Abstract
This article describes the political denial that is implemented by terrorists and supporters of terrorists after an adversary counterterrorist operation and that is intended to impede future operations. Sudanese-sponsored and supported terrorism and United States Government counterterrorist operations are used as an example. The analysis is predicated on the assumption that there is incontrovertible intelligence data supporting the belief that Shifa Pharamceutical Industries in Sudan was engaged in the development and/or transshipment of the chemical warfare agent VX--an assumption based on the alleged detection of a VX precursor that allegedly has no legitimate business or industrial use. (IBPP Note: As of this writing, there are at least three alternative hypotheses: (1) The precursor was accurately detected but can have other innocuous uses. (2) The precursor was inaccurately detected for an agricultural insecticide with similar chemical structure. (3) The precursor was accurately detected but was a byproduct of the breakdown of other pesticides.)
Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP
(1998)
"Political Denial as a Counterintelligence Vehicle to Counter Counterterrorist Operations: The Sudan,"
International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 5
:
Iss.
9
, Article 2.
Available at:
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol5/iss9/2
