear legal and constitutional framework; the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government of the day through a civilian Minister of Defense; qualified civilians to work with the military in the elaboration of defense requirements and the agreement of defense policy and budget; the clear division of professional responsibility between civilian and military and; the effective oversight and scrutiny of parliament.^{ccviii}

Reconciling divergent national interests in the face of concrete post-strategic security tasks such as IFOR once again underscore the need of a continued focus on NATO military cohesion, operativity and capability of short-term contingency planning and implementation. Consequently, especially in the face of the coming enlargement process with public and much of the political awareness on its political implications, one must at least equally heed the military dimension. The focus should be upon sustainably realizing six principles, which the Military Committee agreed upon in March 1994:

- " (1) Preserve the integrated military structure;
- (2) Assure separable but not separate forces in support of the European Pillar;
- (3) Maintain a single command structure for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions;
- (4) Retain the role of the Military Committee in transmitting strategic guidance from the NAC to NATO military authorities;
- (5) Avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies; and
- (6) Preserve the capability of the Major NATO Commanders to undertake timely contingency planning.^{ccix}

6. Practical Implications: Towards a Post-strategic Security Multilateralism

Now the praxeological question remains which form of international cooperation in post-strategic security politics appears realistic in the lights of the presented findings and the just elaborated characteristics of post-strategic security. In addition: What will be the most feasible and likely institutional form of future Euro-Atlantic security relations? Also here a genuinely institutionalist perspective can help, as the one provided by the newly developed approach of "multilateralism"^{ccx}. When seeking to forestall the appearing trend of à-la-carte post-strategic security, basing upon ad-hoc decisions in the wake of national self-interests, a multilateral-institutional approach offers itself as a suitable mid-term leading conception.

Such a *security multilateralism* offers itself as a promising mid-term oriented leading concept. In contrast to pure ad-hoc cooperation on the one side or fully 'communalized' security politics on the other, multilateralism appears as a realistic and stable meso-integrative political and operational action form that both bears respect of important national observations and prerogatives and at the same time overcomes the narrow limits of mere case-dependent cooperation in security affairs and thus will be able to make an important contribution to crafting the Atlantic Alliance for its political and operational future in the coming era of post-strategic security. Within such a multilateral security community, some important common procedures and shared interests will emerge, which however must not be understood as strictly functionally or issue-bound. Nevertheless there would also be well-attuned national and multinational decision-making procedures in concrete questions of prospective military operations, as well as clear rules of engagement.

The formation of a common European and transatlantic post-strategic security community will thus neither follow a "master plan" nor a mere "trial and error"-principle^{ccxi} but rather developmental paths shaped by national interests and prerogatives as well as institutionally solidified fundamentals (for example the Atlantic Alliance as an organized institutional form, EAPC or CJTF HQs as institutional amendments and common historico-political experiences within IFOR or SFOR in Bosnia). In the end, it will always be crucial how the qualities and capabilities of cooperation and integration reached up to a certain point of time prove effective (or not) in the light of concrete security challenges. This kind of *single-case* utility principle of *general* cooperation and integration has already manifested itself in the development of the CJTF-concept with its emphasis on multinational headquarters cells and multinational-multifunctional forces. This concept - unexpectedly and unpredictably - well fitted the requirements posed by the decision to set up the multinational IFOR troop, namely coordinating a combined operation of NATO and non-NATO countries and establishing the required command and control structures.

One can hence expect the emergence of a kind of *dual system* of European and transatlantic security. The first of the two interdependent components forming it would be a sufficient defense capability for the case of classical geostrategic threats, reflected in suitable forms of high-level military cooperation and integration - keeping in mind that the related command and control structures at the same time also represent the preconditions of conducting effective multinational operations precisely beyond collective defense and short of war. The second component would consist in sufficiently institutionalized forms of selective and graded reaction to sub-strategic security challenges or support tasks for U.N. operations.^{ccxii} This also seems as the only viable solution to the problem of mission creep, that is a stepwise, hard to notice and therefore 'creeping' change in the initial situation or tasks of a military peace operation or conflict intervention so that they consequently either come into obvious contradiction to the original political and operational rules and goals of the mission or at least hamper its progress and effectiveness. Ad-hoc arrangements cannot reach the capacity of steady adaptation required here, just because the political preconditions, complementary initial interests and compromises that have actually made the operation possible must not steadily be questioned and redefined. General, evolved and adaptive but nevertheless 'institutionalized' rules of engagement forming a sort of NATO peace-keeping doctrine^{ccxiii} for post-strategic NATO operations - be they conducted in implementation of U.N. resolutions, by NATO as such, or by state coalitions using some NATO assets - could help defuse this problem. The CJTF-conception could serve as a good organizational background.

The decisive national prerequisite for such a security multilateralism to emerge and also for a successful implementation of the CJTF conception will be, in addition to a sustainable internal-political compromise about decision procedures and political objectives, the creation of suitable military capabilities, especially concerning secured international interoperability in the sense of "complementary militaries"^{ccxiv}. Moreover, the concerned national forces must not only be multilaterally but also multifunctionally employable - from peacekeeping to genuine military operations. Defense and force planning then would have to change from the primacy of individual and collective self-defense toward the whole spectrum of

possible military operations in the service of post-strategic security, that is, it should center around multilateral responses to cases of "complex emergency".^{ccxv}

7. Conclusion and Outlook

As the analysis has shown, NATO's specific *long-standing functions* enshrined in the Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, such as providing for broadly-defined regional security, forming a reliable international milieu for projecting political and economic stability or serving as a framework for developing sustainable peaceful and stable relations between its member states, have remained remarkably unquestioned and even been reaffirmed by the system-change in Europe 1989-1991.^{ccxvi} However, NATO's procedures and politics to fulfill these functions and realize these aims are to be redefined and where necessary redesigned due to the changed political setting and scope in and under which the Alliance now is operating in. The clearest signs for this need are the various summits and ministerial meetings held by the North Atlantic Council, which were to a lower degree concerned with questions of goal-setting than they were with the problem of how to adapt the Alliance's political and military organization so to keep the goal-attainment processes effective. Primarily, NATO had, and still has, *not to redefine its functional role but its operational prerequisites to comply with it*.

