Is this project an undergraduate, graduate, or faculty project?
Undergraduate
Project Type
group
Campus
Daytona Beach
Authors' Class Standing
Brianna Johnson, Senior Samantha Harper Tyler Thompson
Lead Presenter's Name
Brianna Johnson
Lead Presenter's College
DB College of Arts and Sciences
Faculty Mentor Name
Alice Dell'Era
Abstract
The deployment of nuclear weapons in space poses an arms challenge that is both critically important and inherently ambiguous. Although Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) explicitly prohibits placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit (UNOOSA, 1966), recent developments suggest that this prohibition is not absolute. In 2024, the U.S. and Japan brought concerns regarding WMD in space to the UN Security Council, calling on states to work to prevent an arms race in space and agree not to place nuclear weapons and WMD in orbit (United Nations Security Council, 2024). However, this resolution failed due to a Russian veto, casting suspicions on potential developments. This issue is further complicated by emerging technologies that challenge the longevity of existing treaty language. China’s reported development of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) paired with hypersonic glide vehicle technology demonstrates how capabilities can be designed to avoid permanent orbit while still achieving global strike potential (Abbas, 2024; Fraioli, 2022). Such systems raise concerns not only about strategic stability, but also about the ambiguity of legal definitions in the OST and how they may be interpreted. This policy brief asks: What threat does the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space pose, and how can the United States and Japan cooperate to build technical resiliency in space against a nuclear threat? In this brief, we propose the creation of technical standards increase resiliency in the event of nuclear detonation in space. This removes the first-strike advantage of a nuclear attack on critical satellite infrastructure by creating engineering standards on satellites operated by the US and Japan for defense purposes, such as missile-warning satellites. These satellites are an essential part of security infrastructure, and ensuring resiliency would allow for these satellites to continue to function in the event of an EMP attack via nuclear detonation.
Did this research project receive funding support (Spark, SURF, Research Abroad, Student Internal Grants, Collaborative, Climbing, or Ignite Grants) from the Office of Undergraduate Research?
No
Included in
International Relations Commons, Navigation, Guidance, Control and Dynamics Commons, Space Vehicles Commons, Structures and Materials Commons
Policy Brief: Satellite Resiliency Against Nuclear Detonation in Space
The deployment of nuclear weapons in space poses an arms challenge that is both critically important and inherently ambiguous. Although Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) explicitly prohibits placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit (UNOOSA, 1966), recent developments suggest that this prohibition is not absolute. In 2024, the U.S. and Japan brought concerns regarding WMD in space to the UN Security Council, calling on states to work to prevent an arms race in space and agree not to place nuclear weapons and WMD in orbit (United Nations Security Council, 2024). However, this resolution failed due to a Russian veto, casting suspicions on potential developments. This issue is further complicated by emerging technologies that challenge the longevity of existing treaty language. China’s reported development of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) paired with hypersonic glide vehicle technology demonstrates how capabilities can be designed to avoid permanent orbit while still achieving global strike potential (Abbas, 2024; Fraioli, 2022). Such systems raise concerns not only about strategic stability, but also about the ambiguity of legal definitions in the OST and how they may be interpreted. This policy brief asks: What threat does the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space pose, and how can the United States and Japan cooperate to build technical resiliency in space against a nuclear threat? In this brief, we propose the creation of technical standards increase resiliency in the event of nuclear detonation in space. This removes the first-strike advantage of a nuclear attack on critical satellite infrastructure by creating engineering standards on satellites operated by the US and Japan for defense purposes, such as missile-warning satellites. These satellites are an essential part of security infrastructure, and ensuring resiliency would allow for these satellites to continue to function in the event of an EMP attack via nuclear detonation.