group
What campus are you from?
Daytona Beach
Authors' Class Standing
Justin Villa, Senior Vienna Li, Junior
Lead Presenter's Name
Justin Villa
Faculty Mentor Name
Laxima Niure Kandel
Abstract
GPS spoofing poses a growing threat to aviation by falsifying satellite signals and misleading aircraft navigation systems. This paper demonstrates a proof-of-concept spoofing detection strategy based on analyzing satellite Carrier-to-Noise Density Ratio (C/N$_0$) variation during controlled static antenna orientations. Using a u-blox EVK-M8U receiver and a GPSG-1000 satellite simulator, C/N$_0$ data is collected under three antenna orientations flat, banked right, and banked left) in both real-sky (non-spoofed) and spoofed environments. Our findings reveal that under non-spoofed signals, C/N$_0$ values fluctuate naturally with orientation, reflecting true geometric dependencies. However, spoofed signals demonstrate a distinct pattern: the flat orientation, which directly faces the spoofing antenna, consistently yielded the highest C/N$_0$ values, while both banked orientations showed reduced C/N$_0$ due to misalignment with the spoofing source. These findings suggest that simple maneuvers such as brief banking to induce C/N$_0$ variations can provide early cues of GPS spoofing for general aviation and UAV systems.
Did this research project receive funding support from the Office of Undergraduate Research.
No
C/N0 Analysis-Based GPS Spoofing Detection with Variable Antenna Orientations
GPS spoofing poses a growing threat to aviation by falsifying satellite signals and misleading aircraft navigation systems. This paper demonstrates a proof-of-concept spoofing detection strategy based on analyzing satellite Carrier-to-Noise Density Ratio (C/N$_0$) variation during controlled static antenna orientations. Using a u-blox EVK-M8U receiver and a GPSG-1000 satellite simulator, C/N$_0$ data is collected under three antenna orientations flat, banked right, and banked left) in both real-sky (non-spoofed) and spoofed environments. Our findings reveal that under non-spoofed signals, C/N$_0$ values fluctuate naturally with orientation, reflecting true geometric dependencies. However, spoofed signals demonstrate a distinct pattern: the flat orientation, which directly faces the spoofing antenna, consistently yielded the highest C/N$_0$ values, while both banked orientations showed reduced C/N$_0$ due to misalignment with the spoofing source. These findings suggest that simple maneuvers such as brief banking to induce C/N$_0$ variations can provide early cues of GPS spoofing for general aviation and UAV systems.