There are, of course, some questions relating to *goal setting*. Generally speaking, whereas during bipolarity the pivotal issue was how to maintain Alliance relevancy and effectiveness through unity and integration, now it is how to maintain alliance relevancy and effectiveness through multiplicity and differentiation. This not only reflects the new political shape of Europe and corresponding new national interests of its member states but also the specific character of the post-strategic security challenges NATO is and will be facing. The step is in the latter respect one from common reaction to graduated reaction according to the functional needs posed by the single case in question. The challenge is despite not to plunge into an 'ad hocery' and à la carte cooperation here.

As for *theory*, the adduced examples stand both for the necessity of an integrated institutional perspective on European security (with path-dependency, discontinuity and multiple causation as methodical pillars) and the missing of a serious institutional approach or a common institutional theory of international politics. The question often enough is not one of neorealism vs. neoliberalism, neither one of traditionalism vs. critical social theory, but one of adequately bringing them all in with their respective strengths according to the case in point.

An *overarching institutionalist perspective* could for example unite the neorealist and neoliberal approach to post-strategic international cooperation. Within such a broader framework, *neoliberalism*, according to the findings presented here, could especially contribute to understanding and explaining the (continued) need for cooperative structures, that is, elucidating the according *institutional core conditions*. NATO in particular distinguishes itself by a multiple institutional sub- and outbuilding (such as permanent multinational headquarters, amending cooperative agreements and consultative bodies - for example PfP and NACC, now flown together into the EAPC - or an own institutional representative, the Secretary General). This institutional structure, and here *neorealism's* strength comes in, offers the member states various opportunities to articulate and pursue national interests. In this context, *neorealist* approaches could make an important contribution to explaining and predicting the concrete shape and contents of institutionalized cooperative forms in their *specific* functionality.

The findings further suggest for instance that after the dissolution of the bipolar "overlay", national security policy is more conditioned by "historical" than systemic pressure. Thus, research should concentrate on the "culture of national security"^{ccxvii}. Especially, recent developments in German security policy and its self-envisioned role in NATO cannot be explained just by resorting to common (neo)realist, neoliberal or intergouvernementalist axioms such as (respectively) securing its relative position in the international system, devising enlightened 'international' interests or playing two-level games between domestic and international win sets. Rather, analysis should try to grasp the typical *problématique* of its subject. As the question of the factors forging the ambiguous appearance of German security policy in the 1990s makes clear, historico-cultural and political-psychological co-determinants have to be taken into account.

However much an institutionalist methodology as advocated in this study offers important tools for checking the process of NATO's institutional adaptation for its underlying causes, comparatively checking related theoretical assumptions and finally devising a forecast and recommendation for the future shape and organization of post-strategic security in Europe with the Atlantic Alliance playing a prominent role, one important caveat is in order: Institutional methodology, by its very name, must not disguise that to a large extent, setting up a European security architecture and placing NATO in that structure are not problems of institutions and their relationships but problems of the respective *nations* belonging, or not belonging to, those institutions.

As regards *policy guidelines for the future of NATO and its military structure*, one should neither argue for a full 'politicization' of the Alliance nor for an operational 'hyper-flexibility'. Over-politicization may result in rendering the Alliance's military component, albeit from progressively ineffective, increasingly invisible - thus undermining both the benefits of post-strategic deterrence and many members' interest in continued integration. Hyper-flexibility, for example in the wage of the CJTF-concept, surely would contribute to short reaction times and increased defense capabilities to meet uncertain and locally dispersed risks but also dissipate the Alliance's image and strength as a widely visible integrated security organization. Yet is precisely that *operational hard core and institutional visibility* beyond strategic myths or mere representational politics of imagined-identity construction that NATO has so much invested in over the decades and that has, in retrospective, always turned out to be the driving force not only for its own continued integration and general relevance but also for the future course of transatlantic and European security. And this the more that it caused debates and strains both within the Alliance and the broader pan-European context - just to mention the NATO crisis of 1966/67 and the adoption of the strategy of flexible response or, needless to say, the 1979 crisis, the double-track decision and subsequent debates about its consequences and implementation.

The troublesome shaping process of a post-strategic European and transatlantic security structure is an outstanding example of the path-dependency of political institution-building and adaptation. What especially marks the post-strategic security realm as distinct is the foreclosed option of a clear institutional 'new' beginning, for almost all of the institutional forms of the Cold War era 'survived' the vanishing of its founding conditions and were quick to adopt, or at least declare the adoption of, new responsibilities and functions. This makes it unrealistic, as it will still be undertaken sometimes, to seek to construct and realize an all-comprising European security structure based on clear-cut functional differentiation and 'synergy' between the existing institutions.

It seems as if we will have to live with a *new security paradox*: The 'new' internationally relevant conflicts seem to denounce the state-centric model insofar as they are precisely of sub- or transnational origin. Yet at the same time, as experience from Somalia to ex-Yugoslavia suggests, obviously only can be effectively countered with recourse to capabilities and strategies particular to the nation-state system. The once criterion of NATO's success, that is *not* to make operational use of its assets, now seemingly muted into a danger for its continued relevance. Moreover, whereas some forty years of joint NATO planning for military contingencies mainly considered all-out war scenarios and the ability to collective crisis-response, in the coming era of post-strategic security the Alliance will see itself faced with a continued crisis: Challenges abound insofar as its enemy has become generalized and multi-faceted, and so have the likely scenarios for Alliance action. This Alliance engagement again will and can not any longer follow the principle of collectivity but one of selectivity, for example in the form of coalitions of the willing (including non-members) as envisaged in the CJTF concept. Still, there should be clear underlying and well-institutionalized rules for Alliance engagement so to avoid the aforesaid problem of 'hyper-flexibility' and its generally disintegrating effects.

In the final analysis, NATO's role in post-cold war Europe is, and will remain, paradoxical in historical perspective - which is a necessary consequence of its political and military successes and institutional adaptability. The *problématique* of the system-change in Europe in its theoretical and practical consequences for the future role of the Atlantic Alliance forms is interwoven and multi-layered and does not allow for final solutions, political or theoretical. As for politics, it permits for no more and no less than situation-specific compromises and solutions, which however, precisely therefore, should follow a clear political line and realistic leading concept and not take up the Euro-euphoric rhetorics of other institutions. For almost half a century, NATO and its members have successfully lived and acted under various world-political and Euro-regional conditions, and the Alliance has made indispensable contributions to regional and transatlantic, as well as arguably global, cooperation and stability, by far not only defined in military but also in general political terms. This it owed in the first place to the prudent politics of its member states' governments and the almost ever-prevailing ability and willingness to make constructive compromises.

To maintain this ability and preparedness together with the related reciprocally attuned values, interests and modes of behavior for the next century and to sustainably embed the new members in to them will be the greatest challenge and chief test for the Alliance's stance in the new Europe.

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- i. Cf. Charles L. Glaser, "Why NATO is Still Best. Future Security Arrangements for Europe," *International Security* 18 (1993), No. 1, pp. 5-50.
 - ii. Cf. Bradley S. Klein, "How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990), pp. 311-25.
 - iii. John F. Duffield, "NATO's functions after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109 (1994/95), pp. 763-87.
 - iv. In May 1997, the countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participating countries of the Partnership for Peace agreed to establish the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), replacing NACC and broadening its scope. Whereas NACC and PfP were not connected by an overarching institutional body, the EAPC, among other things, will serve as an overarching framework for consultations concerning PfP. See Basic Document on the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (NATO press release M-NACC-EAPC-1[97]66, 30 May 1997).
 - v. Peter Schmidt, *Germany, France and NATO* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 12-3.
 - vi. See Robert P. Grant, "France's new relationship with NATO," *Survival* 38 (1996), No. 1, pp. 58-80; Anand Menon, "From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European security," *International Affairs* 71 (1995), pp. 19-34.
 - vii. For general strategic accounts on the role, the changing shape and new roles of NATO after the Cold War, see Ted G. Carpenter, ed., *The Future of NATO* (London: Cass, 1995); Walter Goldstein, ed., *Security in Europe: The Role of NATO after the Cold War* (London: Brassey's, 1994); Philip H. Gordon, ed., *NATO's Transformation. The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Robert A. Levine, ed., *Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: Crane Russak, 1992); S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, eds., *NATO in the post-Cold War Era: Does it Have a Future?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
 - viii. Among the factors leading to the Alliance gaining apparent corporate identity was the specific semantic character in which the enlargement discussion was conducted right from its inception. Typically, the political debates on the side of the proponents of an enlargement as well as on the side of its opponents did not so much center around the objective fact in question (that is, the increase in the signatory nations of the North Atlantic Treaty and a corresponding increase in membership of NATO's military and political bodies and organizational structures) as they evolved along metaphorical paths. Those "security metaphors" strongly conveyed the connotation of an autonomous NATO as a coherent security institution and self-reliant international actor: the Alliance as an 'stability anchor', as a 'projector' and naturally evolving 'community of Western values' etc. (see Paul A. Chilton *Security Metaphors. Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House* [New York: Peter Lang, 1996]). Together with the overarching "architecture metaphor" as it became the characteristic frame of the discussion about a post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic security order, this alone already caused an increase in NATO's institutional autonomy: Not longer did national-power based geostrategic considerations or calculations in terms of the national interest of its member states furnish the chief points of reference, but whole institutional "pillars", "bridges" and "cornerstones", with the Atlantic Alliance often regarded as the leading and integrating institution (ibid., pp. 357-402).
 - ix. See Philip Zelikow: "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again," *International Security* 18 (1994), No. 4, pp. 143-71.
 - x. Gianni Bonvicini et. al., eds., *A Renewed Partnership for Europe* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995/96).
 - xi. See already Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. "Contending philosophies about security in Europe," in Colin McInnes, ed., *Security and Strategy in the New Europe* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-36.
 - xii. For the latest readers, see David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Charles W. Kegley, ed., *Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995).

xiii. For a comparative sum-up of the according neorealist and neoliberal propositions, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, pp. 116-40 (pp. 133-4).

xiv. Hellmann and Wolf can fully take the credit for directing discussion about the explanatory power of neorealism as compared to neoliberal assumption out of its often too metatheoretical impetus back to a practical case, that is, NATO's future. However, in their efforts to provide the debate with some more practical grounds, they overlooked the fact that both schools of thought, as outlined above, have less to say something about the future of the Atlantic Alliance itself (or its further organizational and functional development) than about the future behavior of its member states and the likely future effects of intra-alliance cooperation on their foreign and security policies. See Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," *Security Studies* 3 (1993), pp. 3-43. These restrictions also apply to the newer theoretical account on NATO's recent development provided by Robert McCalla, "NATO's persistence after the cold war," *International Organization* 50 (1996), pp. 445-75.

xv. Sometimes it seems as if it still has neither filtered through that **not only** Waltz-inspired neorealism makes up 'the' contemporary neorealist paradigm nor that it is far from being typical of the neorealist paradigm's response to the international-political change after the Cold War. For other important neorealist trends and branches, cf. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy. Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Benjamin Frankel, ed., *Realism, Restatement and Renewal* (London: Cass, 1996). These however are beyond the progressively myopic scope of the neorealist-neoliberal debate in its current appearance.

xvi. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 118-22 and 126. For a recent reformulation of this axiom see e.g. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19 (1994/95), No. 3, pp. 5-49 (pp. 9-14).

xvii. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 91-2.

xviii. See Mearsheimer, "The False Promise," p. 13.

xix. See Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of cooperation," p. 335.

xx. See Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36 (1984), pp. 461-95; Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (1990), pp. 103-23.

xxi. **Founding works are** Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) **and** Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989).

xxii. Keohane, *International Institutions*, pp. 1-2.

xxiii. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 85.

xxiv. See *ibid.*, pp. 85 and 88-106.

xxv. Keohane, *International Institutions*, p. 8.

xxvi. Thus the sum-up of what neoliberal institutionalism has revealed so far (that is, in some ten years of theoretical endeavors) sounds somewhat poor: "Institutions sometimes matter for state policy, but we do not adequately understand in what domains they matter most, under what conditions, and how their effects are exerted. More research on this subject, by students of world politics critical of institutionalist theory as well as by those working from it, is essential and will be most welcome." See Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20 (1995), No. 1, pp. 39-51 (p. 50).

xxvii. Cf. Keohane, *International Institutions*, p. 2.

xxviii. Cf. Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes. Toward a European-American Research Programme," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp. 23-45.

xxix. Cf. Keohane, *International Institutions*, p. 15.

xxx. Cf. Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism*, pp. 269-300 (pp. 273-4).

xxxi. For a remarkable exception, see Ingo Peters, ed., *New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions. Reforming the UN, NATO, EU and CSCE since 1989* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

xxxii. See Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding change in international politics: the Soviet empire's demise and the international system," *International Organization* 48 (1994), pp. 215-47 (p. 227).

xxxiii. See Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1993) as well as the results presented in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

xxxiv. The concept of *post-strategic security* rests upon a contrasting notion to traditional, zero-sum type strategic security and security politics as it was dominating and appropriate during bipolarity with its clear bloc structures, well-defined and comparatively well-calculable actors and scenarios of crisis and threat. In contrast, the new era of post-strategic security, especially with a view to NATO and the new European condition, is characterized by **a diffusion of actors, institutions and conflict potentials. At the same time, there is an obvious ameliorative transformation of** conflict. This however is for the most part not a sign of an emerging congenial Europe because the essential dynamic of conflict has, at least for the time being, **but** sunk beneath the international level. Here it continues to exist and exert its effects. In consequence, paradoxically, the currently most probable sources even of international or regional conflict are of intra- and transnational nature (e.g. ethno-nationalism, minorities, migration or proliferation). In this regard, the texture of post-strategic security, what has luckily become to be a trivial insight in the meantime, at first results from the vanishing bipolar pattern of world politics. Therefore, the 'narrow', strategically inclined concept of security has given way to a tendency toward the often-invoked 'broad' or 'comprehensive' understanding of international security. This again results in growing competition between different European 'security institutions' (NATO, WEU, OSCE and also the emerging European Common Foreign and Security Policy, or CFSP), which in their activities as well as in their political claims more and more come to overlap than to mutually reinforce, let alone 'interlock' each other. Thus, post-Cold War European security seems chronically "underinsured", despite, or rather because of, its institutional multiplicity. See James B. Steinberg, *Overlapping Institutions, Underinsured Security: The Evolution of the Post-Cold War Security Order* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).

xxxv. Major works include Barry Buzan et. al., *The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990); Barry Buzan et. al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tømer, eds., *European Polyphony: Perspectives beyond East-West Confrontation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). For a review, see Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Studies* 22 (1996), pp. 81-93.

xxxvi. These are Buzan, Jones and Little, *Logic of Anarchy*.

xxxvii. See Buzan et. al., *Identity*, p. 189; Ole Wæver, "Securization and Desecurization," in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) pp. 46-86 (pp. 57-75).

xxxviii. Hellmann and Wolf, "Future of NATO," p. 4.

xxxix. The founding work is often regarded to be Nicholas G. Onuf, *The World of Our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). Important contributions include Hayward Alker, *Rediscoveries and Reformulations. Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate," in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian, eds., *The Study of International Relations. The State of the Art* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 60-86; Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding change"; Richard Ned Lebow, "The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism," *International Organization* 48 (1994), pp. 249-77; Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society. A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994); Jan Aart Scholte, *International Relations of Social Change* (Buckingham, PA: Open University Press, 1993); Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20 (1995), pp. 71-81; Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73.

xl. Typical Works include Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon, eds., *International Security in the Modern World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Neta C. Crawford, "Once and Future Security Studies," *Security Studies* 1 (1991), pp. 283-316; Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security. Challenges for a New Century* (2. Ed., New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994); Bradley S. Klein, "After Strategy: The Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace," *Alternatives* 13 (1988), pp. 293-318; Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also the overview presented by Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the agenda of security studies: Politics and methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* 40 (1996), pp. 229-54.

xli. Cf. for example Wendt, "Constructing International Politics"; Wendt and Duvall, "Institutions and International Order".

xlii. Cf. the contributions in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1996).

xliii. Cf. McCalla, "NATO's persistence," pp. 456-61.

xliv. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares. Problems and Progress of International Organization* (4. Ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984) p. 267.

xlv. Contributions include James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1989); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions* (Oslo: The Research Council of Norway, 1994); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991) as well as Gunnar Grendstad and Per Selle, "Cultural theory and the new institutionalism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 7 (1995), pp. 5-27; John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: an institutional approach to American foreign economic policy," *International Organization* 42 (1988), pp. 219-43; Thomas A. Koelble, "The new institutionalism in political science and sociology," *Comparative Politics* 27 (1995), pp. 231-43. Especially concerning international relations see James A. Caporaso, "International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations," *International Organization* 46 (1992), pp. 599-632; John G. Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters. The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

xlvi. In the sense of Richard Little, "International Relations and the Methodological Turn," *Political Studies* 39 (1991), pp. 463-78.

xlvii. On this multiple context-dependency, see Koelble, "The new institutionalism," pp. 234-5; March and Olsen, *Institutional Perspectives*, p. 16.

xlviii. Cf. Caporaso, "International relations theory and multilateralism," p. 620-30; Ikenberry, "Conclusion," pp. 223-6.

xlix. See especially Caporaso, "International relations theory and multilateralism," pp. 627-8.

i. See Wendt, "Constructing international politics"; Koslowski and Kratochwil, "Understanding change," p. 247.

ii. Koelble, "The new institutionalism," p. 235.

iii. March and Olsen, *Institutional Perspectives*, p. 14.

iiii. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 108.

lv. For another argument against the grand-design approach, see Paul Cornish, "European security: the end of architecture and the new NATO," *International Affairs* (London) 72 (1996), pp. 751-69.

lv. March and Olsen, *Institutional Perspectives*, p. 16-7.

lvi. The following section draws from Helga Haftendorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (1991), pp. 3-17, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zürn, "Transformation der Konflikte in den Ost-West-Beziehungen. Versuch einer institutionalistischen Bestandsaufnahme," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 32 (1991), pp. 399-424 and my *Neorealismus, Neoliberalismus und postinternationale Politik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), pp. 217-23.

lvii. Where (classical) realism and its multi-faceted descendant, neorealism, make comparable statements, which are thus typical of general realist thought in international relations, this study will employ the label '(neo)realist' to cover both.

lviii. For a general, introductory account of those and other theoretical schools mentioned here and henceforth, see Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, *Theories of International Relations* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996).

lix. A neo-classic here is of course Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. See also, as one example of many newer treatments of relevance for the following, the discussion in Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace? Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 18 and 46-50.

lx. As discussed above, see ch. 2.1.

lxi. Exemplary texts are compiled in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

lxii. See Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 11.

lxiii. Mayor works include Richard A. Falk, Robert C. Johansen and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *The Constitutional Foundations of World Peace* (Albany, NJ: State University of New York Press, 1993); Kjell Goldmann, *The Logic of Internationalism. Coercion and Accommodation* (London: Routledge, 1994); Lynn H. Miller, *Global Order. Values and Power in International Politics* (3. Ed., Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).

lxiv. See Robert C. Johansen, "Toward a New Code of International Conduct: War, Peacekeeping, and Global Constitutionalism," in Falk, Johansen and Kim, eds., *Constitutional Foundations*, pp. 39-54 (p. 39).

lxv. The brand of critical theory referred to here as neo-Marxian has to be distinguished from the somewhat more popular and more analytically that 'deconstructivist,' oriented paradigm of critical social theory as mentioned above. Major works include James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds., *International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings in World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); Michael J. Shapiro, *Reading the Postmodern Polity. Political Theory as Textual Practice* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). Typical critical-deconstructivist statements include

lxvi. Klein, "How the West was One"; Timothy W. Luke, "Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order," *Alternatives* 18 (1993), pp. 229-58 and Richard W. Mansbach, "The World Turned Upside Down," *Journal of East-Asian Affairs* 7 (1993), pp. 451-97.

lxvii. Richard W. Mansbach, "The World Turned Upside Down," p. 483.

lxviii. For the following figures, see *SIPRI Yearbook 1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 81-130; "Wars and Armed Conflict in 1993", graphics made up at the University of Leiden using data from the PIOUS database^{Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94," *Journal of Peace Research*, 32 (1995), pp.}

345-60. Figures slightly differ where indicated.

lxix. James E. Goodby, "Collective Security in Europe after the Cold War," *Journal of International Affairs* 46 (1993), pp. 299-321 (pp. 175-6); Kim R. Holmes, "New World Disorder: A Critique of the United Nations," *Journal of International Affairs* 46 (1993), pp. 323-40 (p. 324); Siedschlag, *Neorealism*, pp. 231-2.

lxv. These distinctive features of general realist thought and methodology have, however, become somewhat blurred by the Waltzian enterprise to make realism a rigorous science, like for example economics, thus following the model of deductive reasoning and giving a number of well-defined, fixed principles and cause-effect-assumptions prevalence over historical-hermeneutic and inductive cognitive styles.

lxx. See Robert J. Lieber, "Existential Realism After the Cold War," *Washington Quarterly* 16 (1993), No. 1, pp. 155-68.

lxxi. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 155; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant. The Myth of Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19 (1994), No. 2, pp. 5-49 (p. 11).

lxxii. Lieber, "Existential Realism," pp. 156-6.

lxxiii. See Barry R. Posen, "Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 103-24 (pp. 103-5).

lxxiv. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

lxxv. Alexander Siedschlag, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Management in Areas of ethno-national Tension," in Jörg Calließ and Christine M. Merkel, eds., *Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts as a Joint Task for International Organizations, Governments and Civil Society*. Vol. 1 (Rehburg-Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 1995), pp. 35-56.

lxxvi. Rosemary Righter, *Utopia Lost. The United Nations and World Order* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), p. 376.

lxxvii. See Speech by the Secretary General of NATO Mr Manfred Wörner at the annual General Assembly of the International Press Institute. NATO Press Office, 10 May 1993; The 40th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, the Hague, the Netherlands. Address by Willy Claes, Secretary General of NATO, 28 October 1994.

lxxviii. Cited in Patricia Chilton et. al., *NATO, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations* (London: British American Security Information Council, 1994)^{p. 45}.

lxxix. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 46.

lxxx. *Ibid.*

lxxxi. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. Washington, D.C., 4 May 1994^{pp. 3 and 9}.

lxxxii. John Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," *Survival* 36 (1994), No. 3, pp. 149-73, p. 152.

- lxxxiii Sherard Cowper-Coles, "From Defence to Security: British Policy in Transition," *Survival* 36 (1994), No. 1, pp. 142-61.
- lxxxiv Bernard Bressy, "Trois livres blancs européens sur la défense," *Défense nationale* 50 (1994), No. 11, pp. 75-87 (p. 78).
- lxxxv. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 265.
- lxxxvi See John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (1990), No. 1, pp. 5-56.
- lxxxvii Michael Brenner, "The Multilateral Moment," in Michael Brenner, ed. *Multilateralism and Western Strategy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 1-41 (p. 8); Duffield, "NATO's Functions," p. 777; David G. Haglund, "Must NATO fail? Theories, myths, and policy dilemmas," *International Journal* 50 (1995), pp. 651-74 (p. 662).
- lxxxviii Haglund, "Must NATO fail?," pp. 663-4 and 673-4; Steve Weber, "Does NATO have a future?" in Beverly Crawford, ed., *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 360-95 (p. 362-68).
- lxxxix Weber, "Does NATO have a future?," pp. 363-4; but cf. equivalent long-standing assumptions held by neorealist alliance theory as promoted by Snyder, "The Security Dilemma," pp. 485 and 494-5 and Snyder, "Alliance Theory," p. 196.
- xc. Following Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p. 63; Keohane, *International Institutions*, pp. 8 and 11.
- xc. Cf. William Wallace, "European-Atlantic Security Institutions: Current State and Future Prospects," *International Spectator* 29 (1994), No. 3, pp. 37-51 (p. 45).
- xcii. Cf. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-45 (p. 336). This adaptive pressure firstly resulted from the 'trivial' necessity for military re-orientation after the strategic enemy's disappearance and growing national interests in reduced defense expenditures, secondly of course from the emerging much-invoked 'new security tasks' (cf. for example the out-of-area debate) and finally from the fact that NATO, because of the political-military double function it has possessed from its foundation, had sneaked into a sort of "self-proclaimed collective security organization, together with the according political principles and behavioral norms. See Simon Duke, *The New European Security Disorder* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 311. This last-named implicit dimension alone would have given enough reason for a sincere self-revision of the Alliance along with the beginning decomposition of world politics' traditional bipolar texture, as has been pointed out by Wallace, "European-Atlantic Security Institutions," pp. 45-6, with the underlying aim being precisely to keep NATO's international-political "position" in the Waltzian sense.
- xciii London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5th-6th July 1990, para. 1.
- xciv. Ibid., para. 2.
- xcv. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept. Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991, para. 20 and 43.
- xcvi. Steinberg, *Overlapping Institutions*, p. 6.
- xcvii. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, para. 9.
- xcviii. This follows for example from the general assumptions about inter-state cooperative behavior made in Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 89-109.
- xcix. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
- c. See Keohane, "Institutional Theory," p. 287.
- ci. The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, para. 15-6.
- cii. Alexander Moens, "The Formative Years of the New NATO: Diplomacy from London to Rome," in Alexander Moens and Christopher Anstis, eds., *Disconcerted Europe. The Search for a New Security Architecture* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), pp. 24-47.
- ciii. This national dimension is treated in further detail in ch. 5.
- civ. This concept has been developed by what could be called the German school of policy network analysis, see for example Fritz W. Scharpf, "Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 32 (1991), pp. 621-34 (p. 630).
- cv. Ibid.
- cvi. Ibid.
- cvi. See Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and the European Economic and Monetary Union," in Benjamin Frankel, ed. *Realism*, pp. 261-301 (pp. 287-8).
- cviii. Ibid., p. 287.
- cix. Ibid., p. 288.
- cx. The argument follows my *Die aktive Beteiligung Deutschlands and militärischen Aktionen zur Verwirklichung Kollektiver Sicherheit* (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 158-9. See also Finn Laursen, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Words or Deeds?" in Ingo Peters, ed., *New Security Challenges*, pp. 153-77.
- cx. On this concept, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction. Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, pp. 3-42 (pp. 31-2).
- cxii. On these points, see Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 4 (1987), No. 3, pp. 335-70 (p. 364).
- cxiii. Speech by the Secretary General of NATO Mr Manfred Wörner, p. 3.
- cxiv. Ibid., p. 7.
- cxv. Ibid., p. 7.
- cxvi. William Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, *Preparing for the NATO Summit: What are the Pivotal Issues?* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993)

- cxvii. See Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994 (NATO press release M-1[94]3, 11 January 1994), para. 1 and appendix.
- cxviii Ibid., para. 7-9.
- cxix. Schmidt, *Germany, France and NATO*, p. 14.
- cxx. Ibid.
- cxxi. Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991 (NATO press release S-1[91]86, November 8, 1991), para. 3.
- cxixii. Ibid., para. 6.
- cxixiii. See Andrew M. Dorman and Adrian Treacher, *European Security. An Introduction to Security Issues in Post-Cold War Europe* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 43-73.
- cxixiv. On the following, see Hugh De Santis, "Romancing NATO: Partnership for Peace and East European Stability," in Carpenter, ed., *Future of NATO*, pp. 61-81 (p. 63).
- cxixv. NATO press release M-DPC/NPG-2(95)117, para. 24.
- cxixvi. See Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 3 June 1996. Final Communiqué (NATO press release M-NAC-1[96]63, June 1996), para. 5-6.
- cxixvii. See Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, para. 6.
- cxixviii. "After the NATO Summit: New structures and modalities for military cooperation," explanatory memorandum by Rafael Estrella for the North Atlantic Assembly, NAA, AL 205/DSC (94), 8 November 1994, pp. 16-7.
- cxixix. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, Portugal. Final Communiqué, 29 May 1997 (NATO press release M-NAC-1[97]65).
- cxixxx. Hellmann and Wolf, "Future of NATO".
- cxixxxi. See Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, para. 12.
- cxixxxii. In the terminology of Waltz, "Reflections," p. 336.
- cxixxxiii. See Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 92.
- cxixxxiv. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 126.
- cxixxxv. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," in: *International Security* 18 (1993), No. 2, pp. 44-79 (p. 76); Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," p. 52.
- cxixxxvi. Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations. Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* 44 (1992), pp. 466-96 (pp. 473-4).
- cxixxxvii. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes," pp. 39-40.
- cxixxxviii. "The Western European Union in the 1990s: Searching for a Role" Strategic Outreach Conference Report, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA 1993, p. 1.
- cxixxxix. Keohane, *International Institutions*, pp. 8-9 for instance expects a general conflict-ameliorating effect of a world-political condition of "complex interdependence" and a related reciprocity in international relations, oriented along growing common "conventions". This optimism however is not only typical of the Keohane branch of neoliberalism but moreover for the neoliberal paradigm in general. See related assumptions made by J. Martin Rochester, "The United Nations in a New World Order: Reviving the Theory and Practice of International Organization," in Kegley, ed. *Controversies*, pp. 199-221 and Mark W. Zacher, "Toward a Theory of International Regimes," *Journal of International Affairs* 44 (1990), pp. 139-57.
- cxli. Ted Hopf, "Managing the Post-Soviet Security Space: A Continuing Demand for Behavioral Regimes," *Security Studies* 4 (1994/95), pp. 242-80.
- cxlii. Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, para. 3-4.
- cxliiii. See, respectively, Kegley and Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace?*; Falk, Johansen and Kim, eds., *Constitutional Foundations*; Klein, "After strategy".
- cxliiii. For a history of U.S. foreign and security policy since 1945, see Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power. Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton* (2. Ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).
- cxliv. On the traditional tension between real- and idealpolitik in U.S. foreign policy, see Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1946), esp. pp. 5-10.
- cxlv. See *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994).
- cxlvi. Article 4 reads: "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."
- cxlvii. For this concept see Chilton, *Security Metaphors*.
- cxlviii. Ted G. Carpenter, *Beyond NATO. Staying out of Europe's Wars* (Washington, DC.: CATO Institute, 1994), p. 4.
- cxlix. *A National Security Strategy*, pp. 21-7.
- cli. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, p. 1.
- cli. *Ibid.*, pp. 1 and 3.
- clii. *A National Security Strategy*, p. 13.
- cliii. *Ibid.*
- cliv. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- clv. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations⁹.
- clvi. Cowper-Coles, "From defence to security" pp. 152-3.
- clvii. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
- clviii. See *ibid.* and Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds., *British Defence Choices for the Twenty-first Century* (London: Brassey's, 1993).
- clix. Cowper-Coles, "From defence to security," p. 147.
- clx. *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1995. Stable Forces in a Strong Britain* (London: HMSO, 1995).
- clxi. *Ibid.*, para. 302-29.

- clxii Ibid., para. 331-4.
- clxiii Ibid., para. 335-64 (quotation in para. 336).
- clxiv. David Greenwood, "United Kingdom," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations* (3. Ed., Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 278-304 (p. 281).
- clxv. Bressy, "Trois livres blancs", p.84.
- clxvi. Robbin F. Laird, "The West Europeans and peace-keeping," in James Cooney et. al., eds., *Deutsch-Amerikanische Beziehungen, Jahrbuch 2* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1994), pp. 107-27 (p. 109).
- clxvii Greenwood, "United Kingdom," pp. 280-1.
- clxviii Mackinlay, "Multifunctional Forces," p. 155.
- clxix Ibid., p. 156.
- clxx. Ibid., pp. 118-9.
- clxxi. For a comprehensive history of French foreign affairs with a special focus on military and defence policy, see Jean Doise and Maurice Vaisse, *Politique étrangère de la France. Diplomatie et outil militaire 1871-1991* (Paris: Seuil, 1992).
- clxxii Cf. Uwe Nerlich, "Neue Sicherheitsfunktionen der NATO," in *Europa-Archiv* 48 (1993), pp. 663-72 (pp. 664-5).
- clxxiii William Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, *French Policy toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, vice Rapprochement* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p.⁹.
- clxxiv. David S. Yost, "France and the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Political-military lessons learned," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 16 (1993), pp. 339-74.
- clxxv. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 354.
- clxxvi. See Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, esp. para. 7-8.
- clxxvii. See also the assessment in Johnsen and Young, *French Policy*.
- clxxviii On this still virulent fear of 'the Germans' see Bruce N. Goldberger, "Why Europe should not fear the Germans," *German Politics* 2 (1993), pp. 288-310.
- clxxix. See Robert G. Livingston, "United Germany: bigger and better," *Foreign Policy*, no. 85 (1992), pp. 157-74.
- clxxx. See Uwe Nerlich, "Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik und Konflikte außerhalb des NATO-Gebiets," *Europa-Archiv* 46 (1991), pp. 303-10.
- clxxxi. See Jeffrey T. Bergner, "Unified Germany: a great power with many options," in Gary L. Geipel, ed., *Germany in a New Era* (Indianapolis, ID: Hudson Institute, 1993), pp. 183-98.
- clxxxii. See Ronald D. Asmus, "The future of German strategic thinking," in Geipel *Germany in a new era*, pp. 137-81 (pp. 169-76).
- clxxxiii. See Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The implications of German unification for Western Europe," in Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992), pp. 251-78 (pp. 259-60).
- clxxxiv. See Thomas Kielinger and Max Otte, "Germany: the pressured power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 91 (1993), pp. 44-62.
- clxxxv. See Clay Clemens, "Opportunity or obligation? Redefining Germany's military role outside of NATO," *Armed Forces and Society* 19 (1993), pp. 231-51.
- clxxxvi. *Weißbuch 1994. Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 1994), para. 317.
- clxxxvii Cf. Anpassung der Streitkräftestrukturen, der Territorialen Wehrverwaltung und der Stationierung. Bonn, Ministry of Defense, October 1995; "Die Bundeswehr de Zukunft. Bundeswehrplan 94 vom 15. Dezember 1992," *EXTRA. Brief zur Truppeninformation*, No. 2/1992, p. 3.
- clxxxviii "Die Bundeswehr der Zukunft," p. 3.
- clxxxix Julian Lider, *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought*. Vol. 2: 1966-1988 (Aldershot: Gower, 1988), pp. 541-2 and 544.
- cxc. Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *West German Policy 1949-1963. International Pressure and Domestic Response* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967).
- cxci. Wolfgang F. Schlör, *German Security Policy. An Examination of the Trends in German Security Policy in a New European and Global Context* (London: IISS, 1993), p. 6.
- cxcii. In part, see Julian Lider, *Origins and Development of West German Military Thought*. Vol. 1: 1949-1966 (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), pp. 255-96 and 319-41.
- cxci. Klaus Naumann, *Die Bundeswehr in einer Welt im Umbruch* (Berlin: Siedler, 1994), p. 84.
- cxci. For a recent account on this problematic, a legacy from the Bundeswehr's tradition as an Alliance army of only minimal national operational command and control capabilities to minimize international fears of a reviving German militarism and to reflect its exclusive role as a territorial 'blocking' force against a large ground attack, see Thomas-Durell Young, "German national command structures after unification: A new German general staff?" *Armed Forces and Society* 22 (1996), pp. 379-417.
- cxci. Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification* (London: Pinter, 1994), pp. 80-3; Stephen F. Szabo, *The Changing Politics of German Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 125-34.
- cxci. Timothy G. Ash, "Germany's choice," *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994), No. 4, pp. 65-81 (p. 79).
- cxci. Cf. the assessment made by George Stein, "The Euro-Corps and Future European Security Architecture," *European Security* 2 (1993), pp. 200-26 (p. 223).
- cxci. Young, "German national command structures," p. 396.
- cxci. For corresponding attempts to localize the U.S. in the new world-political setting and to derive corresponding security policy recommendations, see for example John Lewis Gaddis, "Towards the post-cold war world," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1991), pp. 102-116; William G. Hyland, "America's new course," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (1990), pp. 1-2; Charles William Maynes, "America without cold war," *Foreign Policy*, No. 78 (1990), pp. 3-25.

^{cc}. As suggested by David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), pp. 1-12 and 18.

^{cci}. Ibid.

^{ccii}. Cited in: "Towards a Security Strategy for Europe and NATO," draft General Report by Mr. Jan Petersen, North Atlantic Assembly, Political Committee, October 1995 (AM 293/PC [95] 10), Introduction.

^{cciii}. Haglund, "Must NATO fail?", p. 15-6.

^{cciv}. "Towards a Security Strategy for Europe and NATO," para. 2.

^{ccv}. "Study on NATO Enlargement," Brussels, September 1995.

^{ccvi}. See Snyder, "The Security Dilemma" and Snyder, "Alliance Theory".

^{ccvii}. "Towards a Security Strategy for Europe and NATO," para. 9.

^{ccviii}. This is among the findings presented in David Last and David B. Carment, "Conflict prevention and internal conflict," summary of a workshop held at Carleton University, Ontario, 8 March 1995.

^{ccix}. "Towards a Security Strategy for Europe and NATO," para. 21.

^{ccx}. See Brenner, "The Multilateral Moment"; Kegley and Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace*; Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters*.

^{ccxi}. See Peter Schmidt, "The Evolution of European Security Structures: Master Plan or Trial and Error?" in David G. Haglund, ed., *From Euphoria to Hysteria. Western European Security After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), pp. 145-66.

^{ccxii}. Alexis Seydoux and Jérôme Paolini. "From Interlocking to Institutional Evolutionism," in European Strategy Group, ed., *Challenges and Responses to Future European Security: British, French and German Perspectives*. N.p., 1993, pp. 171-202 (p. 199).

^{ccxiii}. A first step has been done with the development of ^{MC 327}, see ch. 3.3

^{ccxiv}. See Paul Bracken and Stuart E. Johnson, "Beyond NATO: Complementary militaries," *Orbis* 37 (1993), pp. 205-21.

^{ccxv}. Mackinlay, "Multifunctional Forces," p. 167.

^{ccxvi}. Article 2 is of special importance here. It reads: "The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

^{ccxvii}. Cf. Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).